Abstract
In this paper we consider multiobjective matrix games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals. Games considered here and conventional matrix games differ by the following three points. First, we employ representing entries of a payoff matrix as fuzzy numbers for expressing ambiguity and imprecision in information which is utilized in modeling of games because such information is not always accurate. Second, multiple payoffs are considered in games because most of decision making problems under conflict possess multiple objectives such as cost, time and productivity. Third, we assume that each player has a fuzzy goal for each objective in order to incorporate ambiguity of human judgment.
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© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Sakawa, M., Nishizaki, I. (1995). A Solution Concept in Multiobjective Matrix Games with Fuzzy Payoffs and Fuzzy Goals. In: Bien, Z., Min, K.C. (eds) Fuzzy Logic and its Applications to Engineering, Information Sciences, and Intelligent Systems. Theory and Decision Library, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0125-4_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0125-4_41
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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