Abstract
The mind is composed of mental fragments – sensations, feelings, thoughts, imaginations, all flowing now in an ordered sequence, now in a chaotic fashion. There are also non-conscious components involved in early brain processing of stimuli (as in lower level processing in vision, such as in V1) or in emotions not yet in consciousness (as discussed in Chap. 14). On the other hand the body is constructed to obey the underlying laws of physics, and its components obey the well-enumerated laws of physiology. It is these characteristic differences – between mind and body – that leads to the Mind-Body problem.
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Taylor, J.G. (2013). Solving the Mind-Body Problem. In: Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_15
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