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Introduction

  • John J. Drummond
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 4)

Abstract

The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools—the “Continental” school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the “analytic” school derived from Frege—is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and positions common to both schools, positions from which we can continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On the other hand successors to both traditions have developed criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict between these two “modern” schools but beyond the kind of philosophy represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move towards a new “postmodern” philosophical style.

Keywords

Intentional Object Abstract Entity Intentional Content Intended Object Positive Argument 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1982). Reidel published a paperback edition, which I am using, in 1984. Future references to this work will be parenthetically inserted within the text without any identifying abbreviation.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (hereafter HICS) ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1984). This collection presents the foundations of the Fregean approach in Føllesdal, its contemporary extensions, and its relevance to developments in cognitive science. I shall not, however, in this work consider the relation between the Fregean interpretation and developments in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). For the challenge to the historical thesis, cf. esp. chaps. 1 and 2, and for that to the philosophical thesis, chap. 3. I refer the reader also to my “Frege and Husserl: Another look at the issue of influence,” Husserl Studies 2 (1985): 245–65, wherein I argue against the historical thesis that Frege decisively influenced Husserl’ anti-psychologism by (1) showing the independent development in Husserl’s logical writings of a non-psychologistic theory of logical content and (2) indicating which theses of Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl continued to maintain and which he rejected as psychologistic before any influence from Frege could have exerted itself.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    This introduces into Mohanty’s work an ambiguity which I think is harmful to a clear understanding of the issues, and I shall in the course of this work discuss these issues as well. Cf. the review of Mohanty’s book by Richard Aquila, Husserl Studies 1 (1984): 320–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • John J. Drummond
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMount Saint Mary’s CollegeEmmitsburgUSA

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