Abstract
Our semantics for modal forms can be given a metaphysical interpretation which fits certain aspects of Aristotle’s essentialism, including part of the doctrine of the predicables. In this Chapter we consider the nature of metaphysical theories in general and essentialism in particular; we show that Aristotle was an essentialist and that our semantics for his modal syllogistic can be given an essentialist interpretation; we identify which parts of Aristotle’s essentialism are, or can by extension be, included in our semantics, and which cannot; we develop rudimentary formal analyses of the latter and we mention some non-Aristotelian essentialist theories that are expressible in the systems E Q 0–5.
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References
This is Plato’s way of drawing the contrast.
See the quote from Democritus below.
PUTNAM p.52.
NIETZSCHE p.25.
PUTNAM p.52.
For an eloquent statement of the connection between ‘real’ and ‘cognitively reliable’ see VLASTOS p.49ff.
QUINE p.118.
E.g. PLANTINGA.
QUINE p.136.
SPRIGGE p.856.
BARNES pp.98, 252–253. Democritus has these words spoken by mind [phren] to the senses. They reply “Poor phren, do you take your evidence from us and then try to overthrow us? Our overthrow is your fall.”
PATTERSON 1989 pp.3–4.
PATTERSON 1989 ibid.
PATTERSON 1989 pp.19–20. That the weak sense is implied by the strong is explicitly stated in PATTERSON 1990 p.166 note 31.
PATTERSON 1989.
For a discussion of these passages see THOM 1991 p.536.
For a historical survey of accounts of necessary accidents, see VAN RIJEN Chapter 7.
See FEREJOHN p.98.
PATTERSON 1995 p.44 notes that “... letting White be... a differentia of Swan would violate Aristotle’s strictures on division, because White would not entail all the essential ancestors of Swan.”
WATERLOW pp.52–53.
FEREJOHN Chapter 4.
E.g. PATTERSON 1995 §2.3.
PATTERSON 1995 Appendix.
PATTERSON 1990 p.161.
PATTERSON 1990 p.162 says “accidents apply contingently or two-way possibly to things of which they are accidents”. He seems (n.24) to take white as genus to swans and accident to humans. This makes it necessary for him to treat swans as belonging to two genera (animals and whites) neither of which is subordinate to the other.
PATTERSON 1995 Appendix., where Patterson replaces his earlier (§2.7) talk of ‘being in the definition’ with talk of being entailed by. This is no insignificant change. I have used the earlier formulation.
PATTERSON 1995 Appendix, where Patterson replaces his earlier talk of contrariety with talk of incompatibility. I have used the earlier formulation. A question not raised by Patterson is whether the ‘incompatibility’ mentioned here is metaphysical or logical.
PATTERSON 1995 p.122.
PATTERSON 1995 Appendix.
PATTERSON 1995 Appendix.
See THOM 1994 §4.1.2.3.
ANGELELLI p.203.
For textual evidence that Aristotle was of this view, see WATERLOW, ch.2 n.4. But see also her Appendix to ch.1.
COCCHIARELLA 1977 p.456.
COCCHIARELLA 1976 p.205.
Cf. (K11) in COCCHIARELLA 1976, p.219. Brian Ellis rejects this principle, giving the example of cuprous oxide, copper compounds, and oxides, all of which he takes to be Kinds, the first being a species of overlapping genera. Concerning this example, one wonders whether all copper compounds (or all oxides) are similar enough to form a Kind. One also wonders whether cuprous oxide should be taken as a Kind. The alternative would be to restrict chemical Kinds to the elements, counting samples of cuprous oxide not as belonging to a Kind but as derived by a relation of composition from things that do belong to Kinds.
PATTERSON 1995 p.32. Of course, Patterson’s point does not count against our use, for semantic purposes, of sets of necessary-whites, possible-whites etc.
LEWIS, p.75 (D2).
For an illuminating discussion see FREELAND 1987 §2.
JOHNSON 1993 p.179.
PELLETIER pp.50–52.
DANTE, Inferno 4.145–146.
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Thom, P. (1996). Essentialism. In: The Logic of Essentialism. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1663-0_11
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