Abstract
Schutz’s interest in the problem of intersubjectivity, which can be traced as far back as to his first work not intended for publication, Theorie der Lebensformen, stretches throughout the whole of his life-work.1 It is clear that unlike in his early work The Phenomenology of the Social World where he left open the possibility of considering intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem in the Husserlian sense, Schutz, in the major portion of his life-work, viewed intersubjectivity exclusively as a mundane problem belonging to the sphere of the natural attitude in which man lives in a world whose existence he simply takes for granted.2
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Notes
Alfred Schutz, Theorie der Lebensformen, ed. Ilja Srubar (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981).
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Translation of Alfred Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932), (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981). We shall follow our practice of providing references first to the English translation (p.) followed by references to the original German text (S.). In regard to the fact that Schutz left open the possibility of considering inter subjectivity as a transcendental problem in this text, see, for example: pp. 43–44,45–96, and 97–102, S. 55–56,62–130, and 137–143. In a crucial footnote, Schutz clearly states with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity that “in the Cartesian Meditations, especially in Meditation V, Husserl has given us a profound analysis of the general significance of these questions and has also given us the essential starting point from which they must be solved” (p. 97, n. 2, S. 193, Anm. 2). For an early criticism of Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem, see Alfred Schutz, “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego” (1942), CP 1, pp. 165–167 and p. 175. Here Schutz questions whether intersubjectivity is a transcendental problem and points to the fact that it is possibly a mundane problem belonging exclusively to the sphere of the natural attitude. “It is in no way established whether the existence of Others is a problem of the transcendental sphere at all, i.e., whether the problem of intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos... or whether intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world” (p. 167). Schutz’s later extended criticism of Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity and his systematic argument that intersubjectivity is exclusively a mundane problem can be found in Alfred Schutz, “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” (1957), in Collected Papers, Vol. 3, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 51–84. This volume is hereafter cited as CP 3.
For example, see: “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, p. 218; Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance (1947–51), ed. Richard M. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 73–74 and p. 134; “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation” (1953), CP 1, p. 10; and “Symbol, Reality and Society”, CP 1, p. 306 and p. 312. It is important to note that in response to a question by Gurwitsch concerning this apparent positing of an isolated ego in the article “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation”, Schutz writes: “Obviously, only for pedagogical reasons, I have taken as a starting point a theoretical solipsistic ego and only afterwards introduced the structures which bring in the social world. That, however, naturally does not mean that I believe that a private experience could be possible which would not be from the outset socialized. Here I have it much easier than Husserl because I am content with remaining at the level of the relative natural world view.... The natural world is thoroughly social and our knowledge of this world is also social, precisely in the natural attitude.” (Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 279–280 (April 20, 1952 S: G)).
“The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl”, CP 1, pp. 51–84.
Schutz, The Phenomenology, p. 249, S. 349. Although Schutz, in places too numerous to cite, only very briefly refers to the notion of the Person throughout his work, it should be mentioned that he did write a lengthy manuscript on the Person which remains unpublished (Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv Konstanz). This manuscript, which appears to be a predecessor to his article “On Multiple Realities” (CP 1, pp. 207–259) arises out of the early period of Schutz’s work. Consequently, little from this manuscript will be used in the following as an attempt will be made to develop the notion of the Person especially in respect to Schutz’s later writings. In any case, I wish to express my thanks to Richard Grathoff for calling my attention to this manuscript. It should also be mentioned that Schutz carefully analyzes Scheler’s notion of the Person in the following articles: “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, pp. 150–179; “Max Scheler’s Philosophy” (1956), CP 3, pp. 133–144; and “Max Scheler’s Epistemology and Ethics” (1957), CP 3, pp. 145–178. This footnote was written before the appearance of Ilja Srubar, Kosmion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988).
“Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, p. 164 and “Sartre’s Theory of the Alter Ego” (1948), CP 1, p. 199.
Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Die Schutz-Voegelin Korrespondenz (Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv Konstanz und in Bielefeld), p. 585 (Oct. 19, 1952 V: S) as part of the original typescript of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, which was distributed and used as the basis for the colloquium “Phänomenologie und Sozialwissenschaft: Alfred Schutz und Aron Gurwitsch” at the Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung at the University of Bielefeld, 1981. (See: Sozialwissenschaft und Intersubjektivität: Phänomenologische Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften im Umkreis von Aron Gurwitsch und Alfred Schutz, ed. Richard Grathoff and Bernhard Waidenfels (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1981)). In citing Die Schutz-Voegelin Korrespondenz, the page numbers refer to this original archive typescript. They are followed in parentheses by the date of the letter and initials of who sent the letter to whom.
