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Physicalistic Platonism

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Physicalism in Mathematics

Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 45))

Abstract

To many, the phrase “physicalistic platonism” will seem a contradiction in terms, and rightly so. The physicalist confines himself to the physical, while the platonist embraces the abstract; the two are irreconcilable. Of course, beginning from an inconsistency has the undeniable advantage of allowing us to prove anything we like, but I have something a bit more serious in mind.

I would like to thank my fellow participants in the Toronto conference on Physicalism in Mathematics, especially Hartry Field and the organizers, Jim Brown and Andrew Irvine. A modified version of this discussion will appear in Chapter V of my forthcoming Realism in Mathematics.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine, USA

    Penelope Maddy

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  1. Penelope Maddy
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada

    A. D. Irvine

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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Maddy, P. (1990). Physicalistic Platonism. In: Irvine, A.D. (eds) Physicalism in Mathematics. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 45. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7348-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1902-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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