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Transaction Cost Economics and Public Administration

  • Chapter
Public Priority Setting: Rules and Costs

Abstract

Whether or in what degree transaction cost economics is pertinent to public administration is still unresolved. Terry Moe, for example, expresses grave doubts that the successes of the new economics of organization in helping to better understand complex economic organization will carry over to the study of political organization (1990, p. 119). James Q. Wilson is more optimistic: “The idea of transaction costs has not been applied, as far as I know, to government activities. But I see no reason why it should not be” (1989, p. 358).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California, S545 Student Services Building, Berkely, CA, 94720-1900, USA

    Oliver E. Williamson

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  1. Oliver E. Williamson
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Peter B. Boorsma (Professor of Public Finance), Kees Aarts (Associate Professor of Public Policy Research Methods) & Albert E. Steenge (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Public Finance),  (Associate Professor of Public Policy Research Methods) &  (Professor of Economics)

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© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Williamson, O.E. (1997). Transaction Cost Economics and Public Administration. In: Boorsma, P.B., Aarts, K., Steenge, A.E. (eds) Public Priority Setting: Rules and Costs. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1487-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1487-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7165-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1487-2

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