Advertisement

Husserl and Realism

  • John J. Drummond
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 4)

Abstract

Reference was made in the last chapter to the fact that one of the difficulties in determining whether a thinker such as Husserl is a realist or idealist is the multitude of senses with which those terms are used. It is, for example, no small irony that in the Middle Ages those who most vigorously defended a realist position were the inheritors of a position sometimes called idealistic. These medieval realists, of course, defended the Platonic or strong position that universals had an ideal existence separate from individuals, and they were opposed by the nominalists who claimed that only individuals, including general terms, exist. Intermediate positions were certainly available. We must, for example, consider Aristotle a realist, although his realism regarding universals is a moderate form asserting that universals have a real existence only as principles or abstract moments of individuals. Similarly, we must consider Abelard’s conceptualism a nominalism, although general terms refer not directly to collections of individuals but to an individual idea, whose extension ranges over similar individuals.

Keywords

Mathematical Object Formal Ontology Ontological Realism Transcendental Idealism Phenomenological Reduction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 5.
    FTL, §51.Google Scholar
  2. 7.
    For a detailed account of categorial intuition, cf. Robert Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition,” Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: Supplement to Philosophical Topics, (Denver: Philosophical Topics, Inc., 1982), pp. 127–141.Google Scholar
  3. 8.
    Robert S. Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).Google Scholar
  4. 9.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 2.Google Scholar
  5. 10.
    Dummett, “Realism,” p. 155.Google Scholar
  6. 11.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 37.Google Scholar
  7. 12.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, pp. 59–60.Google Scholar
  8. 13a.
    Cf. Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, pp. 14Google Scholar
  9. 13b.
  10. 13c.
    113. This thesis controls Tragesser’s discussion throughout, although he gives no clear textual references in support of it.Google Scholar
  11. 14.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 116.Google Scholar
  12. 15.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 113.Google Scholar
  13. 16.
    Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 119.Google Scholar
  14. 17.
    Cf. Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, pp. 121–22.Google Scholar
  15. 18.
    Cf., e.g., Tragesser, Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics, p. 102.Google Scholar
  16. 21.
    Husserl, Studien, p. 399.Google Scholar
  17. 23.
    Cf. Oskar Becker, “Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen”, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 6 (1923): 558. Husserl apparently approved of Becker’s account in a letter to Weyl; cf. Strohmeyer’s introduction to Studien, pp. lxvii-lxviii.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • John J. Drummond
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMount Saint Mary’s CollegeEmmitsburgUSA

Personalised recommendations