Abstract
It is not a caricature of the conventional wisdom to say that it holds to the view that congressional governments are invested with numerous checks and balances and are, as a consequence, internally competitive bodies, while parliamentary governments are all but devoid of such checks and balances and are internally non-competitive. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the conventional wisdom is mistaken, that on an a priori basis both forms of government are competitive, though competition is organized very differently in the two structures.
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Breton, A. (1991). The organization of competition in congressional and parliamentary governments. In: Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (eds) The Competitive State. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0645-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0645-7_2
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