Abstract
The manuscripts in the Portsmouth collection amply testify to the fact that Newton from 1686 to the end of his life in 1727 was concerned to strengthen the basic principles of his Natural Philosophy. As is well known both the Principia and the Opticks went through three editions during this period: each successive edition containing more reflections on many of the leading philosophical and theological questions of the time. Still, many of Newton’s speculations never reached the press and have remained in manuscript to be analysed and related to the published material. Some of these documenss have been ably discussed by Professor Cohen & Koyré.1 They have convincingly established that Newton was actively involved, behind the scenes, in the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, and that he also produced many private arguments to rebut the leading Leibnizian charges against his philosophy as developed in the Opticks and the Principia.
Omnss ut est igitur per se natura duabus constttit in rebus: nam corpora sunt et inane.
Luceetius Book I
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Notes
Alexandre Koyré & I. Bernard Cohen, “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, pp. 63–126.
Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Edited by F. Cajori, Berkeley, California, 1960 p. 397.
Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Edited by F. Cajori, Berkeley, California, 1960, Book III, pp. 411–414.
Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Edited by F. Cajori, Berkeley, California, 1960, Book III, p. 411.
Principia. London, 1687, Book III, p. 411.
J. Edleston, Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes, London, 1850, pp. 65–80. Cotes’s criticisms and Newton’s replies are contained in a series of important exchanges from February to March 1711–12. His main concern is with the Newtonian definition of inertia. He argues that Newton has not shown in Corollary III, either a priori or experimentally, that two bodies which occupy equal volumes, and are entirely filled with matter, necessarily have the same density or inertia. That this is a necessary consequence, is implied in the Corollary as formulated in the First Edition.
Essentially the same argument, often similarly expressed, is to be found in the writings of the Newtonians. For example: J. Keill, An Introduction to Natural Philosophy, London, 1745 (translated from the last Latin Edition). These lectures were given in 1700, Lecture X, p. 117.
W. Whiston, Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematick Philosophy, London, 1716. Lecture XXXIV, April 26, 1708, p. 340.
R. Bentley, Confutation of Atheism reprinted in Isaac Newton’s Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, ed. I. Bernard Cohen, Cambridge, 1958, p. 321.
And S. Clarke’s note on p. 96 of Rohault’s System of Natural Philosophy, vol. II. London, 1728.
Isaac Newton, Opticks, New York, 1952, p. 352.
Isaac Newton, Opticks, New York, 1952, p. 368.
Vide, note 10, item Whiston, p. 341.
A. Rupert Hall & Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, Cambridge, 1962, p. 312.
Cf. Bernard Gagnebin, “De la Cause de la Pesanteu.. Memoire de Nicolas Fatio de Duillier Presenté á la Royal Society le 26 Fevrier 1690”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 6, 1949, p. 117. Fatio says: “Je suppose que les diferens Epaces du Monde sont presque entierement vuides de Matiere. Plusieurs Phenomenes que nous observons dans la Nature, etablissent cette extreme Rarété des Corps. Elle est necessaire, dans mon Hypothese, afin que les Particules de la Matiere, qui cause la Pesanteur, aient leurs Mouvemens, en Lignes droites, extrement Libres.” p. 127.
Isaac Newton, OPTICE sive de Reflexionibus, Refractionibus, lnflexionibus Coloribus LUCIS, London, 1706, p. 229. There is no substantial difference in the English and Latin editions. In a letter to Leibniz in 1694. Fatio states that Newton believes there is much more ‘de vuide que de plein’. However, no arguments are given. The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, Vol. III, p. 308.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 115.
Cajori Op. cit., Bk. III, p. 418.
Cajori Op. cit., Bk. III, p. 419.
Opticks, op. cit. Query 28, p. 367.
Cajori, op. cit., Bk. II, p. 366.
Opticks op. cit., Query 28, p. 368.
Henry Guerlaac, ‘Newton et Epicure’, Conférence donnée au Palais de la Dêcouverte, Paris, 1963. Professor Guerlac has gone some way to establishing this view by a comparative analysis of the difference in the Queries of the 1706 edition from those of the 1717 edition. There is much manuscript evidence from the period under discussion to support this; for instance, Vide. note 17 F 266v.
