Advertisement

Abstract Right and the Socialisation of Wrong: Retributivism’s English Decline and Fall

  • Alan W. Norrie
Chapter
  • 148 Downloads
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 12)

Abstract

In the last three chapters, we have traced the development of the classical retributive theory of punishment. We have seen how the contradiction between juridical individualism and the reality of individual life slowly develops. In the first place, material realities are understood in the atomised form of an actual individual determined by his psychic and physiological nature. Gradually, however, the view of the isolated natural individual becomes inflected with the recognition of the role of social determinations on individual life. In Hobbes, this occurs, minimally, with his discussion of the ability of the common people to become citizens. In Kant, we noted the influence of social mores which he saw as determining certain types of person to commit some kinds of crimes. With Hegel, we noted the philosophical and methodological exclusion of this kind of consideration, but we also saw how the social reality of civil society ultimately intruded rather dramatically upon the later sections of the Philosophy of Right.

Keywords

Social Good Chapter Versus Retributive Justification Practical Understanding Public Indignation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.7, emphasis added.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.7Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.8.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.8Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.228.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.225.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p. 8–9Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.39.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.39Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.20.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.21.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.24.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.24Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.24, Chapter III, fn.1.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.44Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.180, emphasis added.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.180Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.183.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.188. Cf. Cooper’s account of Hegel’s philosophy of punishment in the previous chapter.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.204.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.204.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.184.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.185.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.185Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.186.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.186–187.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.180.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.180, fn.26. emphasis added.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.202.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.25–27.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.196Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.194.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.195.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.191.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.191Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.190.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.183.Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.192.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.188, emphasis added.Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.188–189.Google Scholar
  43. 43a.
    T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1901), p.189. This, Green concedes, is an ‘abstract and negative’ kind of criterion. A ‘positive and detailed criterion of just punishment’ must wait until the rights of men have been truly harmonised and experience has shown which punishments are required for which crimes.Google Scholar
  44. 43b.
    Of course, we still await this ideal state of affairs, although some still cling to the possibility of its achievement: see A. Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crime (Manchester, 1986), ch.6.Google Scholar
  45. 44.
    A. Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crime (Manchester, 1986), p.188.Google Scholar
  46. 45.
    A. Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crime (Manchester, 1986), p.193.Google Scholar
  47. 46.
    A. Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crime (Manchester, 1986), p.147, emphasis added.Google Scholar
  48. 47.
    A. Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crime (Manchester, 1986), p.148–149.Google Scholar
  49. 48.
    Of course, this is not to say that Green would intend that the state should act in such a way, only that the logic of his theory is open to such things happening: ‘Strictly speaking, a theory of rights, defined purely as socially acknowledged claims, says nothing about their content. If the members of a society recognised cannibalism as a practice, not only justified but mandatory in certain circumstances, no one using Green’s criterion would have a right to object to being eaten under such specified conditions.’ M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.264.Google Scholar
  50. 49.
    M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.203.Google Scholar
  51. 50.
    M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.203Google Scholar
  52. 51.
    M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.204–205.Google Scholar
  53. 52.
    A. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment (London, 1929), p.34.Google Scholar
  54. 53.
    H. Acton, The Morality of Punishment (London, 1929), p.16.Google Scholar
  55. 54.
    H. Rashdall, International journal of Ethics (5) 1894–95, p.243.Google Scholar
