Abstract
Our embodied minds frame and act on hypotheses as spontaneously as our lungs inhale and exhale. The ceaseless rhythm involved in the inhalation and exhalation of breath might itself be taken as a metaphor for the framing and testing of hypotheses. The give-and-take of this physiological function exhibits what the semiotic function of human conjecture functionally is—a dialogue with the world, truly a give-and-take. In being semiotic, however, this function does not cease to be somatic; indeed, it is at once a semiotic, somatic, situated, and historical function. So, even our most causal, hence our most unreflective movements, embody our hypotheses—for example, our hand assuredly reaching for the handle of a door is guided by a conjecture, no less than that same organ frantically trying to clutch a limb as we are tumbling down a steep incline. Explicitly formulated and critically assessed hypotheses are the exceptions to the rule, whereas thoroughly tacit, irreducibly somatic conjectures define the rule in this case. Our movements are in effect conjectures. The space in which they take place is ineluctably a space of signs (an expression deliberately used to recall the use of “the space of reasons” by Wilfrid Sellars and other philosophers).
This chapter grew out of a presentation to a session of the Metaphysical Society of America (December 27, 2011), held in conjunction with the Easter Division of the American Philosophical Association. At this session, I received very helpful suggestions and criticisms for various members of the audience, but especially from Robert Innis, John Lysaker, and John Stuhr.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. R. W. Emerson (1982, pp. 225–238).
- 2.
See my Colapietro (2003, pp. 157–179).
- 3.
Though this is a word used more memorably by John Dewey than either Charles Peirce or William James, it is also used by Peirce and James. Moreover, it is used to make the point being stressed by Dewey in his deployment of this term.
- 4.
“If any of us knew what we were doing, or where we are going,” R. W. Emerson stress in “Experience,” “then when we think we know best! We do not know to-day whether we are busy or idle” (Emerson 1982, p. 286). In “the Poet,” he suggests: “All that we call sacred history attests that the birth of the poet is the principal event in chronology. Man, never so often deceived, still watches for the arrival of a brother who can hold him steady to a truth until he has made it his own” (265). The insights provided by the utterances of such a poet “will reconcile me to life and renovate nature, to see trifles animated by a tendency, and to know what I am doing” (emphasis added)—i.e., to allow me to come to know what I have been and am now doing. “Life [as a consequence] will no more be a noise.” It will be rather a sound possessing significance, indeed a self-understood significance. Even so, it is imperative to recall (returning to “Experience”): “The results of life are uncalculated and uncalculable. The years teach much which the days never know. The persons who compose our company converse, and come and go, and design and execute many things, and somewhat comes of it, but an unlooked-for result” (300). Regarding this result, Emerson goes so far as to say (at least in this context) the “individual is always mistaken” (pp. 300–301). Without question, “something is done,” even advances (though little) are made, “but the individual is always mistaken.” For it “turns out somewhat new and very unlike what he promised himself” (301).
- 5.
In a later reformulation of his pragmatist position Peirce noted: The indubitable beliefs acknowledged by the critical commonsensist “refer to a somewhat primitive mode of life, and while … they never become dubitable in so far as our mode of life remains that of somewhat primitive man, yet as we develop degrees of self-control unknown to that man, occasions of action arise in relation to which the original manner of means, but in our highest activities” (5.511). The innate dispositions of the human animal (i.e., beliefs, if stretched to cover them, have no sufficient authority. In other words, we outgrow the applicability of instincts [including our instinctual beliefs or innate dispositions]—not altogether, by any human instincts) tend to be effective in the narrowly circumscribed situations for which these behavioral tendencies have proven advantageous. But, “man is so continually getting himself into novel situations that he needs, and is supplied with, a subsidiary faculty of reasoning for bringing instinct to bear upon situations to which it [instinct] does not apply directly” (6.497). This faculty or capacity is first and foremost that of conjecture, deduction and inducting being subservient to abduction.
- 6.
We are ineluctably haunted by the possibility that the qualitatively resonant world of our “immediate” (or direct) experience is somehow not identifiable with the real world (cf. Stanley Cavell on skepticism). The world as it is disclosed in our experience seems itself to point to a world beyond anything we can even imagine or conceive. For the pragmatist, however, any distinction between the world of our experience and the world needs to be seen as one we draw—and do so in the context of experience itself, for the sake of rendering the world of our experience more luminous, secure, fulfilling, inhabitable, and indeed intelligible. In The Quest for Certainty Dewey (1929/1990) emphatically asserts: “The world as we experience it is the real world. But it is not in its primary phases [or primordial character] a world that is known, a world that is understood, and is intellectually coherent and secure. Knowing consists in operations that give experienced objects a form in which the relations, upon which the outward course of events depends, are securely experienced. It marks a transitional redirection and rearrangement of the real. It is intermediate and instrumental; it comes between a relatively casual and accidental experience of existence and one relatively settled and defined. The knower is within the world of existence; his knowing, as experimental, marks an interaction of one existence with other existences” (LW 4, 235-36). This knowing, precisely as experimental is in the fist instance conjectural. It is the offspring of hypotheses. No matter how secure it becomes in the tangled course of our intellectual history, the value of our knowing remains in large measure that of providing basis for ever more fruitful hypotheses.
- 7.
“No human acquisition is,” José Ortega y Gasset (1957) notes in Man and People, “stable. Even what appears to us most completely won and consolidated can disappear in a few generations” (p. 25).
- 8.
The word intuition of course is ambiguous. I am using it (following the lead of Peirce in “Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”) to designate an immediate cognition, i.e., a cognition not mediated by signs or concepts.
- 9.
This involves a paradox, since it leaves the relationship between intelligence and intelligibility unmediated and, thereby, unintelligible. But this paradox is generated by the necessity, on the one hand, to avoid reductionism (i.e., to acknowledge the irreducibility of the relationship between intelligence and intelligibility) and, on the other, to render this relationship intelligible in the accredited modes of human understanding (e.g., by offering an evolutionary account of the emergence and functions of animal intelligence).
- 10.
“It is,” Peirce suggests, “plain that intelligence does not consist in feeling in a certain way, but in acting in a certain way. Only, we must acknowledge that there are inward actions—what might be called potential actions, that is, actions which do no take place [in the outward world], but which somehow influence the formation of habits” (CP 5.286; cf. 5.479). Cf. Chapter 5 of my Peirce’s Approach to the Self.
- 11.
In particular, I am focusing on the section of this text devoted to “The Triad in Psychology,” that is, how the categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness appear in the context of the experimental study of consciousness and (more broadly) mind.
- 12.
Using an analogy from geometry, Peirce describes the lower modes of thirdness as degenerate. The mode of synthetic consciousness being identified here is thus indicated to be “[s]ynthetical consciousness degenerate in the first degree” (CP 1.383).
- 13.
By the expression “a transcendental force of necessity,” all Peirce means here is an external force (i.e., a force outside of consciousness itself, thus one in a sense transcending consciousness), one capable of exerting such control over our minds or consciousness that, in given circumstances, we cannot think otherwise than we are compelled to do as a result of this force upon us. E.g., the object in the foreground of my vision is near, while those in the background are far from me, my experience of the relative positions of these visual objects being a paradigmatic instance of the kind of brute compulsion (external “necessity”) intended by Peirce in this context.
- 14.
In “Religious Insight and the Cognitive Problem,” John E. Smith writes: “Under what circumstances, in a world of whirling atoms, would systems of meaning, of intelligibility and purpose emerge unless there were some form of co-ordination between the types of order we encounter in every region of existence and the human mind with its capacity for symbolic representation?” (Smith 1971, p. 109). He adds: “Experience makes its appearance only when there occurs a [more or less] precisely co-ordinated interaction between a structured world and a sign-using animal capable of remembering what has happened and of anticipating what may come” (110).
- 15.
