Abstract
While the concept of neutrality does not lend itself in an obvious manner to the discussion of judicial protection of minorities and of the theories of criminal punishment — the two areas discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 — it is no doubt very much at home in the area of the relationship between law and religion. One may say that the law-religion relationship is a natural locus of the liberal neutrality. The idea of a secular liberal state, i.e. the state which neither gets involved with matters religious nor inhibits in any way religious expression and activities, has been long understood as best encapsulated by the idea of the state’s neutrality toward religion. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly declared that the Constitution requires the government to pursue a policy of neutrality regarding religion, and that, in accordance with that constitutional mandate, the Court must “enforce[] a scrupulous neutrality by the State, as among religions, and also between religious and other activities”1.
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Notes
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 744, 746–7 (1976), footnote omitted.
Id. at 747.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”, U.S. Const. amend. I.
“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth”, Aust. Const. (Cth) s. 116.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 15–16.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612–13.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See, e.g., J. Choper, “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict”, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 47 (1980) 673
W.G. Katz, “Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality”, University of Chicago Law Review 20 (1953) 426.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner for Pay-roll Tax, (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 785, 791.
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 176.
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 343.
Church of the New Faith (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 785, 791.
(1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 785.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 787.
See J.A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 29.
J.A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 29 at 130.
P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin: 1957), pp. 1–4.
P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin: 1957), pp. 1–4. at 13.
P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin: 1957), pp. 1–4. at 46.
M. Marty, Varieties of Unbelief (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 122.
G.C. Freeman, “The Misconceived Search for the Constitutional Definition of ‘Religion’”, Georgetown Law Journal 71 (1983) 1519.
367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y: Foundation Press, 1978), para. 14–6
D.A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 145–46.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970).
A.H. Loewy, “Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause”, North Carolina Law Review 64 (1986) 1049
1068.
Attorney-General (Vic.) Ex rel Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612–13.
Committee for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
Id. at 813.
Id. at 813.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 56 (1947).
Id. at 58.
For a good survey of these attacks on “secular humanism” in public schools, see Note “Developments in the Law — Religion and the State”, Harvard Law Review 100 (1987) 1606, 1665–74.
J.T. Valauri, “The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine”, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 48 (1986) 83
127.
S.L. Carter, “Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby”, Duke Law Journal (1987) 977, 985–86.
Id. at 984.
For a similar argument, see J. Weiss, “Privilege, Posture and Protection: ‘Religion’ in the Law”, Yale Law Journal 73 (1964) 593
621–23
P. B. Kurland, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”, University of Chicago Law Review 29 (1961) 1
22–52.
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
398 U.S. 333, 334 (1970) (emphasis added).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 215–16.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
See, e.g., W.G. Katz, “Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality”, University of Chicago Law Review 20 (1953) 426.
Valauri, supra note 43, at 120.
Id. at 120.
See E. Mack, “Liberalism, Neutralism, and Rights”, in J.R. Pennock, J.W. Chapman, eds., Religion, Morality, and the Law: Nomos XXX (New York: New York University Press, 1988) 46–70.
A. Montefiore, Neutrality and Impartiality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) p. 5, footnote omitted.
L. Kolakowski, “Neutrality and Academic Values”, in Neutrality and Impartiality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) p. 5, at 72–73.
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Sadurski, W. (1990). Neutrality of Law Towards Religion. In: Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1928-0_7
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