Critique of the Subject and Interpretation of the Cogito. Heidegger and Ricoeur

Abstract

We are quite convinced that a rethinking of hermeneutics requires coming to grips with Heidegger and are likewise sensible to the attractions of Vattimo’s proposal (we would be tempted to test it against the results reached by two scholars we are very fond of, both of them far from Heidegger’s philosophical style: Pierre Thévenaz’ “philosophie sans absolu”⁴ and the radical “assenzialismo” of Piovani’s later years⁵). However, we do not feel that the only way to radicalize hermeneutics is by going back to Heidegger, nor that having praxis as our theme necessarily leads to a sort of ontological extenuation of philosophical hermeneutics. Quite frankly, one wonders whether the conclusive philosophical gesture of proclaiming a “breach” to have been opened, a “bottomless pit constitution of existence,” might be no less turned in upon itself and ultimately barren than the assertion of any other absolute, the only difference being that one cannot even allow oneself the further possibility of transcending philosophy in favor of mysticism. The search for a “methodical” hermeneutics, such as to found and justify in a credible fashion a method or a plurality of methods of interpretation and demystification, corresponds to so deep and pressing a need for clarity, understanding and self-understanding in mankind today that the undertaking must at least be attempted, avoiding any hardening of the Gadamerian opposition between “truth” and “method.”