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Rationalising Juridical Individualism and the Rise of ‘The Irrational’: Hegel

  • Alan W. Norrie
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Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 12)

Abstract

With Hegel, we reach the culmination of the philosophical developments outlined in the two preceding chapters and embodied in the construction of a modern classical retributive theory of punishment. That theory has two essential, related components. First, punishment of the individual is justified by reference to the individual, and not some extraneous source (society in general, the rights of others, etc.). This justification is based upon the individual’s consent to, or rational willing of, punishment, which he therefore deserves. Punishment is given an individualistic justification in terms of the criminal’s own will and actions.

Keywords

Civil Society Universal Principle Empirical Reality Ethical Life Injured Party 
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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan W. Norrie
    • 1
  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK

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