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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 121))

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Abstract

Wittgenstein never developed a full-fledged theory of rationality. Granted his hostility to general theories, this is hardly surprising. There are, however, certain themes in his later philosophy which, when put together, have substantial implications for such a theory. The target of this paper is to explore these themes and bring out their implications for the concept of rationality.

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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Tsinorema, S.F. (1990). Wittgenstein, Rationality and Relativism. In: Nicolacopoulos, P. (eds) Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 121. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2015-6_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2015-6_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7403-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2015-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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