Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to philosophically reconstruct those sections and verses of the Introduction to the Middle Way [MA] that bear on the liberative path, i.e. the path that leads to nirvana. The major sections under which this is discussed are: the cognitive basis of Madhyamika soteriology; the theory of emptiness; the ways in which emptiness is expressed and communicated; the different types of emptiness; the analyses that claim to demonstrate the emptiness of the person and phenomena; certain meta-epistemological observations that the Introduction [MA] makes about Madhyamika philosophy; and, the path-structure implied in the Introduction [MA] concerning the development of the insight into emptiness.
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Notes
For a comparison of Buddhist and western “cognitive theories of the emotions” see P. Fenner “A Therapeutic Contexualisation of Buddhist Consequential Analysis” in Religions and Comparative Thought — Essays in Honour of the Late Dr. Ian Kesarcodt-Watson (Eds. P. Bilimoria and P. Fenner), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1988, pp. 319–352.
See BCA, 9.152–156, that not seeing things as empty is the cause of all the pain and evil of samsara. And vs. 9.56, that emptiness is the antidote for the emotional problems (klesa).
The translation of this term poses a problem here and throughout. It is traditionally translated as body, a rendering that is appropriate for the two formed bases that buddhas are said to produce; namely the manifest body (nirmana-kaya, sprul sku) and Utility body (sambhoga- kaya, longs sku). It is inappropriate, though for the two mental bases (nama-kaya) as these are not formed, that is, they have no shape or colour. Basis or mode is relatively non-anthropocentric and at least less implicitive of possessing form (rupa). For a useful discussion of Chinese equivalents and English meanings see Nagao Gadjin, “On the theory of the Buddha-Body (Buddha-kaya)”, Eastern Buddhist, (N.S.) 6.1 (May 1973), 31, n.8.
See also H.V. Guenther’s “The experience of Being: The Trikaya Idea in Its Tibetan Interpretation”, in Roy C. Amore (ed.5, Developments in Buddhist Thought: Canadian Contributions to Buddhist Studies (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979), pp. 38–58. This essay is interesting for the sharp break it makes from anthropomorphic equivalents. According to Guenther kaya represents embodiments of value that are best described as existential patterns.
Cf. BCA, 9.2, that paramartha is not an object of the intellect. Also, PPS, p. 410 and p. 646, that the inexpressible realm exists by way of the ultimate reality.
For example, MK, 5.7,18.8, 25.3 (wrt. nirvana); RA, 1.36 (wrt. phenomena), 1.57. Bi-negative disjunctions are also used by Phenomenalists such as Maitreya-Asanga in texts like the Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras [MSA]. Their use in these texts is quite different from that of Madhyamikas, for the terms on either side of the disjuctions are not the same. The context in which they are employed is in an elaboration of the three natures (trisvabhava); viz. imaginary (parikalpita, kun btags), dependent (paratantra, gzhan dbang), and perfected (parinispanna, yongs grub) phenomena. Thus, when the Phenomenalists says that X is neither empty nor non-empty the qualification “empty” is predicated of the dependent and perfected natures while being “not empty” is predicated of the imaginary nature. For the Phenomenalists “empty” typically means empty of duality. As one does not have the same nature appearing on either side of the disjunction these are not genuine bi-negative disjunctions. For a discussion see D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuskoti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahayana Buddhism”, JIP, 5 (1977), 25–32.
Bi-negations are also used in Hinduism, for example, in the Bhagavad Gita (13.12b) where brahman is characterised as “not being nor is it not-being, R.C. Zaehner,” The Bhagavad-Gita (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p 337. Also, Sankara’s ontological specification of maya — the Hindu equivalent of the Buddhist samvrti — as neither being nor non-being.
The bi-negation is also included in the four cornered (negation) (catuskoti) where it is the fourth corner. The interpretation and use of this device is varied. As Mervyn Sprung has correctly observed, its importance in the expression of emptiness and its role m the Madhyamika generally is less crucial than that of the bi-negation in isolation. See M. Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada of Chandrakirti (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979) p.7. For a very thorough discussion of the four corners see D. Seyfort Ruegg, op. cit.
Cf. PPS, pp. 38, 91, 130, 140, 179, et passim.
See Charles Crittenden, “Everyday Reality as Fiction — A Madhyamika Interpretation,” JIP, 9 (1981), 323–332 for a philosophical treatment of the Madhyamika theory of the fictional character of phenomenal reality.
The dharma-nairatmya is affirmed, for example, in the MN, I. 228, p. 281, which says that all phenomena (dhamma) are without self (anatta).
PPS, pp. 144–148.
See MN, III. 111–112, pp. 154–155 and MN, 2 and 3. And Robert Chalmer’s (ed.) Majjhima-nikaya, (London: Pali Text Society, 1977, vol. Ill, p. 112. The PPS (p. 144) says the internal emptiness refers to the emptiness of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind and the external emptiness to forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touch objects, and mind objects.
In the Yogacarabhumi the great emptiness apparently refers to the pudgala- and dharma-nairatmya. See Isshi Yamada, “Premises and Implications of Interdependence,” in S. Balasooriya, et al (eds.), Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), p. 290, n. 61.
These are referred to later, infra, p
PPS, pp. 183–184.
Oral communication from Geshe T. Loden.
E. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer 1967), p. 158 gives a date of “about A.D. 800”.
See E. Obermiller, “A Study of the Twenty Aspects”, pp. 172–187. The PPS does not give this explanation.
As the PPS says (p. 185), emptiness isn’t multiple.
Streng, Emptiness, p. 199. Here and elsewhere lines have been run together with appropriate orthographical changes. For the Tibetan see MABh, 305.
J.W. de Jong, “The Problem of the Absolute..” op.cit., p.3.
See, for example, John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 86.
This is to say that a lack or absence of intrinsic existence does not imply the affirmation of something else.
PSS, p. 462.
The dual usage is fully exposed in Willian L. Ames, “The Notion of Svabhava in the Thought of Chandrakirti”, JIP, 10 (1982), 161–177. For this latter use see MABh, 305–8.
Leibniz, The Monadologu and Other Philosophical Writings (tr, with intro. and notes by Robert Latta) (London: Oxford University Press, 1925, 2nd ed.), Monadology 31, p 235.
See BCA, 9.117–149 for Shantideva’s analysis of dharmanairatmya.
See ME, 131–150 for Hopkins’ account of this analysis.
See LMS, 60.
See PP, 36–37 and 42–43 for the analysis.
For Buddhapalita’s arguments see ME, 441–443 and 455–498.
See ME, 321–326 for a summary of Samkhya tenets.
St. Thomas Aquinas reasons likewise when he writes: “Now the same thing cannot at the same time be both actually x and potentially x, though it can be actually x and potentially y: the actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, though it can be potentially cold. Consequently a thing in process of change cannot itself cause that same change; it cannot change itself;” Summa Tneoloqiae (ed. ana tr. with Latin text by Timothy McDermott) (London: Blackfriars, 1964), vol. 2. Q1, Art. 3, p. 13.
For Nyaya-Vaisheshikas this is the theory of a new beginning (arambhavada), that when the cause (upadana) produces an effect then the latter results in the creation of an utterly and uniquely new product.
See ME, 327–330 for a summary of Charvaka tenets.
See, for example, AK, 1.9 that rupa includes external sense-objects (artha).
See ME, pp. 678–681 and pp.888–890 and n.739 for the Tibetan dGe lugs debate on the pervasiveness of “mine”.
See LSNP, p. 297.
See Tsong kha pa in LSNP (p. 302) that the eradication of the non-Buddhist self does nothing to reduce the afflictions such as desire.
For a detailed account of the Sammitiya’s pudgala thesis see N. Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), pp. 194–223.
See ME, 48–51 and 178–193 for Hopkins’ account of this analysis.
See verses 10.14 and 22.1
The MABh, 267 quotes vs. 22.1 following 6.144.
See Leslie Kawamura, Golden Zephyr (tr. of Suhrllekha with a Tibetan comm. by Mi pham) (Emeryville: Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1975), p. 46, n. 58.
See e.g. SN, 1.135 where a human person is said to be like a ‘carriage’ in that it comes to be when the parts are assembled.
T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.39.
See ME, 337–343 for a summary of Vaibhashika tenets.
H.G. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence (New York: Manchester Univ. Press, 1956) (letter 4, para. 4), p. 37. Another statement is: “There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from each.” (Alexander, p.36), also see pp. 61–63. In The Monadology the principle is stated thus: “In nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality (denomination).” In Leibniz The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings op. cit., p. 222.
L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 105.
See PP: 247–248 for the orthodox definitions of the residual (sopadhisesa) and non-residual (nirupadhisesa) nirvanas.
Cf. MK’s analyses of “having”. The corresponding locutions are: “tathagatah skandhavan (22.1)” and “nagnir indhanavan (10.14)” See K. Inada, Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970), pp. 132 and 84.
In summarising the conclusions of the last three sections verse 6.144 proliferates these four misconceived relationships into “twenty [wrong] views of the self”. The twenty are arrived at by applying the four misconceived relationships to each of the five psychophysical constituents.
See BCA, 9.15–32 for a later and analogous critique of Buddhist Phenomenalism.
For Hopkins’ analysis of the critique see ME, 374–397.
See, for example, Madhyantambhaga, 1.5, and ME, 388–392.
See J.S. Mill, “Berkeley’s Life and Writings” in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, vol. 11 of the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 451–452, quote, p. 459
See LSNP, pp. 273–277 for the Vijnanavadas sources for the mind-only thesis.
The issues have been recently discussed by Alex Wayman, “Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians”, JIABS, 21 (1979), 65–78.
Janice Dean Willis, On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asanga’s Bodhisattvabhumi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); both of whom side with a phenomenalist interpretation of the Vijnanavada theory of perception. Such interpretations are selective, I think, and also present just one perspective on the Vijnanavada for many Vijnanavada works, especially Vasubandhu’s treatises, seem clearly idealistic in tone.
See MABh, 139–140 that dependent phenomena cannot be known as objects of the intellect as they exist independently of mental and verbal (RSM, f.l9a4) elaboration.
This breakdown into the three times follows RSM, f. 30b1–32a5.
Supra, pp. 112–13. Also MK, chpt.2.
See LSNP, pp. 317–321 for Tsong kha pa’s comments on this critique.
See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol.1 (New York: Dover Publications (reprint 1962)), pp. 163–169.
BCA, 9.18–19.
Also MA, 6.92–3
Supra.
Cf. W for a similar debate between the Madhyamikas and Hindu Naiyayikas. The issue in question is the same, viz., the consistency and efficacy of the Madhyamika propositions and logic, though the arguments are not exactly parallel, as the VV does not focus its critique on the question of an interface between refutation and what is refuted. The objections in the VV (1–4) are that (vs.1) if the Madhyamikas are consistent then their propositions have no self-existence, in which case those propositions are powerless to refute self-existence. On the other hand (vs.2), if the propositions do nave a self-existence the Madhyamikas are inconsistent with their assertion that all things are empty. The Madhyamikas’ reply (vss. 21–99) is that they are consistent as their propositions do not have a self- nature. Their efficacy is in their being causally conditioned. For a reconstruction and appraisal of the arguments in the VV see Mark Siderits, “The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistomology 11,” JIP, 9 (1981), 121–160. Cf. also BCA, 112–113 that there can be no relation between a cognition and its object of comprehension for one who upholds the intrinsic existence of these.
See, for example, F.J. Streng, “The Significance of Pratityasamutpada for Understanding the Relationship between Samvrti and Paramarthasatya in Nagarjuna”, in M. Sprung (ed), Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1973), pp. 27–39.
D. Seyfort Ruegg, op. cit., pp. 10–13; and David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 156
MABh, 228.
See MSA, 15.28–36 for the ‘path of intuition’ as gaining a non-dualistic perception.
The path structures and path structure literatures in Buddhism are many and complex, and deserve a study in their own right. Besides different structures being given for the paths traversed by arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, variations occur between the various philosophical schools. Both Madhyamika schools, the Svatantrika and Prasangika, describe different paths for all three yanas. They are agreed though on the significance of the path of seeing as the yogin’s first genuine knowledge of emptiness and the traversing of ten levels prior to the buddha-level. The Svatantrika path structure for all three yanas is the subject matter of the Abhisamayalamkara. For studies see E. Bastian, op. cit., pp, and E. Obermiller, “The Doctrine of Prajna-paramita…”. See H.V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1974), chpt. 5 for description of the Theravada, Vaibhashika, and Vijnanavada paths.
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Fenner, P. (1990). The Profound View. In: The Ontology of the Middle Way. Studies of Classical India, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0547-4_3
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