Oeuvres completes, The Hague Vol. XXI, p. 473.
J. Gerhardt, ed., Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, Halle, 1860 VI, p. 144 sq. 161 sq. Originally in Acta Eruditorum 1689 81–96.
It is not certain that Leibniz had read the Principia prior to composing his Tentamen. He himself tells us that he had only read an account of the Principia in the Acta Eruditorum for June 1688 pp. 304–315. Vide C. I. Gerhardt. Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, Halle, 1859 IV pp. 87ff. Also Huygens remarks in a letter to Leibniz on 8 February 1690: “You have only seen an extract of his book and not the book itself.” Oeuvres Completes IX, p. 367.
These three letters form only a part of the correspondence which began in 1706. The void is criticised implicitly by Leibniz The letters were republished in the Memories of Literature in 1712 and Cotes drew Newton’s attention to them. Vide Note 8 p. 158. Rémond’s criticisms will be discussed below.
Throughout references and quotations are from Robinet’s edition of the Correspondence unless otherwise indicated A Robinet “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957.
Ed J. E. Erdmann Opera Philosophica pars prior. Berlin 1840 Preface, pp. 468–479.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 36
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 48.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 55.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 70.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 91 29th May 1716. It is in this letter that Leibniz makes the charge that void space is an attribute without suppor:: “Si l’espace est un realité absolue bien loin d’etre une propriété ou accidentaiité opposée á la substance, il sera plus subsistant que les substances.” Clarke replies in Fourth Letter “Void Spacce is not an Attribute without a subject; because by void space, we never mean Space void of everything, but void of Body only.” Vide. Note 1, Koyre & Cohen pp. 90–91, where there is a discussion of this point.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 78.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 109. Clarke also stresses in this passage that “EXTRA-MUNDANE SPACE, (if the Material World be Finite in Dimensions,, is not IMAGINARY, but REAL.”
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 138.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 192. Also see Opticks, Query 28 p. 365, the Scholium to Proposition XIX, Bk. II of the Principia, and Cotes’ Preface to the Second Edition.
A collection of papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716. Relating to the principles of natural philosophy and religion, London, 1717.
Robinet “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 76.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, pp. 135–136, 181. Where Leibniz says that neglect of the principle of sufficient reason leads to “l’origine des chimerics, comme par example d’un temps ou, d’un espace absolu réel, du vuide, des atomes ”
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 41.
Koyré & Cohen, “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, pp. 73, 110. All twelve drafts are published in this substantial article.
H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester, 1956, p. 187.
ULC. Add. 3968.36. Fol. 517 at the bottom of the sheet on which the post-script is copied in French by Newton, we find, “Received of ye Princess May 7th 1716. Vide Koyré & Cohen, “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, p. 81.
The Quaestiones are found in ULC. Add. 3996 and De Gravitatione et Aequipondie Fluidouum is published by the Hall’s. Vide. Note 15.
Richard S. Westfal, “The Foundations of Newton’s Philosophy of Nature”, Brit. J. for the Hist. of Sc. 1 (1962), 172–182.
W. Charleton, Physiologia EpicurI-Vassendi-Charltoniana, London, 1654.
Opera Omnia, Vols. I and II ed. T. Gregory.
Charleton, Physiologia EpicurI-Vassendi-Charltoniana, London, 1654 Chap. IV, pp. 21–50
Charleton, Physiologia EpicurI-Vassendi-Charltoniana, London, 1654 Chap. III, p. 19. P. Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophicum Vol. 1, Sect. 1. Lib. 11. Cap. 111, pp. 192–196. With respect to the Quaestiones, it is more prbable that if Gassendi influenced Newton at this early stage it was the Philosophia Epicuri Syntagma Vol. III, pars secunda-Cap. 1. pp. 11–12.
