Abstract
In his Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Edward Zeller makes the following remark about Presocratic thought:
Greek philosophy, therefore, in its first period was in respect to its object a philosophy of nature; for its essential interest lay in the inquiry into the origin and causes of the universe . . . . Further, this philosophy was, in respect to its procedure, a dogmatism: i.e. it seeks to obtain a theory of the objective world before it has given account to itself of the problem and condition of scientific knowledge.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Edward Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, New York, p. 28.
Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, Penguin Books, p. 22.
Ibid, p. 23.
Ibid, p. 24.
Jonathan Barnes, op. cit., Early Greek Philosophy, p. 23.
When Aristotle speaks of induction he could mean at least two things — intuitive or enumerative induction. Neither of these proves anything, although the former results, according to Aristotle, in a kind of knowledge that is more certain than demonstrative knowledge (Post. Anal. II.ixx). Aristotle tends to view enumerative induction not as a means of proving or justifying anything, but, as Ross has pointed out, as means of moving from the particular to the universal which in turn can be used in deductive inferences. He does not take induction to be, along with deductive inference, a means of attaining scientific knowledge or of giving explanation. He was, therefore, criticized by some eighteenth-century philosophers for not assigning any role to induction in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. This last point is discussed in detail by Athanasia Glykofrydi-Leontsini, “Thomas Reid’s Observations on Aristotelian Logic”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Aristotle, Athens 1981.
Thus, Bas C. van Fraasen, “I think almost any bit of information could play the crucial role of allowing a questioner to complete his understanding in the particular respect in which he wants to be complete” (“Salmon on Explanation”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXXII, No. 11, Nov. 1985, p. 640).
I disagree in this connection with R. Sorabji’s suggestion that what Aristotle means by cause is whatever figures in an explanation that is understood simply as a deductive inference (cf. his Necessity, Cause and Blame, Cornell University Press, 1980).
It is interesting to note here that when the ancients speak of the reasoning faculty they invariably mean either the faculty that grasps certain truths or the faculty that reasons demonstratively. For some discussion of the cognitive faculties and their objects in Plato see the papers by J. Hintikka and G. Santas, in Patterns in Plato’s Thought (ed. by J. M. A. Moravcsik). The discussion of H. H. Joachim on Aristotle’s views on these matters in the introduction to his edition of De Gen. et Cor. is one of the best.
Cf. J. Barnes’ discussion in his commentary on the Post. Anal.
J. Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration”, Phronesis, 1969, pp. 123–52.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Anagnostopoulos, G. (1990). Some Thoughts on Explanation in Ancient Philosophy. In: Nicolacopoulos, P. (eds) Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 121. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2015-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2015-6_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7403-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2015-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive