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Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising

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Business Ethics and Risk Management

Part of the book series: Ethical Economy ((SEEP,volume 43))

Abstract

In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a more plausible account of promissory obligation. My conclusion is negative. Given the arguments on the table, I argue, we should conclude that the debate is in a stalemate. It is, therefore, hard to see how the issue of promissory obligation could help us choose between consequentialism and deontology.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It seems that the morality of promising is one of the aspects of the general moral philosophical debate which should particularly interest business ethicists. Business ethicists, after all, often stress the central moral importance of contracts Sollars (2002). Some of them even go so far as to claim that the whole subject is based on the notion of a contract Lütge (2005). Since contracts are, in effect, mutual promises, business ethicists should, it seems, be most interested in what deontologists and consequentialists have to say about promissory obligations.

  2. 2.

    Note, however, that certain theorists (e.g. Birnbacher (1999) and Nida-Rümelin (1993)) have proposed a taxonomy that makes room for “deontological consequentialism”.

  3. 3.

    This issue has been discussed by many scholars, e.g., Allen (1967), Atwell (1969), Broome (1991), Macklin (1967a), Macklin (1967b), Oldenquist (1966), Rachels (1997), Rechenauer (2003), Schroth (2009) and Trapp (1988).

  4. 4.

    It seems that the only exception are so called “basic actions” (Danto 1965) which cannot be factorized into smaller component parts.

  5. 5.

    Note that Sinnott-Armstrong has a slightly different conception of consequentialism. This makes it a bit hard to connect his ideas with my own. I hope, however, that what I say nevertheless captures the gist of his argument in a fair way.

  6. 6.

    It may be noted that a further possibility is (iv) that variations in x cause variations in y through some intermediary factor w. This, however, shall not concern us in what follows.

  7. 7.

    I would like to thank Johanna Griesshammer, Johanna Jauernig, Thomas Kaczmarek and Martin Rechenauer for their generous comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Nikil Mukerji

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  1. Nikil Mukerji
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Correspondence to Nikil Mukerji .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Christoph Luetge

  2. Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Johanna Jauernig

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Mukerji, N. (2014). Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising. In: Luetge, C., Jauernig, J. (eds) Business Ethics and Risk Management. Ethical Economy, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7441-4_8

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