Abstract
Husserl’s critique of psychologism is more decisive and more complete than that of Frege and his followers, because it is founded upon a convincing rehabilitation of cognitive intuition. His extensive comments on psychologism in the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations put forward essentially the same arguments that Frege had already made about psychologism’s self-refuting relativism. However, his more original contributions on the topic are to be found in subsequent passages from the Investigations, which develop a powerful criticism of British empiricism, and offer a positive account of how cognitive intuition founds the differentiation of sense from reference. Before considering Husserl’s texts, let us first sketch the philosophic developments leading up to the modem denigration of intuitive rationality.
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Notes
See Wallace Matson, “Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?” in Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl eds. Paul Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1966 ), pp. 92–102.
Karl Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1873), p. 5
Hermann Lotze, Metaphysik (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1897), pp. 537–8.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 402–5.
Ideas I, #41; Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 90–2.
Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 1–36.
Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), pp. 60–62.
Emmanuel Levinas, Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. André Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. 68.
See François Fédier, “Le séminaire de Zahringen,” in Questions IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 314.
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Cobb-Stevens, R. (1990). Psychologism and Cognitive Intuition. In: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. Phaenomenologica, vol 116. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1888-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1888-7_7
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