Abstract
The emergence of the liberal ideal of criminal justice with its emphasis on individual responsibility is closely connected with the development of modern theories of punishment. There are three main theories — the retributive, the utilitarian and the rehabilitative — and of these, the liberal ideal is most closely linked with, indeed based upon, the retributive theory of punishment. That is why even modern legal philosophers, writing within a utilitarian tradition, find it important to return to retributive principles when they seek to explain the place of justice for individuals within the criminal law.1 Hence it is necessary to seek the roots of this intellectual tradition in order to get to the heart of the liberal ideal. My argument in this chapter is that those roots are to be found not in the work of the classical retributivists Kant and Hegel where, one might say, the plant has already reached its full development, but in the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. This will come as a surprise to many for Hobbes is commonly regarded as of no great importance in the development of the theory of punishment. Furthermore, he is usually seen, where he is discussed, not as a retributivist of any colour but as a utilitarian (by implication opposed to the retributive philosophy) of secondary importance.2
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References
See in particular, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968), ch. 1, and ch.6. The connection between retributive theory and criminal justice practice is explicitly made by those developing the justice model of penal reform. See ch.IX.
For example: Hobbes’s conception contains in essence the basic principles of a utilitarian theory of punishment, principles that were later developed and elaborated by Beccaria and Benthan’. (M. Cattaneo, ‘Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment’ in K.C. Brown (ed.) Hobbes Studies (Oxford, 1965) pp.275–297, at 289. Whereas retributivists are primarily concerned with punishing individuals justly, utilitarians are more concerned with punishing them effectively, in order to promote social well-being through deterrence and example. The key issue between the two theories is that effective punishment on utilitarian principles may be incompatible with just punishment on retributive principles. See ch. VI for analysis of this issue.
See J. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas, (London, 1973), p.97.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.354.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.354.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.192.
See J. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas, (London, 1973), p.98.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV.
Cf. D. Raphael, Hobbes (London, 1977), p.98.
Cf. D. Raphael, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge, 1986), J. Hampton disputes Gauthier’s interpretation, arguing that the moral authorisation of the sovereign is textually sanctioned by chapter 16 of Leviathan but not by the work as a whole. The predominant line of Hobbes’s work, she argues (pp.117–122), is that people surrender their rights as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of moral-juridical transfer, as ‘authorisation’ suggests. But Hampton overlooks other examples of the moral authorisation stance elsewhere in Leviathan. For example there are passages in ch.14 (p.191), ch.18 (pp.229–230, 232), and ch.21 (pp.264–265) which conform to Gauthier’s account. On p. 118, Hampton quotes in favour of her reading a passage (Leviathan, p.227) in which Hobbes apparently equates authorisation with simply the giving up of right. She does not note, however, that this is immediately preceded by lines in which Hobbes talks of men conferring ‘all their power and strength upon one man’ and of creating a consent that is ‘a reall Unitie of them all’ in which ‘everyone [is] to owne, and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever’ the sovereign does. This is more than simple renunciation of right. It is the active enabling of the sovereign to act in the individual’s place. As we shall see, Hobbes’s position on punishment is also much more ambiguous and ambivalent than Hampton allows (p. 119) as between authorisation and surrender.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p. 146.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.147;
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.229.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.147;
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.354.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.354.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.148.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.148. Cf. J. Hampton, op.cit., pp. 174–178. Hampton argues that the people cannot consent to their own punishment but can participate in the punishment of others. She concludes, following the logic of this through, that the juridical idea of binding contractual obligation is inconsistent with Hobbes’s egoistic psychology. The power to punish accordingly must be understood in terms of a de acto accrual of power by the sovereign through the exploitation of the self-interest of some, but by no means all, individuals. She analogises the achievement of sovereign power with that of a Genghis Khan or Los Angeles gang leader. I would not deny her the logic of her argument, but I do not think it was Hobbes’s logic. See the conclusion of this chapter.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.291.
L. Strauss, ‘The Spirit of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy’ in K. Brown, Leviathan, p.26.
L. Strauss, ‘The Spirit of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy’ in K. Brown, Leviathan, p.293, emphasis added.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.223, emphasis added.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.229.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.235.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p232.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp.229–230, p.264.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C. MacPherson) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.189.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p. 147: ‘But no man can be supposed to authorise another to punish him, or kill him. For in authorising, one man gives another the use of his right, but no man has the right to harm himself, for the right of nature is a right to do what is conducive to one’s preservation’.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.192. See also p.199.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.192. See also p.199.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.14, p.192. See also p.199.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.354. See also p.199.
D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), ch.IV, p.191. See also p.199, emphasis added.
L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 170.
L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 119.
J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London, 1974), p.43.
J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London, 1974), p.65; and see generally, pp.62–67.
J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London, 1974), p.65; and see generally, pp.62–67
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.72–74. Against MacPherson, my argument is that Hobbes did intend to postulate a moral and not merely prudential theory of obligation.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.215, 216.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.216–217.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p.191
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism,p.262.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p.263.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.189, 262.
Cf. P. Edwards, ‘Hard and Soft Determinism’ in S. Hook, Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New York, 1961). See also below, ch.VII
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 26.
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 26, p.m.
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 26
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 262.
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 202.
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), pp.288–289.
A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London, 1978), p. 232.
I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (transi. J. Ladd) (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 105.
G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (transi. T. Knox) (Oxford, 1952), p.70.
G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (transi. T. Knox) (Oxford, 1952), p.353.
G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (transi. T. Knox) (Oxford, 1952), p.355.
G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (transi. T. Knox) (Oxford, 1952), p.359–360.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968) p. 19.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968), p.360.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968), p.360, ch.1, and see below, ch.VI.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968), p.360
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968), pp.232–233,p.228.
D. Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’ in Essays Literary, Moral and Political (London, 1898).
D. Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’ in Essays Literary, Moral and Political (London, 1898), pp.378–379
See, for example, E. Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology (Chicago, 1901), for whom crime had natural and social causes ‘which lie outside of that mathematical point called the free will of the criminal.’ (p.81). See also below, ch.V.
Cf. C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.72–74, ch.2.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp.205, ch.2.
A.E. Taylor, ‘The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes’ in K. Brown (ed.) Hobbes Studies (Oxford, 1965);
H. Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford, 1957).
Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford, 1957), p.279.
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Norrie, A.W. (1991). The Birth of Juridical Individualism: Hobbes and the Philosophy of Punishment. In: Law, Ideology and Punishment. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0699-0_2
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