Abstract
This article seeks to examine the insights for practice that can be obtained from the recent work in explicit, extensive-form models of bargaining. I discuss the results of the theory and compare them to the advice often given to practitioners. Also included are sections on criticisms of these models and possible responses.
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Chatterjee, K. (1996). Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining. In: Shakun, M.F. (eds) Negotiation Processes: Modeling Frameworks and Information Technology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1824-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1824-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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