Checks and balances and international openness

Abstract

In the course of a long digression within his famous inspection of Plato’s political philosophy, Karl Popper (1945: 121) argues that “the problem of politics” is the following: “How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?” Popper’s answer is: “the theory of checks and balances”, which he defines as the striving to establish “institutional control of the rulers by balancing their powers against other powers” (122). From that general approach to “the problem of politics”, it follows that democracy is definitely not the rule of the majority, or the sovereignty of the people (a conception that entails various paradoxes). It is a system in which “we can get rid of [governments] without bloodshed — for example by way of general elections”, i.e. a system in which the “social institutions provide means by which the rulers may be dismissed by the ruled”. Thus, although we can have systems of checks and balances without democracy, all democracies are systems of checks and balances, first of all by definition.¹

Although the actions of rulers are by no means wholly determined by their selfish interests, it is chiefly as a security against those selfish interests that constitutional checks are required.

John Stuart Mill (1843), 80

I think that it is reasonable to adopt, in politics, the principle of preparing for the worst, as well as we can, though we should, of course, at the same time try to obtain the best.

Karl Popper (1945), 122

I am very grateful to the participants of the Third Villa Colombella Seminar, especially to Vani Borooah, my discussant, for their helpful comments. I must also thank Alain Wol- felsperger and an anonymous referee for their valuable suggestions. The errors and shortcomings that remain are solely my responsibility. Finally, although I disagree with him on some points, the person who has influenced me most is undoubtedly Albert Breton.