In A Pluralistic Universe, William James (1977) asserts: “What really exists is not things made but things in the making” (117).
- 16.
In doing so, I am not implying that Emerson is a pragmatist, but rather that the pragmatists were (among other things) his progeny. See Stanley Cavell’s (1998).
- 17.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me point out that I am speaking ironically: those in the know about knowledge—professional epistemologists—are as often as not guilty of knowingness (the presumption to be in an ideal position to determine—in some instance, truly to dictate—what knowledge is or even what it must be.
- 18.
In Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, John Greco (2010) notes: “One benefit of the distinction [between knowledge and understanding] is that it points to a richer plurality of epistemic goods. Truth and knowledge have epistemic value, but so do understanding, wisdom and other intellectual goods. It should not be unexpected that the values manifested in this plurality are distinctive, and therefore require distinctive treatment in a complete epistemology” (pp. 7–8).
- 19.
In “What Does the Maker Mind Make?” (an essay on Aristotle’s doctrine of nous poiētikos), L. A. Kosman (1992) asserts, “animals have a rudimentary form of nous in the general capacity of discrimination which is aesthesis” (p. 357).
- 20.
In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein (2009) notes: “Concepts lead us to make investigations; [they] are expressions of our interests, and direct our interests” (#570). They are shaped in no small measure in accord with out interests; but, in turn, our interests themselves are directed and even transformed by our reliance upon concepts.
- 21.
In Philosophy in a New Key, Susanne K. Langer (1966) asserts: “The first thing we instinctively try to conceive is simply the experience of being alive. Life is a network of needs and fulfillments and further needs, with temporary frustrations here and there. If its basic needs are long unsatisfied, it ends [death ensues]. Our first consciousness is the sense of need, i.e., desire. Therefore our most elementary conceptions are of objects for desire” (130). Cf. Dewey (1925/1990, p. 194 ff.)
- 22.
“I take this evanescence and lubricity of objects,” Emerson suggests, “which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (Emerson 1982, p. 288). Cf. Cavell.
- 23.
In Modes of Thought, Whitehead (1938/1966) identifies the activity of assemblage. Specifically, he urges that the task of systematic articulation be preceded by that of intellectual assemblage (the identification of the themes or ideas most worthy of being integrated into a systematic articulation of what strives to cover the entire range of human experience). See Colapietro (2010).
- 24.
“Interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or take our stand upon, are,” James notes, “the very floor out of which our mental dough is kneaded. The organism of thought, from the vague dawn of discomfort or ease in the polyp to the intellectual joy of Laplace among his formulas, is teleological through and through. Not a cognition occurs but feeling is there to comment on it, to stamp it as of greater or less worth” (Essays in Philosophy, 18). In reference to the human organism, as an engaged participant rather than aloof spectator, James emphasizes: “its judgments of the should-be, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of cogitandum as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival” (21). “Every actual existing consciousness,” James (1983) proposes in his Principles of Psychology, “seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not” (144). The success of the ends for which an organism fights, and by which he practically defines its identity, are far from guaranteed. This makes of the world not only (as is implicit in his characterization of consciousness as a fighter for ends) an arena of action but also (as he states explicitly in The Varieties of Religious Experience) “a theatre for heroism” (290).
- 25.
“Bear in mind that interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a certain object” (MW 9, 362). If we bear this in mind, then there is no need either to assume a need to propel the self into motion (as though a living being were an inert mass until pushed or pulled by an utterly external force) or to take the objects with which the self, in its very identity, is bound up to be fixed.
- 26.
In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead (1933/1967) suggests that the subject-object relationship is not first and foremost the knower-known relationship. The primordial relationship of subjectivity to the world in which it is enmeshed is affective, not epistemic—a relationship of “concern” in the Quaker sense, not knowledge in its typically abstract meaning (pp. 175–176).
- 27.
The reason for this parenthetical remark is to avoid begging the question of skepticism. It may be the case that the knower is animated by a desire forever frustrated by some invincible defect in it or some insurmountable elusiveness in the objects on which it sets its sight.
