The Aesthetic Construction of Darwin’s Theory

  • David Kohn
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 182)


The nature and operation of natural selection are conveyed in the Origin of Species by two famous metaphors, whose history in Charles Darwin’s consciousness form the substance of this paper.1


Natural Selection Yielding Surface Scientific Content Paradise Lost Natural Selec 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Kohn
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of HistoryDrew UniversityUSA

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