Abstract
In this chapter, I introduce and explain the relation between three seemingly conflicting claims that guide the discussion throughout the book. I argue that Rawls’s conception of political identity can reconcile the apparent conflict between these claims. The first claim is Embedded Essential Characteristics, which is the claim that characteristics that are essential to personhood or personal identity are, at least to some extent, embedded in or partially constituted by persons’ societies or values. The second claim, Public Justification, is the claim that the coercive power of the government must be justified to the people subject to the coercion by reasons they accept. The third claim is The Fact of Disagreement, which concerns the fact that liberal democratic societies are characterized by intractable disagreement on citizens’ fundamental values. In the first chapter, I use these three claims to explain how the issues in the liberal/communitarian debate relate to the current discussion of perfectionism versus neutrality in politics. I explain why looking back at the liberal/communitarian debate, which focused on Rawls’s conception of persons, can be useful as a vehicle for assessing the current perfectionism/neutrality debate as well as for developing a viable conception of political identity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
This claim, in particular, is one that needs refining. The way I’ve stated it here allows for a number of interpretations. It is so stated because a number of interpretations of it are found, but not adequately distinguished, in the literature.
- 2.
- 3.
“5 GOP Presidential Maybes Share Iowa Stage” (2011)
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
For a useful overview, see Gaus (2009).
- 6.
My purpose is not to argue that this is the best definition for the term ‘political identity ’ which is used to refer to the general characteristics of a nation, or a political group, or to the essence of what it is to be a citizen, and so on. I think this use of the term is fair, and if someone objects I urge them to take the term ‘political identity’ as shorthand for the unwieldy phrase “cluster of characteristics of a person that are relevant for political theorizing.”
- 7.
Rawls never articulates a conception of political identity per se. He relies on a conception of persons in the original position , and on a political conception of the person . In the final chapter, I use these two elements as the basis for a Rawlsian conception of political identity.
- 8.
It is worth noting that Taylor (2007) , whose work will be discussed in depth in the following chapters was originally engaged in the debate regarding the (purportedly negative) implications liberal political theory has for the nature of personhood and personal identity , but has recently been focusing on issues connected with those I discuss in this manuscript—issues having to do with how living in a “secular age” relates to political justification and people’s developing their personal and political identities, see, e.g., Taylor (2007, pp. 453–59) .
- 9.
- 10.
I say ‘certain specific conceptions’ rather because some perfectionist theories are pluralists about what is intrinsically valuable. By this I mean, such theorists hold that a particular conception of what is intrinsically valuable is objectively true, but that the conception may allow for more than one “good.” For example, one could hold that living an excellent life is objectively intrinsically valuable, but that there is more than one way that a person could live an excellent life.
- 11.
Sandel (1984, p. xi) claims that his view “is not, strictly speaking, communitarian … it is better described as teleological, or (in the jargon of contemporary philosophy) perfectionist” Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
- 12.
I discuss liberal perfectionism in more detail in Chap. 8.
- 13.
Isaiah Berlin (1969) .
- 14.
For elaboration on this point, see the discussion of empirical objections in Chap. 6, p. 115 ff.
- 15.
References
“5 GOP Presidential Maybes Share Iowa Stage” Last modified March 8, 2011 (http://www.npr.org/2011/03/08/134354471/5-gop-presidential-maybes-share-iowa-stage)
Ballamy, Richard., and Martin Hollis, eds. 1999. Pluralism and liberal neutrality. Portland: Frank Cass.
DeGrazia, David. 2005. Human identity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaus, Gerald F. 2009. The moral foundations of liberal neutrality. In Contemporary debates in political philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Christman, 81–98. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Isaiah Berlin. 1969. Two concepts of liberty in Isaiah Berlin. Four essays on liberty. London: Oxford University Press.
Lecce, Steven. 2008. Against perfectionism: Defending liberal neutrality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lister, Andrew. 2010. Public justification and the limits of State Action. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9:151–175.
Macedo, Stephen. 1991. Liberal virtues: Citizenship, virtue, and community in liberal constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Olson, Eric T. 2007. What are we? A study in personal ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quong, Jonathan. 2011. Liberalism without perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sandel, Michael. 1998. Liberalism and the limits of justice. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schechtman, Marya. 1996. The constitution of selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Shoemaker, David W. 1996. Theoretical persons and practical agents. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25:318–332.
Shoemaker, David W. 2007. Personal identity and practical concerns. Mind 116:317–357.
Taylor, Charles. 2007. A secular age. Cambridge: Belknap.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1987. Theoretical foundations of liberalism. Philosophical Quarterly 147:127–150.
Wall, Steven. 2009. Perfectionism in politics: A defense. In Contemporary debates in political philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Christman, 99–117. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wall, Steven. 2010. Neutralism for perfectionists: The case of restricted state neutrality. Ethics 120:232–256.
Wall, Steven., and George Klosko, eds. 2003. Perfectionism and Neutrality. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Campbell, C. (2014). Political Identity, Perfectionism, and Neutrality. In: Persons, Identity, and Political Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-7916-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-7917-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)