Abstract
I would like to reexamine the thought experiments that are very often invoked by those who argue for anti-individualism. I will try to reevaluate those experiments by interpreting the statements that they purport to elucidate within a general semantical framework which accounts for the meaning of sentences in terms of assertability conditions.
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References
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Seymour, M. (1996). “Three Thought Experiments Revisited”. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_8
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