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 134 (June 11, 1945 S: G).
For Schutz’s account of these basic spatial, temporal, and social structures of everyday experience, see, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 45–214, S. 62–290; “Sender’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, pp. 167–179; “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 209–226; “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 10–19; and Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. (London: Heinemann, 1974), pp. 35–92. The latter is a translation of Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, Vol.1 (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand, 1975). We shall follow our practice of providing references first to the English translation followed by references to the original German text. See S. 53–107. In referring to the shortened-title form “Structures” in the following, it is always this first volume which is intended.
“Symbol, Reality and Society”, CP 1, p. 306.
Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 51–52, S. 67.
For Schutz’s notion of a “pure we-relation”, see, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 163–172, S. 227–240; “Sender’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, pp. 172–177; “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 212–222; “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 15–19; Alfred Schutz, “Making Music Together” (1951), in Collected Papers, Vol 2, ed. Arvid Broderson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 159–178; and Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 75–81. Collected Papers, Vol. 2 is hereafter cited as CP 2.
See, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 176–214, S. 245–302; “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 15–26; and Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 68–92, S. 81–102.
Schutz makes this point numerous times when speaking of the “pure we-relationship”. See n. 12 above.
“The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl”, CP 3, p. 81.
For Schutz’s concept of the “work world”, see, for example “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 218–234.
Ibid., pp. 207–259.
Ibid., pp. 229–234.
See Ibid., pp. 245–253.
Ibid., p. 253.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 257–258.
Ibid., p. 259.
Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 241 (Jan. 19, 1952 S: G).
See Chapter 6, especially Sec. 2.
“The Stranger” (1944), CP 2, pp. 91–105; “The Homecomer” (1945), CP 2, pp. 106–119; and “The Well-informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge” (1946), CP 2, pp. 120–134.
“The Stranger”, CP 2, p. 92.
Ibid., 96.
See, for example, ibid., pp. 96–105.
“The Homecomer”, CP 2, p. 109.
For this and the following definition of the home group, see ibid., pp. 107–113.
Ibid., p. 107.
In Part 4, the ‘home group’ will be further considered and will play a major role in our drawing Schutz and Gurwitsch’s work together. The fact that the Luckmann position, as presented in The Structures of the Life-World, did not follow through with this insight will become clear in Chapter 7.
“The Well-informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge”, CP 2, pp. 120–122.
Ibid., p. 121.
Ibid., pp. 122–131.
Ibid., p. 122.
For the following account of Schutz’s theory of social action, see, for example: “The Social World and the Theory of Social Action” (1940), CP 2, pp. 1–19; Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, ed. Richard Grathoff (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World” (1943), CP 2, pp. 64–88; “On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, pp. 208–218; and “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 3–47.
“On Multiple Realities”, CP 1, p. 211.
Ibid.
See n. 40 above.
Ibid.
See, for example: Schutz and Parsons, The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons; “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World”, CP 2, pp. 64–88; and “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, pp. 27–47.
“Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”, CP 1, p. 24. Also see Richard Grathoff’s excellent study devoted precisely to this problem. Richard Grathoff, The Structure of Social Inconsistencies (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
While Schutz makes this claim in numerous places, see the following where it carries a Bergson-ian reference. “Choosing Among Projects of Action” (1951), CP 1, p. 92 and Schutz, Relevance, p. 98.
Richard Zaner, “Theory of Inter subjectivity: Alfred Schutz”, Social Research, 28, No. 1 (Spring 1961), 71–93, especially, 87–93.
Maurice Natanson, “Das Problem der Anonymität im Denken von Alfred Schutz”, in Alfred Schutz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwissenschaften, ed. Walter M. Sprondel and Richard Grathoff (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1979), pp. 79–88, especially pp. 83–85.
“Sender’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego”, CP 1, p. 176.
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Vaitkus, S. (1991). The Fundamental Levels to the Problem of Intersubjectivity. In: How is Society Possible?. Phaenomenologica, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2077-4_6
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