Quaestiones Folios iiv, 89r, 89v, 97r, 114r. It cannot be maintained that Newton acquired this language exclusively from Charleton or Gassend.. Such expressions were widely used in the plenist-vacuist controversy of the first half of the seventeenth century, see C. Webster, “The Discovery of Boyle’s Law and the Concept of the Elasticity of Air in the Seventeenth Century”, Arch. for History of Exact Sciences2, 141–502 (1966). Also, such phrases are used by Stanley in his History of Philosophy, London 1655–62 part 5 1660 pp. 144 154, 159 and 178 which was read extensively in this period. However since many of Newton’s doctrines seem to come from Charleton and Gassendi, it is probable that the terminology was, in the first instance taken from them.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 146. On page 147 Newton says ‘Since the resistance of the aether is on the contrary so small when compared to the resistance of quick-silver , there is all the more reason for thinking that by far the largest part of the aetherall space is void, scattered between the aethereal particles’.
Charleton, Physiologia EpicurI-Vassendi-Charltoniana, London, 1654, p. 17 He is of course only repeating in part Gassendi’s elaborate discussinn in Bk. III of the Syntagma.
Gassendi, Syntagma. Vol. I p. 231 Similar passages are to be found on pp 230 to 232 and on pp 180 184 185 of Lib. II In the earlier Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma, Pars Philosophiae Secunda, Caput I, p. 11 the doctrine is expressed in a similar way. The influence of Henry More in this respect cannot be overlooked. The correlative nature of these notions is clearly expressed in several places in his writings. In A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More, London, 1712, Vide the Epistola Prima H. More ad R. Cartesium, p. 62; the Immortality of the Soul, Chap. III, pp. 8–9, Chap. VII, pp. 25–28, and Chap. XI, pp. 40–43. In the Divine Diaglogues, 1668, More says, with reference to the reality of infinite extension. ‘This evidently demonstrates the existence of the ancient Democritish Vacuum, and withall that Extension and Matter are not convertible terms, for which Cartesius so much contends.’ p. 103.
Professor Wesffall has urged this view in his ‘Newton and Absolute Space’. Arch. Inter. d’his. des Sc., Numero 67, Avril-Juin 1964, pp. 121–132. However, as I shall attempt to show, the thesis needs important qualification.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., pp. 139–140. Although there is no direct evidence that Newton read More’s Divine Dialogues the manner in which the doctrines of De Gravitatione are expressed is mindful of the first Dialogue. This dialogue is More’s mature expression of his position, and the whole discussion is anti-Cartesian in a vein similar to Newton’s treatise. Moreover the leading doctrines expressed are closer in character to those of De Gravitatione than in any of More’s earlier treatises. God’s omnipresenc,, his identificaiion with space, the reality of general extensinn (this is the first time that More argues for this position,, the ‘vital congruity’ of spirit and matter, that everything, including spirits, must exist ‘somewhere’, etc. Thus it is quite probable that Newton knew this treatise. Accordingly his theory of the manner of matter’s creation could have occurred to him on reading the first Dialogue. After the Platonist Barthnous argues that general extension (space) is a necessary existent, utterly distinct from extended things, and the only ground for the existence of an infinite Spirit, Cuphophron suggests that ‘Extension is the Capacity of matter’. Barthnous then asks, ‘What do you mean by Capacity, Matter in potentia?’ p. 108. The idea is not pursued; but in the context of the discussion, where it is repeatedly affirmed that matter is a dependent existent moved by God’s will, we surely have the germ of Newton’s hypothesis, namely, that space is the potentialtty of matter made actual when determinate parts of space are made to manifest sensible appearances. If this suggestinn can be substantiated, Westfall’s assertion that ‘Newton’s empty spaces moved about by God are the direct product of Gassendist skepticism’, Westfall, op. cit., p. 129, can no longer stand.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 144. Clarke makes the same point in different terms ‘ if Extension were the Essence of Matter and so Matter the same as Space itself: it would follow that Matter is infinite, and necessarily eternal, and could neither have been created, nor reduced to nothing; which is very absurd.’ Vide Note 10, item Rohault, Vol. I, p. 24. The passage in the text makes it plain that Newton regards matter to have even less reality and perfection than accidents by which he probably means properties. For the epistemology supporting this, see Section VI below.
More, A Collection. Immortality of the Soul II:XI:10.
Quaestiones, Fols. 89, 104, 105, 117 and 132.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, p. 19 The letter is dated 18th October.
