Philosophical Perspectives on Formal Theories of Predication

  • Nino B. Cocchiarella
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 167)


Predication has been a central, if not the central, issue in philosophy since at least the time of Plato and Aristotle. Different theories of predication have in fact been the basis of a number of philosophical controversies in both metaphysics and epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals. In what follows we shall be concerned with what traditionally have been the three most important types of theories of universals, namely, nominalism, conceptualism, and realism, and with the theories of predication which these theories might be said to determine or characterize.


Natural Kind Primary Semantic Natural Realism Predicate Variable Constructive Conceptualism 
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© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1989

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  • Nino B. Cocchiarella

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