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After the Special Nature of the Firm: Beyond the Critics of Orthodox Neoclassical Economics

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Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 48))

Abstract

What is the boundary of a franchised restaurant as a firm? Does it consist only of the organization of power exercised by the owner over the employees? Or does it extend to include as well the structure of patrons and long-term suppliers of goods, capital, and franchising rights? Is the network of that restaurant merely an organization (i.e., firm) at a greater scale, or is that network qualitatively different from the organization?

The author appreciates the comments of Pitelis, Vromen, Kerstholt, Vanberg and McGrath, the conversations with Hodgson and Csanyi, and the research support by the Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of Cambridge, and the Special Research Assignment grant offered by Ohio State University, Mansfield Campus. None of them should be held responsible for any failings.

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Authors
  1. Elias L. Khalil
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, GRASP / Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    John Groenewegen

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Khalil, E.L. (1996). After the Special Nature of the Firm: Beyond the Critics of Orthodox Neoclassical Economics. In: Groenewegen, J. (eds) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7302-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1800-9

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