Teleological Arguments from a Methodological Viewpoint

Abstract

In Michael Ruse’s Philosophy of Biology Today, the chapter devoted to teleology starts with a paradoxical statement:

A major philosophical puzzle about biology stems from the way in which its practitioners, unlike physicists and chemists, seem generally quite prepared to use teleological or functional language (Woodfield, 1976; Wright, 1976; Rescher, 1986; O’Grady, 1986). They talk about “ends” or “functions” or “purposes” - as in “the sail on the back of the dimetrodon exists in order to regulate body temperature” or in “heartbeats serve no useful function”. Admittedly, every now and then biologists lecture themselves sternly on their practices. They assure themselves - and us - that their usage is just shorthand. And they try to pretend that they are not doing what they do, by refusing to talk of “teleology” and substituting “teleonomy” or some such thing (Mayr, 1974). But the language does persist (Ruse, 1988).