Abstract
Intentionality is that feature of certain mental states and events that consists in their (in a special sense of these words) being directed at, being about, being of, or representing certain other entities and states of affairs. If, for example, Robert has the belief that Ronald Reagan is President, then his belief is an intentional state because in the appropriate sense his belief is directed at, or about, or of, or represents Ronald Reagan and the state of affairs that Ronald Reagan is President. In such a case Ronald Reagan is the intentional object of Robert’s belief, and the existence of the state of affairs that Ronald Reagan is President is the condition of satisfaction of his belief. If there is not anything that a belief is about, then it does not have an intentional object; and if the state of affairs it represents does not obtain, it is not satisfied.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Block, N. (ed.): 1980, Readings in Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Borst, C. V. (ed.): 1970, The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Macmillan, London.
Braithwaite, R. B.: 1953, Scientific Explanation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Dilthey, W.: 1962, Meaning in History, H. P. Rickman, (trans, and ed. ), New York.
Rorty, R.: forthcoming, ‘Mind as Ineffable’, in R. Q. Elvee (ed.), Mind and Nature, Harper & Row, San Francisco.
Rosenthal, D. M. (ed.): 1971, Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Ryle, G.: 1949, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson’s University Library, London.
Smart, J. J. C.: 1970, ‘Further Remarks on Sensations and Brain Processes’, in Borst ( 1970 ), pp. 93–94.
Winch, P.: 1958, The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Searle, J.R. (1990). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. In: Cole, D.J., Fetzer, J.H., Rankin, T.L. (eds) Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1882-5_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1882-5_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7340-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1882-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive