Abstract
In the previous three parts of our investigation into the problem of inter subjectivity, an attempt has been made to lay out Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz’s theory of intersubjectivity, and to draw out some of the limitations of each. Our analyses of these theories were held, for the most part, somewhat separate from one another in order to clearly present and criticize the relevant author’s theory of intersubjectivity which was usually quite implicit in his own work and quite complex in itself. In general, the intention was not to make an already very difficult subject matter even more difficult by entering into comparisons at such an early stage of our analyses. In the present chapter, it is precisely such comparisons which will be provided. However, the main goal of this chapter is not merely to provide comparisons, although those which are presented are hoped to be quite illuminating.
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Notes
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). This translation is based primarily upon Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, Husserliana, Vol. 1, ed. S. Strasser (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950). We shall follow our practice of providing references first to the English translation followed by quotations and references to the original German text.
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 92–99, S. 124–130.
See “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl”, CP 3, pp. 51–84.
See, for example, p. 32 above and “The Objective Reality of Perspectives”, SW, p. 306.
See, for example, pp. 61–63 above.
See Chapter 5, n. 2 above and Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 97–102, S. 137–143.
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel p. 391 (May 1, 1956 S: G).
With respect to all of these points, see ibid., pp. 40–45 (August 19, 1939 S: G).
“Phenomenology and the Social Sciences”, CP 1, pp. 118–139. In this work, Schutz already questions Husserl’s transcendental treatment of the problem of intersubjectivity and indicates the need for a critique of it. See p. 124, n. 5 therein.
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 69 (Nov. 16, 1940 S: G).
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 401 (March 22, 1957 S: G). “Bathos = depths (from Kant’s Prolegomena A 204; according to Bernhard Waldenfels)” (ibid., p. 401, editor’s n.2).
Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2. Vols., 2d rev. ed. (Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1913–1921).
Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserliana, Vol. 12, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
See Husserl, Log. Unt., Vol. 2, pp. 345–363, especially, Addendum, p. 363.
See, for example: “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control”, SW, pp. 278–289; “The Objective Reality of Perspectives”, SWpp. 306–319; Aron Gurwitsch, “An Apparent Paradox in Leibnizianism”, Social Research, 33 (1963), 47–64; Aron Gurwitsch, “Zwei Begriffe von Kontingenz bei Leibniz”, in Weltaspekte der Philosophie, eds. Walter Beierwaltes and Wiebke Schrader (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1972), pp. 107–118; and Gurwitsch, Leibniz.
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 100–103, S. 131–133. 18. Ibid., pp. 103–106 and p. 110, S. 134–136 and 140.
Cf. Kersten’s quite interesting and different position on this point. Fred Kersten, “Privatgesichter”, Sozialität und Intersubjektivität pp. 121–133.
See above, especially, pp. 13–20 and 34–35. 21.See above, especially, pp.46, 48–50 and 54–55.
See above, especially, pp. 86–87 and p. 105.
However, in this latter regard, see Schutz’s enlightening critique of Sartre and Sartre’s own criticisms of various authors. “Sartre’s Theory of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, pp. 180–203.
See “Seneler’s Theory of Inter subjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, pp. 177–179 and “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences”, CP 1, p. 147. Also see Schutz’s interesting further insight that it is illic which is originally given and not hic, or at least hic is not originally given in the same way as illic. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 192–193 (July 27, 1950 G: S).
See, for example, Schutz, Relevance, pp. 125–126, 148–149, p. 135, and pp. 130–131, and Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 363–364 (Oct. 13, 1954 S: G).
See, for example: “Gelb-Goldstein’s Concept of ‘Concrete’ and ‘Categorial’ Attitude and the Phenomenology of Ideation” (1949), SPP, pp. 359–384; “On the Conceptual Consciousness” (1959), SPP, pp. 390–396; and “Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Consciousness” (1950), CP 1, pp. 260–286.
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 108–120, S. 138–149. 28. Ibid., pp. 120–128, S. 149–156.
Ibid., pp. 128–136, S. 156–163. In regard to the last point concerning the easy derivation of these communities, see p. 129, S. 157.
See René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 Vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–1985). Also see Gurwitsch, Human Encounters and, then, compare Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
“The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl”, CP 5, p. 66.
See pp. 39–40 and 40–41 above.
See pp. 63–70 and 49–50 above.
See Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, especially, pp. 346–456. Also see Ferdinand Alquié, “Une philosophie de l’ambiguïté: l’existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty”, Fontaine, 11, No. 59 (April 1947), 47–70 and A. De Waelhens, Une philosophie de l’ambiguïté (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1951).
See pp. 33–34 above.
It is of interest to note that this question concerning the predominance of taken for granted and accomplished intersubjectivity has recently drifted down and become the major stumbling block for modern empirical social research. In fact, it actually provides the fundamental framework for understanding the differences between contemporary empirical interpretive sociologists whose perspectives were, of course, in various ways, derived from the foundational work of our authors. Briefly, Harold Garfinkel tends to view intersubjective relations as essentially taken for granted situated reflexive practices, thereby requiring disruptive methodological procedures to describe them, while, at the other end of the spectrum, Erving Goffman tends to view intersubjective relations as primarily intentional accomplished performances, thereby requiring only a skilled participant observer to describe them. Others, such as Aron Cicourel, fall somewhere in between relying upon such documentary devices as tape recorders and video machines for their descriptions (see, for example: Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967);
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959);
and Aron V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement (New York: The Free Press, 1964)
and Aron V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Education, 1973)).
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Vaitkus, S. (1991). A General Program for any Future Analysis of the Problem of Intersubjectivity. In: How is Society Possible?. Phaenomenologica, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2077-4_9
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