Abstract
One striking feature of Indian philosophers’ concern with knowledge (jñāna)- especially in the Advaita Vedānta-is the way a theory of ignorance (ajñāna) is made to play a central role in theory of knowledge (analogously to the role theory of error plays in theory of truth). In this paper I will focus on this dialectic of knowledge and ignorance (as I shall call it), and will draw attention to some interesting consequences of this way of looking at things.
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Notes
For this distinction, see Bina Gupta, Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1992).
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Mohanty, J.N. (1996). The Dialectic of Knowledge and Ignorance in Advaita Vedānta. In: Drummond, J.J., Hart, J.G. (eds) The Truthful and the Good. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1724-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1724-8_7
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