Abstract
12.1 The Possibility of an Account. Though he acknowledged no need to provide any account of truth for sentential quantifications, Prior’s text yet suggests a conception of quantification which coheres with the claim that sentential quantification is neither objectual (and thus certainly not referential) nor substitutional, and which may lend itself to an account of truth for such quantification.
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Hugly, P., Sayward, C. (1996). A Possible Solution. In: Intensionality and Truth. Synthese Library, vol 255. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0293-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0293-0_13
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