Abstract
Since the publication of The Scientific Image and earlier works Bas C. van Fraassen has defended his constructive empiricism as the most appropriate philosophical interpretation of scientific activity in critical open dialogue with realisms (both old and new) and instrumentalisms. A new impetus was added to the debate by the publication of his most recent book, Scientific Representation, in which he qualifies some of his basic suppositions and proposes a new name for his empiricism: empiricist structuralism. In this paper I argue in line with his thesis that if philosophy of science aims to offer a specific view and an adequate interpretation of science, the starting point should be a recognition of the complexity of the dialectic process between theoretical construction and data generation, processing and laboratory analysis procedures; also a recognition of the central role of subjects as interpreters in designing and using scientific representations. I also argue that the family resemblance which exists between the constructivist/structuralist empiricism and American pragmatism suggests new avenues for analysing the decision-making process and the role played by subjects who interpret, construct or use models in scientific contexts. A connexion with the pragmatists’ thesis and perspective that is very much present, not only in van Fraassen’s most recent texts on scientific representation, as some other authors maintain, but also from the outset in his earliest publications.
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Notes
- 1.
This is how I defined it in the text analysing the work and focus of van Fraassen. Perdomo and Sánchez (2003).
- 2.
M. Suárez believes that, due to this change of course, van Fraassen ends up “in no man’s land. Or in someone else’s land. I think we end up in the land of pragmatism.” In my opinion, constructivist empiricism and pragmatism have always shared common ground. See Ladyman et al. (2011) (Nov. 2010).
- 3.
U. Moulines has affirmed that “the philosophy of science constructs interpretative philosophical frameworks which enable us to understand these interpretative frameworks of the reality which we call scientific theory.” Beyond the limits imposed by the descriptive/prescriptive dichotomy for defining the task of philosophy of science, what this implies is the possibility of offering a view of things, a way of thinking about certain phenomena in a certain manner. Moulines (1995, 110). This approach is very similar to that offered by van Fraassen.
- 4.
It is also applied fruitfully to the analysis of the history of science, as a means of putting into practice different styles of scientific reasoning and creative imagination. The history of science is understood as the result of applying different styles of scientific thinking, and as the product of both processes of mutation and the continuity of said styles of thought. This is the approach adopted by A. C. Crombie (1994).
- 5.
There are other models we could use to illustrate this attitude: the attitude of the feminist critique of science, for example, and more specifically, that of critical and contextual empiricism, defended by H. Longino, for whom the possibility of a future non-androcentric science is necessarily based not on the absolute condemnation of science, but rather on the adoption of a critical attitude to both contextual values and internal methodological criteria and the rules that define this practice (H. Longino 2002). This attitude is also expressed by Kant in Prolegomena, when he confesses that Hume interrupted his dogmatic slumbering, giving his research a completely different character. This is, according to van Fraassen, a perfect illustration of the empiricist attitude, although Kant did not define it as such.
- 6.
van Fraassen explores this idea of interpretation, which is similar to that used in the arts context, in “Interpretation in science and in the arts,” 1993, 73–99.
- 7.
I am referring to Balzer, Sneed and Stegmuller’s structuralist view. The structuralist approach defended by both perspectives provides a set of conceptual tools for dealing with the fact that science is, above all, a kind of activity whose aim is to provide an interpretation of its object of study in terms of its structure. They defend this activity as being essentially constructive in nature, i.e., scientists construct models, mathematical objects, which are then used to represent nature. Structuralism continues to defend the ideal of axiomatisation, opting for mathematical methods such as set theory to develop its vision of science. Thus, it offers a series of tools appropriate for reconstructing highly mathematised theories, enabling the adequate establishment of the set of elements and relationships which make up a theory, as well as the relationships between different theoretical elements, whether they be contemporary or part of a historic series. However, at the same time, in our opinion, this approach was unable to offer an image of the processes of theoretical construction based on the idealisation of the world of experience, and therefore, an adequate image of the relationships existing between theories and the world, issues which van Fraassen’s approach does tackle.
- 8.
This is a concept used by F. Suppe (1974/1977), 257.
- 9.
This fiction of isolation is the reason why the results obtained are, strictly speaking, false. It is, on the other hand, the reason for the explanatory and predictive force of the hypotheses, hypotheses which rather than talking about how phenomena behave, focus instead on how they would behave in the event of said ideal conditions coming to pass. An updated debate based on contemporary references to the Kantian Vaihinger and the philosophy of “as if,” or the analyses which explore the use of fictions and simulation in the construction of models and theories.
- 10.
The difference is defined by van Fraassen in “On the extension of Beth’s semantics of physical theories,” 1970, 325–339.
- 11.
van Fraassen (1980, 12). Although in other later texts van Fraassen tackles the question of belief not as an all or nothing issue, but rather by incorporating the probabilistic model. Belief, according to W. James, as van Fraassen read him, is a question of will and is, above all, a decision to make a commitment.
- 12.
- 13.
The arguments are mainly developed in van Fraassen (1989a), passim.
- 14.
These data may arise in what have been dubbed the “margins of science” The similarly to Feyerabend is evident, but the resemblance to new studies of science from the gender perspective is also patent. These studies have levelled radical criticism at many aspects and ideas of the more traditional philosophy of science and the resulting images of science, while at the same time outlining new epistemological proposals.
- 15.
The resulting image may be that of a patchwork of theories, disciplines and laws, with no hierarchical order or systematic relationship. Vid. N. Cartwright (1999).
- 16.
The political, cultural and social context of the inter-war period, in which the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group arose, has been widely studied by intellectual and political historians. In his work, P. Galison presents what he terms the Aufbau culture. The concept has been badly translated as “reconstruction,” an interpretation which dilutes all its original revolutionary meaning. The original authors used the term to express a radical sense of newness, a breaking away from the past and a deep-rooted conviction that the inauguration of a “new world” should not be superficial, but should rather mean a complete transformation of culture, education and architecture, expressed in the Bauhaus movement and the new ways of reasoning. Galison (1996).
- 17.
Richardson’s analysis moves away from specific philosophical theses in order to focus on the philosophical commitments, goals and aspirations of empiricists and pragmatists, on the motivational and attitudinal elements of scientific philosophy, a project shared by both parties in an attempt to overcome an aging philosophy closely allied to traditional conservative discourses. From this perspective, the convergence between empiricism and pragmatism becomes much clearer. Richardson (2002).
- 18.
These ideas are developed in more detail by Ángel M. Faerna (1996).
- 19.
A comprehensive study of the role of fictions in the construction of models and theories and the epistemological consequences of the use of these strategies has been edited by Suárez (2009).
- 20.
This was argued also by Steven French (2003).
- 21.
van Fraassen (2008, 239).
- 22.
Ladyman et al. (2011), Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics. Metascience. Book Symposium, published online, November 2010.
- 23.
In other works I have explored this relationship between models and maps, focusing on the differences between the realists P. Kitcher and R. Ronald Giere and the empiricists H. Longino and van Fraassen. Perdomo (2011).
- 24.
Giere (2006), 64. The slogan could be, proposes Giere: No representation without representers.
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Perdomo, I. (2014). Scientific Activity as an Interpretative Practice. Empiricism, Constructivism and Pragmatism. In: Gonzalez, W.J. (eds) Bas van Fraassen’s Approach to Representation and Models in Science. Synthese Library, vol 368. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7838-2_2
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