Abstract
The final chapter of this study investigates the ways in which the insight into emptiness, or what is called the profound view (gambhira-drsti), is related to various doctrinal structures that are included within the rubric of the extensive deeds (udara-gocara). In particular it examines the relationship between insight and the universal vehicle concept of full evolution (bodhi) that the Introduction to the Middle Way [MA] subscribes to.
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Notes
Supra, p. 38.
Cf. Nyayabindu, 1.5, which isolates four specific causes that falsify perceptions. N. Gangopadhyaya (tr.) Vinitadeva’s Nyayabindu-tika (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1971), p. 100, n. 23.
See C.W. Huntington, Jr. “The system of the two truths in the Prasannapada and the Madhyamakavatara: A study in Madhyamika Soteriology.” JIP, 11 (1983), pp. 85–88 for another detailed analysis of Chandrakirti’s transactional epistemology.
See Sprung, Lucid Exposition, p. 64 where Chandrakirti accepts the four Nyaya pramanas.
A compilation from the Tibetan oral tradition by Geshe Rabten, The Mind and Its Functions (Switzerland: Tharpa Choeling, 1978), p. 109, n. 9 isolates a common dominant condition (thun mong bai bdag rkyen) and an exclusive dominant condition (thun mong ma yin pai bdag rkyen). The common dominant condition for a senseperception is the mental-organ (yid kyi dbang po) or immediately preceding condition, called ‘common’ because it is a dominant condition for all five sense modalities. The exclusive dominant condition are the sense-organs. Hence, the sense-modality of mental cognitions is determined by mediation through one of five sense-organs.
At MA, 6.85, Chandrakirti also refers to the non-Buddhists’ mountain peak of wrong-views that are rectified in the Lankavatara-sutra. D.T. Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970 (1930 reprint), pp. 110–14 locates twelve wrong discriminations (vikalpa), perhaps these being what Chandrakirti refers to.
In the D.R. Suzuki (tr.) The Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 (1932 reprint) see pp. 156–61.
Also the traditional sixty-two wrong-views (sometimes condensed into fourteen) concerning metaphysical speculation are presumably included here within the tenets of non-Buddnist philosophers.
See Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.) Discourse of the All-Embracing Net of Views: The Brahmajala Sutta and Its commentorial Exegeses (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1978).
See, for example, Arthur Waley (tr.) The Analects of Confucius (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), pp. 171–172.
See Ramanan, op. cit., p. 288 for the differences between the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas.
See PPS, pp. 75, 124–125, 127, 129, 132, 170, 172, et passim.
PPS, pp. 115, 343, 393, 402.
See Guy Newland Compassion: a Tibetan Analysis, A Buddhist Monastic Textbook. London: Wisdom Publications, 1984 for an exposition and translation of a section of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s textbook exegeting Chandrakirti’s opening stanzas in the MA. For the three compassions see pp. 124–143.
Cf. PPS, pp. 133–134.27.The ideal here is similar to the Advaita doctrine of the liberation of everyone (sarva-mukti) and the idea of select liberated sages (adhikarika mukta) whose task is to help others in the quest for freedom. A difference, though, is that for the Madhyamika all people will become buddhas and so have been bodhisattvas.
See Karel Werner, “Bodhi and Arhattaphala. From early Buddhism to early Mahayana” JIABS, 4.1 (1981), 78–84 for a thorough discussion of the development of the bodhi idea and (pp. 78–79) for discussion of the relative differences between the Buddha’s knowledge and that of arhats.
The higher knowledges (MABh, 56–60) are a psychic power producing manifestations (rddhi), divine audition (divya-srota), knowing others’ minds (para-citta-jnana), recall of previous lives (vurvanivasanusmrti), and divine sight (divya-caksu). (Mvy, pp. 202–209, adds a frequently cited sixth, the extinction of defilements (asrava-ksaya). Cf. PPS, pp. 79–82. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Delhi: Motilal Bararsidass, 1975 reprint), pp. 134 and 227, says they are acquired on the third or eigth bhumi. RA, 5.45 (probably Chandrakirti’s source) says the third. These super-sensitive cognitions are gradually developed for the purpose of cognising ever more phenomena. They are direct mental cognitions. (Geshe Loden says that some Tibetan philosphers are of the opinion that divinesight and audition are meant to be mediated by a subtle (suksma) organ while others say there is no sense-organ mediation. In either case, though, there is no mediation by a normal sense-organ.) They arise concomitantly (3.11) with the equipoises (samapatti) and immeasurables (apramana) and in dependence on the four formless equipoises (arupasamapatti). According to Bastian, op. cit., pp. 281–305, the first five are obtainable upon reaching any of the four dhyanas, and the sixth asrava- ksaya after realising the highest (rab mtha) dhyana. Presumably the abhijnas presuppose certain levels of concentration and tranquilisation and a freedom from afflications. Cf. also AK, 7.42ff and MSA, 15.15–58.
E. Lamotte, “Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism” in L. Cousins et al. (ed.), Buddhist Studies in honour of LB. Horner (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1974) notes (p. 100) that the PPS seems to imply the sequential eradication. Also, n. 32.
The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra follows the Prasangika view also, saying that although the klesas are extinguished in the seventh level the vasanas remain until their removal at buddhahood. See Ramanan, Nagarjuna’s Philosophy…, p. 309
K. Ward, The concept of God (Oxford: Basil Blackwill, 1974), p. 156.
See Garma C.C. Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971).
This seems to be the meaning intended by a distinction between literal and non-literal interpretative scriptures. See Tsong kha pa’s Great Exposition of Secret Mantra (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977) (Hopkin’s Supplement), pp. 186–187.
