Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance

Abstract

In November 1992, voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of Congress. All fourteen propositions passed (ten received more than 60% support), bringing the total number of states with congressional term limits to fifteen. Much of the discussion of term limitation has focused on issues of representation, the strength of parties, and the functioning of Congress after the adoption of limits (Benjamin and Malbin, 1992), (Will, 1992). This paper explores an important but less discussed consequence of term limitation, its impact on the partisan balance of legislatures. We inquire how electoral dynamics, incumbent advantage, and voluntary retirement interact with a term limit to produce a new balance between parties in a two-party legislature. Which party is favored by the introduction of term limits? How does the length of the term limit matter? Are there conditions such that one party will be favored by any limit, regardless of how restrictive?