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Part of the book series: Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems ((SSCNS,volume 9))

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Abstract

In this chapter we will review a set of models of consciousness that are presently considered the most promising by those working in the field of neurally-based models of consciousness. We specify that the models we evaluate are indeed neurally-based, since neural networks form the basic structure of the brain. However the models need not necessarily be ones expressed in mathematical formulae, ready for simulation (as we developed in Sect. 2.2 and the associated Appendix). The criterion we will apply will be in terms of the use in the models of various components of the brain, with functionality of those components being seen to be based on that of the various lobes or modules of the cortex or of sub-cortical nuclei.

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Taylor, J.G. (2013). Current Brain Based Models of Consciousness. In: Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_4

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