‘Indeed however we cast about we find almost no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies having as it were a complete and absolute and independent reality in themselves ‘Hall & Hall op. cit., p. 144. This view is commonly found in English Natural Philosophy of the period. With Newton however it is a basic principle In an early draft of Query 31 he says: ‘ matter depends upon a Deity for its laws of motion as well as for its existenc.. The Cartesians make God the author of all motion and it is as reasonable to make him the author of the laws of motion ‘Add 3970 F. 243r. And in a draft version of the General Scholium: ‘Materia non est aeterna sed originem habuit a voluntate Dei.’ Add 3965; 13 [150–182] F 547r. See also Note 75.
Robinet, “Correspondence Leibniz-Clarke” Paris 1957, pp. 209–210
Cajori, op. cit., p. 546.
After stating that if the particles of bodies were pressed together ‘in a compact mass like grains of sand or heap of stones’ the force of gravity would tend less to the inner than the outer ones, thus violating the proportionaltty of gravity to matter, Newton says ‘Other textures of the bodies must be devised by which their interstices are rendered more ample, and this is the necessary condition of an Hypothesis by which gravity is to be explained mechanically.’ Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 315. It is necessary, however, to be cautions about Newton’s complete acceptance of the hypothesis even in the 1690’s; for we have Fatio’s own testimony to the effect that Newon ‘did not scruple to say that there is but one possible mechanical cause of Gravity, to wit that which I had found out. Thô he would often seem to incline to think that Gravity had its foundation in the arbitrary will of God ’ Vide. Note 19, Notes and Records. p. 117. But on the other hand, notice Newton’s comment to Leibniz in 1693 Correspondence, Vol. III, p. 287, ‘But some very fine matter seems to fill the heavens. And if all the laws of motion can be shown to be compatible with it, Newton says he is ‘far from objecting’. Again this is evidence of a state of vacillation.
Cajori, op. cit., pp. 385–396. Especially important are the corollaries and scholium for Proposition L 11, and Propositions L 111 of Book II. The main charges against the vortex theory are: the radical instability of the system (the corollaries to Prop. L11) the fact that whether the planets move through, or with the vortices (Leibniz’s ‘harmonic motion’) the third law of Kepler is violated, and that the areal law would also have no application. Cotes gives a very clear account of these criticisms in his Preface to the second edition. He especially stresses the irregularity of the motions of the Comets as evidence against vortices. Vide. Bk. III.
Edleston, op. cit. p. 310. Ex Epistola cujusdam ad amicum. This manuscript was not published during the controversy. It gives a clear indication of Newton’s commitment to the void
Opticks. op. cit. p. 350.
Opticks. op. cit. p. 353. The real difficulty here is not that of understanding how an aether of small denstty can quantitatively transmit gravitation as L. Rosenfeld suggests ‘Further Papers of Isaac Newton.’ Nature196 (1962)] but how such a medium can transmit any influence at all This is especially so in view of the fact that Newton repeatedly states that very dense media are necessary for maintaining vibrations and for propagating them quickly, viz. Opticks p 344 J. Lohne in an important articlet ‘Newton’s theory of colours’ Arch. for the Hist of Ex Sc. 1, 402 (1961) has suggested that Newton gave up the cosmological aether because it was incompatible with the exact application of the inverse-squaee law which indicated a non-resisting void. Again, Rosenfeld has suggested that he restricted its operation to short-range interaction. in his theory of light and colours, ‘Newton and the Law of Gravitation’, Arch. or Hist. of Ex. Sc. 2, 385 (1965). I agree with this. And these difficultie, in conjunction with those indicated above, make it difficult to explain why Newton outlined such an elaborate hypothesis in the Queries of 1717; unless of course to attempt an explanation of the independent existence of Forces. Professor Guerlac’s view — apart from the greater merit of his papers — that he did so as a result of Hauksbee’s work on electrical and magnetical phenomena is of little help in the light of such conceptual dilemmas: unless of course these phenomena supported in Newton’s eyes a notion of an immaterial aether See Chapter 5 See H Guerlac ‘Francis Hauksbee’ experimentateur au profit de Newton’ Arch. Inter d’his, des Sc. 16, 113–128 (1963) and ‘Sir Isaac and The Ingenious Mr. Hauksbee’ L’aventure de la Science Melanges Alexandre Koyré, Vol. I, Paris 1964 pp 228–253.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., pp. 305–308 317, 333, 341, and 345. Opticks. Query 31, pp. 389–390, 395 and 397, the Preface to the first edition of the Principia, and many other references scattered throughout the published and unpublished writings.
Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, pars secunda, art. 10, Ouvres, Vol. VII: p. 45, ed. C. Adam & P. Tannery, Paris, 1897–1913.
Syntagma Philosophicum, Opera Omnia, Vol. I, Liber Secundus, Cap. I. p. 179.
More, A Collection. Epistola Prima H. More ad R. Cartesium, p. 62.
Charleton, Physiologia EpicurI-Vassendi-Charltoniana, London, 1654, p. 66. Chapters VI and VII of the Physiologia could be shown to be an important influence on Newton’s views of space and time.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 132.
Leibniz points out in the Correspondence, Robinet, p. 136. that for Newton space is ‘un realité absolué’. Koyré & Cohen agreeing that he is right, clarify the implications by saying that for the Newtonian,, ‘infinity implies necessity thus eternity’, op. cit., p. 90. This does not get to the heart of the matter. For the sense in which Newton thought space to be infinite must be made clear. It seems that he held it to be an unconditioned existent. Thus no temporal change or condition could possibly affect its existence; not even the annihilation of the physical world. Hence, in the following sense, it is an infinite and necessary existent: namely the unconditioned condition for the existence of anything in the world. This is plainly a traditional position.
Hall & Hall, op cit., p. 138
Hall & Hall, op cit., p. 132. See also pp. 137–138.
Opticks. op. cit., pp. 353–354. Hall & Hall., op. cit., p 132 The same view is clearlv
developed in Newton’s first reply to Hooke’s criticisms of his theory of colours in 1672. Vide Note 10, item Cohen, pp. 118–119.
Hall & Hall., op. cit., p 132
K. Digby, Two Treatises, London 1658 p. 1
Syntagma. Liber Tertius, Cap. 1 p. 231. Gassendi’s reference is corrupt. He quotes ‘Tangere enim, tangi sine corpore null potest res’. It is interesting to notice that Charleton in the Physiologia, quotes it in the same form. Digby on the other hand is correct.
Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester, 1956, p 187
Koyré & Cohen, “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, p. 111.
ULC. Add. 3968. 33. Folios 468–470. For details of Pierre Rémond de Montfort see D. Brewster, Memoirs of the Life Writings and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, Vol. II, p. 436 Edinburgh 1855.
Acta Eruditorum. 1694, p. 112. My translation
Cf. the letter to Conti the Review of the Commercium Epistolicum Phl. Trans. Vol. 29. 1715, p. 224, and the Preface to the 1722 edition of the Commericum.
Koyré & Cohen “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, pp. 118–121
Koyré & Cohen “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, p. 120
Acta Eruditorum, April pp 145–157
ULC. Add. 4005. Fols. 21–22. Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 374. As the Hall’s point put, this seems to be a shortish version of ‘Phaenomena’, another treatise in the same manuscript bundle: the latter manuscript closely resembles the ‘Phaenomena’ of the 1713 edition of the Principia; cf. Halls p. 378.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 361. A similar, but less elaborate passage is to be found in the Principia. Cajori, op. cit., p. 546.
Koyré & Cohen, “Newton and the Leibni-Clarke Correspondenee”, Arch. Inter. d’Hist. des Sc. Quinzieme Annee, Nos. 58–59 1962, p. 113. See Chapter 2.
Opticks. op. cit., p. 369.
Cajori, op. cit., p. 397. The preface to that Book.
Cajori, op. cit., p. 6. The same point is made on p. 11.
Hall & Hall, op. cit., p. 316. Vide. Section 1.
Opticks. op. cit., pp. 405–406.
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McGuire, J.E. (1995). Body and Void and Newton’s De Mundi Systemate: Some New Sources. In: Tradition and Innovation. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 56. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1581-7_3
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