  56. 55.
    H. Rashdall, International journal of Ethics (5) 1894–95, p.42.Google Scholar
  57. 56.
    H. Rashdall, International journal of Ethics (5) 1894–95, p.43.Google Scholar
  58. 57.
    See M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.203, chs. 7 and 8.Google Scholar
  59. 58a.
    Cf. M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.201: Green engaged in a ‘massive effort’ to ‘prove that Idealist metaphysics when applied to the sphere of politics did not subordinate the individual to the state. Throughout his ethics there are signs of the strain produced by his merger of conservative concepts with liberal and even radical values.’Google Scholar
  60. 58b.
    See also M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.211.Google Scholar
  61. 59a.
    F. H. Bradley, “The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility’ in Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1921), (originally published in 1876);Google Scholar
  62. 59b.
    F. H. Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ International Journal of Ethics 4 (1893–94), p.269. Reprinted in Collected Essays I (Oxford, 1935). References are to the original journal publication. For a recent discussion of the two essays which attempts to rescue a revised retributive philosophy from them,Google Scholar
  63. see P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley (Oxford, 1984).Google Scholar
  64. 60.
    P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p.27.Google Scholar
  65. 61.
    P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p.26–27.Google Scholar
  66. 62.
    P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p.28.Google Scholar
  67. 63a.
    P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p.27–28;Google Scholar
  68. 63b.
    P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p.26, ch.3, text at fn.4.Google Scholar
  69. 64.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 270Google Scholar
  70. 65.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 272–273, 278.Google Scholar
  71. 66.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 272.Google Scholar
  72. 67.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 273.Google Scholar
  73. 68.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 215.Google Scholar
  74. 69.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 275, emphasis added.Google Scholar
  75. 70.
    P. Johnson, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ in A. Manser and Stock, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1984), p. 284: ‘In short, I should have little to correct in the old statement of my view except a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions.’Google Scholar
  76. 71.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965) p.ix. This is a reprint of the 3rd edition (1919) which differs little from the original of 1899.Google Scholar
  77. 72.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp.272–213.Google Scholar
  78. 73.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.ix.Google Scholar
  79. 74a.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.272.Google Scholar
  80. 74b.
    Interestingly, Bosanquet is in fact quoting the words of Green (B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.129). That Green could write thus indicates the ambivalence in his work between compassion and compulsion. Compare this comment with his pity for the ‘denizen of the London yard’ (above, text at fn.5). The difference between Bosanquet and Green is that for the former, no such ambivalence is apparent.Google Scholar
  81. 75.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.208.Google Scholar
  82. 76.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.208Google Scholar
  83. 77.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.210.Google Scholar
  84. 78.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.210Google Scholar
  85. 79.
    B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), p.210Google Scholar
  86. 80.
    B. Bosanquet, ‘On the Growing Repugnance to Punishment’ in Some Suggestions in Ethics (London), 1919, pp.198, 191.Google Scholar
  87. 81.
    B. Bosanquet, ‘On the Growing Repugnance to Punishment’ in Some Suggestions in Ethics (London), 1919, pp.193.Google Scholar
  88. 82a.
    B. Bosanquet, ‘The violation of right within the moral community has called forth a shudder of repudiation which is at the same time a reflex stroke and shock directed against the guilty person.’ Some Suggestions in Ethics (London), 1919, pp.193 At least one of Bosanquet’s critics was aware that his theory was not really retributive at all:Google Scholar
  89. 82b.
    see H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil Vol I (Oxford, 1907), pp.300–301 (fn.).Google Scholar
  90. 83.
    H. Acton, The Theory of Good and Evil Vol I (Oxford, 1907), p.9.Google Scholar
  91. 84.
    H. Acton, ‘Punishment’ in Acton, The Theory of Good and Evil Vol I (Oxford, 1907), p.39.Google Scholar
  92. 85.
    H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil Vol I (Oxford, 1907), pp.284–287.Google Scholar
  93. 86.
    A. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment (London, 1929), p.17.Google Scholar
  94. 87.
    A. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment (London, 1929), p.17, fn.8.Google Scholar
  95. 88a.
    On these historical developments, see G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London (Oxford, 1971,)Google Scholar
  96. 88b.
    and D. Garland, Punishment and Welfare, (Oxford, 1971,), at ch.1, fn.32, parts I and II. On Green and the philosophy of public service,Google Scholar
  97. 88c.
    see M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.264Google Scholar
  98. 89.
    M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience (London, 1964), p.8–11.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan W. Norrie
    • 1
  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK

Personalised recommendations