Abstract
In the philosophy of language and mind, the abstract entities called propositions have a double nature. On one hand, they are units of sense of a fundamental logical type which are expressed by the use of sentences. All propositions represent states of affairs and are true or false depending on how things are in the actual world. On the other hand, propositions are also the contents of conceptual thoughts that we, human beings, have in mind whenever we think, speak or write. As ordinary language philosophers have shown, the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of language are speech acts such as assertions, promises and requests which consist of an illocutionary force F with a propositional content P. Moreover, many of our mental states are attitudes like beliefs, intentions and desires which consist of a psychological mode m with a propositional content P. Like illocutionary acts, such attitudes are conceptual thoughts whose contents represent states of affairs.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Carnap, R., 1956, Meaning and Necessity, Univ. of Chicago Press.
Church A, 1951, ‘A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation’, in P. Henle et al. (eds.), Structure, Method and Meaning, Liberal Arts Press, New York.
Creswell, Max, 1975, ‘Hyperintensional Logic’, Studia Logica 34, 25–38.
Frege, G., 1923–6, ‘Gedankengefüge’, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus 3, 36–51.
Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell Univ. Press.
Montague R., 1974, Formal Philosophy, Yale Univ. Press.
Parry, W. T., 1933, ‘Ein Axiomsystem für eine neue Art von Implikation (analytische Implikation)’, Ergebnisse eines Mathematisches Colloquiums, Volume 4.
Searle, J. R. and Vanderveken, D., 1985, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Vanderveken, D., 1990–1, Meaning and Speech Acts, 2 Volumes, Cambridge Univ. Press; and The Logic of Propositions (forthcoming).
Wittgenstein, L., 1961, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vanderveken, D. (1995). A New Formulation of the Logic of Propositions. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 177. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1575-6_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1575-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7204-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1575-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive