Abstract
Games of timing constitute a sub-class of two-person, constant-sum, infinite games, where the problem facing each player is not what action to take, but rather when he should take action. The theoretical structure of games of timing with complete information and equal accuracy functions is described. An experimental paradigm of such games is presented by a computer-controlled, two-person, infinite game that simulates the Western-style duel.
Ten pairs of male subjects participated in three sessions each in a duel experiment. Each pair played 420 duels in which both players had the same accuracy function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Rapoport, A. (1990). Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information. In: Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions. Theory and Decision Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7391-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1992-1
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