According to Tsong kha pa (see Jose Cabezon, “The concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scripture”, JIABS, 4.1 (1981), 15–16) a text of interpretative intent must satisfy three criteria. It must have a basis of intention (dgongs-bzhi) — this is the interpretative environment. It must be necessary (dgos pa) — i.e. some reason whereby it is incumbent for the buddha to teach a particular concept. Lastly it must contradict reality if taken literally.
Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy (New York: George Braziller, 1972), p. 48.
In the Siksa-samuccaya Shantideva quotes the Tathagatakosa-sutra to the effect that one who realizes the illusory nature of past evil deeds will not have to reep their miserable results; and the Karmavaranasuddhi- sutra that one who (really) sees wnat is sin and no sin, discipline and no discipline, etc. stops the effects of actions. See C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse (trs.), Siksha- samuccaya — a Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine of Santideva (Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass (1st Indian ed.), 1971), p. 168.
See the essays by T.R.V. Murti, “Samvrti and Paramartha in Madhyamika and Advaita Vedanta”, and M. Sprung, “The Madhyamika Doctrine of Two Realities as a Metaphysic”, in Mervyn Sprung (ed.), Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, Michael J. Sweet, “Santideva and the Madhyamika: The Prajnaparamita-pariccheda of the Bodhicaryavatara”. pp. 20–37, some of which appears in Michael Sweet, “Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpret- ations of the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamika”, JIABS, 2.2 (1979), 79–89; Karl Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965), pp. 237–40; Chr. Lindner’s textual work in “Atisa’s Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources,” JIP, 9 (1981), 161–214; op. cit. Also I. Yamada, op. cit.
F. Streng, “The Significatnce of Pratiyasamutpada…”, op. cit., and “The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths as Religious Philosophy”, JIP, 1.3 (1971), 262–71.
C.W. Huntington, Jr. op. cit.
F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, “Nagarjuna’s Conception of ‘Voidness’ (Sunyata),” JIP, 9 (1981), 277.
C.W. Huntington, Jr. op. cit., p. 93.
Ibid., pp. 93–94.
See M.J. Sweets, “Santideva and the Madhyamika…”, pp. 20–21 and 25–27. See also infra, p.. Likewise, any identifications and differences between the two truths are relative and not ultimate.
Two papers that have addressed the problem fail to make any significant discovery. W.C. Beane in “Buddhist Causality and Compassion,” Religious Studies, 10 (19), 41–56 reached an impasse with the conclusion (p. 456) “that the phenomena of Dharmatika and Karuna should no longer be regarded as co-inherent aspects of one philosophical world-view”. D.W. Mitchell in “The Paradox of Buddhist Wisdom,” PEW, 26.1 (Jan. 1976), 55–68 reduces the problem of how (p. 55) the bodhisattva practices compassion on the one hand and courses in wisdom (prajna) on the other, to its reconciliation in the two truths, which, while providing an ontological resolution to how the buddhas can function in samsara, doesn’t answer why they act for other creatures, nor the question of how insight and compassion are related, except that they are compatible within the Prajnaparamita metaphysic. Robert Thurman in “The Emptiness that is Compassion,” Religious Traditions, 4.2 (Oct-Nov. 1981), 11–34 is much more insightful. He describes insight as a dynamic condition that encompasses a supremely elevated conception of personhood and personal agency. Peter Stater has also written a spirited essay titled ‘The Relevance of the Bodhisattva Concept for Today”, in The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism (ed. by Leslie s. Kawamura Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981, pp. 1–17, see esp. pp. 10–12. An early paper by H.V. Guenther, ‘The Buddhist Sunyata and Karuna,” Aryan Path, 22 (1951), 406–410 briefly relates the doctrines of sunyata-karuna and prajna-upaya.
John Makransky brought this possibility to mind. In the Tibetan lineages of universal vehicle Buddhism there are two methods for developing the fully evolved mind (bodhi-citta), one called “the seven cause and effect instruction (rgyu bras man ngag bdun)”, which is said to have come from the Buddha to Maitreya Bodhisattva and thence to Asanga. The other is called “equalising and exchanging oneself with others (bdag gzhan mnyam brje)” and is said to have be transmitted from Buddha to Manjushri Bodhisattva and thence to
Nagarjuna and Shantideva. Generating an attitude of equanimity or impartiality to all creatures be they emotionally close or distant to one is incorporated within both those methods of comtemplation and also within the meditations that cultivate the four boundless or infinite (apramana) thoughts. See Geshe K. Gyatso, Meaningful to Behold; View, Meditation and Action in Manayana Buddhism (Cumbria, England: Wisdom Publications, 1980), pp. 235–237.
E. Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, pp.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 43–44.
Ramanan, op. cit., p. 289 reports that the arhats have an all-knowledge (sarva-jnata) but that it is “rough and gross’ whereas the buddhas’ sarvakarajnata is the thorough and detailed knowledge of everything.” The PPS, p. 518 says that the all-knowledge of the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas cognises everything there is “both inner and outer dharmas…. but not all the paths, and not in all respects.” Even so, it must be logically possible that saint could gain nirvana without this degree of knowledge. The Nikayas cite instances of arhats such as Sariputta and Kasyapa who don’t appear to have supersensitive faculties, yet other such as Moggallana and Panthaka who nave magical powers (iddhividha). See T. Rahula, ‘The Buddhist Arhant: Is his attainment of nirvana as perfect as the Buddha’s enlightenment,” Religious Traditions, 1.1 (April 1978), 38–39.
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Fenner, P. (1990). Insight and the Extensive Deeds. In: The Ontology of the Middle Way. Studies of Classical India, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0547-4_5
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