Skip to main content

The Core of the Firm: The Issue of the Employer-Employee Relationship

  • Chapter
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 48))

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the limits of the contractual approach to the theory of the firm and to question the notion of wholly circumscribing the employer-employee relationship in a contract. I submit that the employment relationship is the organizational core of the firm.

The author wishes to acknowledge the CNR for its financial support (CNR 92.01979). Comments by Baumol, Dow and Tatara are gratefully acknowledged.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, M., B. Gustafsson and O. Williamson. 1990. The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties. Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K.J. 1974. The Limits of Organizations. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barnard, C. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press (1968 Printing).

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4, 368–405.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1988. Lecture on “The Nature of the Firm: Influence.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4, 33–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production.” American Economic Review, vol. 82, n. 4.

    Google Scholar 

    Google Scholar 

  • Commons, J. 1924. Legal Foundation of Capitalism. Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H. 1988. “The Theory of the Firm Revisited.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 4, n. 1.

    Google Scholar 

    Google Scholar 

  • Dow, G, 1987. “The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 8, 13–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Egidi, M. 1992. “Organizational Learning and the Division of Labour.” In Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution, H.A. Simon, M. Egidi and R. Marris. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • — and M. Turvani. eds. 1994. Le Ragioni delle Organizzazioni Economiche. Rosenberg and Sellier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grillo, M. 1993. Teoria Economica dell’Organizzazione. Roma Mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole 1989. “The Theory of the Firm.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Sehmalensee and R. Willig, eds. North Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M and Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Capital Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knight, F.H. 1971. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Langlois, R. ed. 1976. Economics as a Process. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — and M. Cosgel 1993. “Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty and the Firm.” Economic Inquiry, Volume XXXI, July.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loasby, B.J. 1976. Choice, Compexity and Ignorance. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malmgren, H.B. 1961. “Information, Expectation and the Theory of the Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 399–421.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • March, J. 1988. Decisions and Organizations. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, R. and S. Winter. 1982. An volutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter, 97–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penrose, E. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, M. 1962. Personal Knowledge. Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salais, R. 1989. “L’Analyse Economique des Convention du Travail.” Revue Economique, 40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schanze, E. 1987. “Contract, Agency and the Delegation of Decision Making.” In Agency Theory, Information and Incentives, G. Bamberg and K. Spreman, eds. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, J. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shackle, G.L. 1955. Uncertainty in Economics. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. 1951. “A Formal Theory of Employment Relations.” Econometrica.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turvani, M. 1987. Introduzione alle “Istituzione Economiche del Capitalismo.” In Le Instituzione Economiche del Capitalismo, O.E. Wiliamson. Franco Angeli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Hayek, F. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review, 35, n. 4, 519–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O.E. 1980. “The Organization of Work.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 1, 5–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • — 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • —, M. Watcher and J. Harris. 1975. “Understanding the Employment Relation: the Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange.” Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 250–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Turvani, M. (1996). The Core of the Firm: The Issue of the Employer-Employee Relationship. In: Groenewegen, J. (eds) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7302-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1800-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics