Abstract
We shall focus on thesis 2 which entails the basic redundancy theory: the claim that for any sentence A, A and “it is true that A” say the same. There are three objections to this claim which we shall take up. The first is that not all truth is realist or objective truth, and that thesis 2 does not fit non-objective truth. The second is an objection put forth by Michael Dummett. Dummett argues against thesis 2 using principles he thinks are found in Frege’s philosophy. The third objection against thesis 2 is that thesis 2 is inconsistent with truth value gaps. In this chapter we take up the first objection. In the next chapter we take up the second and third objections.
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Hugly, P., Sayward, C. (1996). Non-Objective Truth. In: Intensionality and Truth. Synthese Library, vol 255. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0293-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0293-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6617-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-0293-0
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