- 28.
Our understanding of the categories, Peirce insists, “must grow up in the mind, under the hot sunshine of hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well-aimed thought; and you must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are no inventions of mine [cf. Peirce’s letter to James, CP 8.264]. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn them. Confused notions of these [distinct] elements [or aspects] appear in the first infancy of philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle’s De Caelo …” (CP 1, 521). In a letter to Victoria Lady Welby (12 October 1904), Peirce confessed that, “after only three or four years’ study,” he was led to the categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. “This sort of notion is,” he stressed, “as distasteful to me as to anybody; and for years, I endeavored to pooh-pooh and refute it; but it long ago conquered me completely. Disagreeable as it is to attribute such meaning to numbers, and to a triad above all, it is as true as it is disagreeable” (CP 8.328).
- 29.
- 30.
There are often dramatically what William James calls life answering to life, e.g., a smile returned or an embrace accepted and answered by an embrace. The sense of a threatening or a beneficent being is one of our most rudimentary yet crucial abductive propensities.
- 31.
In Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought, Lloyd (1968) notes: Aristotle “evidently arrived at his classification [of reality] mainly from a consideration of linguistic facts, that is of what kinds of things may be said, and of what kinds of questions may be asked, about anything, and this is natural enough, for he assumes that the logical distinctions that these data suggest will reflect and reveal the real distinctions between [or among] the real things in which he is interested” (114; emphasis added). I would make the even stronger claim that Aristotle derived his categories, first and foremost, from the array of questions any responsible inquirer, regardless of the specific field being explored, must ask. The categories are instruments of inquiry and, hence, means of interrogation.
- 32.
Peirce goes on to claim: The very “possibility of science depends upon the fact that human thought necessarily partakes of whatever character is diffused through the whole universe, and that its natural modes have some tendency to be the modes of action of the universe” (CP 1.351). In Psychology: the Briefer Course, James makes an analogous point when he writes: “Mind and world … have evolved together, and in consequence they are something of a mutual fit” (19).
- 33.
While inquiry is a species of query, query is hardly exhausted by the forms of probing properly identified as inquiry or investigation. Moral and artistic query ought not to be assimilated too quickly or too completely to scientific query. In the chapter in Nature and Judgment (Buchler 1966) devoted to explaining query bu noting: “The tradition term ‘inquiry’ has come to be used in a very broad sense. …This breadth of usage for ‘inquiry’ is booth good and bad. It is good because it suggests that an important form of conduct is not limited to the profession of a discipline. But it is bad because it forces the mold of assertive judgment over the other modes of judgment [these being, according to Buchler, active and exhibitive]. To speak [for example] of art as inquiry is misleading and awkward. The term is applicable to science and to one function of philosophy; but art is contrivance [i.e., a mode of articulation primarily involving exhibitive judgment]. Inquiry may enter into art, contrivance into science. Contrivance in natural science takes the form of physical experimentation, and in mathematics it takes the form of symbol legislation and symbol organization. … In philosophy, contrivance is an end in itself; it takes the form of arranging categories into an order of judgments which compels as an order and not only as a means of assertive [i.e., the exhibitive function of philosophical discourse is as important as the assertive dimension]. Like art, philosophy contrives to exhibit traits; like science, it aims to affirm truth. Science, art, and philosophy are equally modes of invention. But ‘query’ is a fuller term than ‘invention’. ‘Invention’ primarily suggests the emergence of a product: ‘query’ the process of advance, the nature of this process and the product as a relative termination. ‘Query’ bears the sense of activity persisting beyond a given product. … The freedom and sacredness of query, not merely of inquiry, is what must be meant in the account of the struggle between reason and unreason” (58–59; emphasis added).
- 34.
“Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and hæcceity, or pure secondness, are facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question about; hæcceity is the ultima ratio, the brutal fact that will not be questioned. But every fact of a general or orderly nature [and intelligibility is such a fact] calls for an explanation” (CP 1.405).
