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“Three Thought Experiments Revisited”

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Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 178))

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Abstract

I would like to reexamine the thought experiments that are very often invoked by those who argue for anti-individualism. I will try to reevaluate those experiments by interpreting the statements that they purport to elucidate within a general semantical framework which accounts for the meaning of sentences in terms of assertability conditions.

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References

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Seymour, M. (1996). “Three Thought Experiments Revisited”. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6537-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-0113-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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