Abstract
In The Structures of the Life-World, Thomas Luckmann carries out a careful systematization and explication of Schutz’s thought based upon notes for a proposed book left behind by Schutz.1 Moreover, he develops a brilliant extension of Schutz’s work in Chapter 4 entitled “Knowledge and Society”.* Although Luckmann is not explicitly concerned with the problem of inter subjectivity, his analyses do have a bearing upon this topic. In the following, we shall first examine this extension of Schutz’s work by Luckmann which will simply be referred to as ‘the Luckmann position’. The concern will not be with whether Schutz really intended to say what Luckmann puts forth or whether Schutz would agree with it. Rather, the concern will be with whether the Luckmann position makes sense in itself, especially with respect to the question of intersub-jectivity. This critical analysis will not only provide us with an evaluation of the contribution made by Luckmann to Schutz’s work in the Structures, but, more importantly, it will provide us with a starting point for taking up, in a critical manner, one of Schutz’s essential theses regarding intersubjectivity; a thesis from which Luckmann develops his own position. Schutz’s conception of the practical attitude, intimacy, the Person, and the social group will then be considered.
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Notes
With respect to questions concerning the written material left behind by Schutz for this book, and Luckmann’s editing and contributing to it, see Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. xi-xx, S. 11–20.
See, for example: ibid., pp. xvi-xvii, 229–241, 247–248, 261–304, and, especially, p. 291 and p. 291, n. 19, S. 16, 229–240, 248–249, 262–301, and, especially, S. 289 and S. 326, Anm. 15.
Ibid., p. 264 and 265, S. 264.
Ibid., pp. 286–291, S. 285–289.
Ibid., p. 291, S.289.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 291–299, S. 289–296.
Ibid., pp. 308–312 and 317–318, S. 305–308 and 313–314.
Ibid., p. 312, S. 308.
Ibid., pp. 312–318, S. 309–314.
Ibid., pp. 312–313 and 317–318, S. 309–310 and 313–314.
Ibid., p. 327, S. 322. In general, with respect to this issue, see ibid., pp. 326–331, S. 321–326.
Ibid., pp. 327–328, S. 323.
Ibid., pp. 250–251, S. 251.
For this and the following example, see ibid., p. 314, S. 310.
Ibid., pp. 308–315, S. 305–311. Also see, for example, p. 307 and pp. 289–295, S. 304 and 287–293.
See ibid., pp. 243–261, S. 245–261. Although Luckmann only very occasionally uses the word ‘internalization’ in these analyses, it is clear from his characterization of the socially conditioned aspects of the subjective stock of knowledge that it is essentially what he has in mind. Of course, ‘internalization’ is to stand in contradistinction to ‘objectivation’. Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), especially, pp. 129–183.
Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 243–261, S. 245–261. However, also see the programmatic and somewhat unclear section entitled “The Subjective Correlates of the Social Stock of Knowledge”, pp. 319–331, S. 315–327.
Ibid., p. 247, S. 248.
See, for example, ibid., pp. 250–251 and 259–260, S. 251–252 and 259–260.
Ibid., p. 95, S. 104.
See, for example, ibid., pp. 95–98 and p. 329, S. 104–107 and 324.
Ibid., p. 261, my emphasis, S. 261.
See pp. 120–121 above.
See p. 118 above.
Ibid.
For example, Luckmann writes: “The ‘socialized’ interpretational and motivational relevances again refer in turn to ‘originary’ situations of acquisition based on intersubjective thematic relevances and formed by immediate social givens” (Ibid., p. 256, S. 257). He further writes that “since the intersubjectivity of thematic relevances is dependent on the formal arrangement of subjective experiences in the social world, it also has significant relevance for the ‘socialization’ of the interpretational and motivational relevances” (Ibid., p. 255, S. 256). In general, for Luckmann’s interpretation of Schutz’s theory of relevance, see ibid., pp. 252–261, S. 252–261. Also see pp. 229–241, S, 229–240.
Ibid., p. 255, S. 256.
Schutz, Relevance, especially, pp. 68–71 where he most clearly argues this point. However, also see “Some Structures of the Life-World”, CP 3, p. 132. There Schutz appears to argue that the thematic relevance structures are indeed primordial.
For Schutz’s assumption concerning the practical attitude, see, for example: “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World”, CP 2, pp. 64–88; “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 207–259, especially, pp. 208–229; Schutz, Relevance, especially, pp. 16–21 and 121–132; “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 3–47; “Symbol, Reality and Society”, CP 1, pp. 287–356, especially, pp. 306–329 and 340–343; and “Tiresias, or Our Knowledge of Future Events” (1959), CP 2, pp. 277–293, especially, pp. 283–284.
For example, see “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 208–229, especially note, pp. 208–209, 212–213, and 226–229.
See, especially, p. 104 above.
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 253 (Jan. 25, 1952 S: G).
For example, see: “The Social World and the Theory of Social Action”, CP 2, pp. 12–13; “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences” (1940), CP 1, p. 134; “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World”, CP 2, pp. 70–72; and “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences” (1959), CP 1, p. 148.
See, for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 139–214, S. 198–302 and “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1; pp. 225–226.
See, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 163–172, S. 233–240; “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences”, CP 1, p. 134; “The Homecomer”, CP 2, p. 110; and “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 225–226.
See, for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 181–207, S. 252–290 and “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 19–27.
“Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, p. 25, my emphasis.
See above, pp. 78–80 and p. 104.
“Symbol, Reality and Society”, CP 1, p. 353.
See, for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology, p. 168, S. 234 and “The Homecomer”, CP 2, p. 110.
See pp. 102–110 above.
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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Vaitkus, S. (1991). Critical Remarks to Schutz’s Theory of Intersubjectivity. In: How is Society Possible?. Phaenomenologica, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2077-4_8
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