- 35.
The idea of the absolutely first “precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought; assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown!” (CP 1.357). Along these same lines, Peirce stresses, “the conception of the absolute first eludes every attempt to grasp it” (CP 1.362). While the “idea of second must be reckoned as an easy one to comprehend [at least, to designate or point out], “[t]hat of first is so tender that you cannot touch it without spoiling it” (CP 1.358), i.e., with destroying it.
- 36.
In “Religious Insight and the Cognitive Problem,” Smith stresses: “Whatever may be the shortcomings of modern idealism, it has one distinctive insight indispensable for understanding man and the world. From that standpoint, the real is not adequately represented by a ‘given’ external world on one side and an internal knowing subject on the other. The fact of man and the fact of the world do not exhaust what there is; in addition there is the peculiar relation of intelligibility holding between the two and this relation is just as real as its terms. The total reality we find must be represented as man-in-the-universe-interpreting the universe” (110-11; cf. William James (1902/1985) in The Varieties of Religious Experience on the “full fact,” 393). Though Smith almost certainly did not have John William Miller in mind when he made this point, Miller was one of a host of idealists who tried to stake a position (to use W. M. Urban’s expression, “beyond realism and idealism”). (See Smith’s article in Review of Metaphysics on Urban). Moreover, he was emphatic in refusing to sunder what in our experience is integrally related. Self and world cannot be torn apart; they are equi-primordial. In The Midworld of Symbols, Miller (1982) affirms: “What I am unwilling to say is, ‘There is the world, and here are the signs.” That seems to me impossible…” (75).
- 37.
Dewey (1925/1988) Experience and Nature (Later Works, volume 1, see especially 371–372, 386–387, and 389–391).
- 38.
Cf. William Ernest Hocking (1959) in Types of Philosophy [Third Edition] on spiritualism (Chapter “The Continuity of Life: On Peirceʼs Objective Idealism, “The Enduring Pre-Philosophy: Spiritualism”; also Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man by Henri Franfort et al.
- 39.
In Themes in American Philosophy (Smith 1970), in particular in “Charles S. Peirce: Community and Reality,” Smith charges (and, in my judgment ,justly charges that: “Peirce, for all of his understanding of the need for an ontological theory, still belonged to that modern tradition in philosophy according to which the key to being is found through being known” (105). Later in this essay he details this charge by noting: “Peirce seems to have underestimated the differential character of the controlled, theoretical inquiry that is to issue in the real truth about things. The question may fairly be raised as to whether the knowing relation is the only [or even simply the primary] relation in which we stand to the world and to the things in it. Ethics, aesthetics, and religion point to dimensions of things that are excluded from the highly precise, and therefore abstract, considerations that are alone relevant for scientific inquiry. This is not to say that Peirce neglected these other dimensions n his thought; it is rather to say that they cannot easily be included in a theory of reality in which the ultimate truth comes from scientific inquiry alone. The reality of things is not exhausted in their being material for knowledge. This is the great error of much modern philosophy; Peirce was not free from it” (108). Cf. also Smith’s (1981) “Philosophical Interpretation and the Religious Dimension of Experience” in Logos 2, pp. 5–20; and John Dewey, “Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relation,” The Journal of Philosophy, volume 8, number 20 (September 1911), reprinted in Middle Works of John Dewey, volume 6, 111–122.
- 40.
In “Ego and Reality,” one of the essays included in Papers on Psycho-Analysis, Hans Loewald offer extremely important insights into how certain conceptions of reality reflect distinctive stages of emotional maturity. In Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul, Jonathan Lear (1998) helpfully draws upon these insights (see pp. 123–147).
- 41.
This in no way contradicts what Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) argues in Philosophical Investigations regarding ostensive definition.
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Colapietro, V. (2014). The Ineffable, the Individual, and the Intelligible: Peircean Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human Animal. In: Romanini, V., Fernández, E. (eds) Peirce and Biosemiotics. Biosemiotics, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7732-3_7
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