Abstract
Venezuela has seen many constitutional reforms since its first Constitution was enacted in 1811. The current Constitution, ratified in 1999, reversed a trend towards decentralization and empowerment of states and municipalities by recentralizing power under an authoritarian government. The Constitution enumerates a number of areas of competence for the central government, many of which are considered to be reserved exclusively to the central authority. While other subjects are designated to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, in practice these powers are not truly exclusive. The only area where the states enjoy true legislative power is that of organizing their own constitutional structures. The states are able to legislate concurrently with the federal government in some areas, but must use federal “basic laws” as a framework. In theory, the states also have residual authority over any area not enumerated as a federal power. However, in practice, federal powers are interpreted so broadly as to leave little room for residual powers. Municipalities are also granted authority under the Constitution, though their power has been diluted by the creation of competing, non-democratic “communal councils” whose leaders are approved by the President. The courts are also dominated by supporters of the President and are generally favorable to the national government. These factors combine to create a system that, though federal in theory, is in practice so unified and centralized that it is debatable whether it is federalist at all.
Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Professor, Central University of Venezuela; former Simón Bolívar Professor, University of Cambridge UK; former Vice President of the International Academy of Comparative Law.
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, London School of Economics; Visiting Professor at the University Panthéon-Assas – Paris II.
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Notes
- 1.
Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Professor, Central University of Venezuela; former Simón Bolívar Professor, University of Cambridge UK; former Vice President of the International Academy of Comparative Law. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, London School of Economics; Visiting Professor at the University Panthéon-Assas – Paris II.
- 2.
Article 13 n° 22 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela of 22 April 1864. The texts of all the Venezuelan Constitutions are published in A.R. Brewer-Carías, 1–2 Las Constituciones de Venezuela (Caracas 2008).
- 3.
Article 13 n° 19 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela of 27 April 1881.
- 4.
See also J. de Galíndez, “Venezuela: New Constitution”, American Journal of Comparative Law 3: 81–82 (1954): “Only in theory does Venezuela continue to be a federal republic”.
- 5.
See M. Kornblith, “Constitutions and Democracy in Venezuela”, Journal of Latin American Studies 23: 61, 63 (1991).
- 6.
For the political background of this decentralization reform and its impact on the political scene in Venezuela, see M. Penfold-Becerra, “Federalism and Institutional Change in Venezuela”, in: E.L. Gibson (ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America 197–225 (Baltimore 2004). See also Point 20.2.2.1, below.
- 7.
See infra note 30.
- 8.
See on the 1999 constitution-making process: A.R. Brewer-Carías, “The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an Instrument for Framing the development of an Authoritarian Political Regime,” in: L.E. Miller (ed.), Framing the State in Times of Transition. Case Studies in Constitution Making, 505–531 (Washington 2010).
- 9.
See A.R. Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy. The Chávez Authoritarian Experiment (Cambridge 2010).
- 10.
See also Article 156 n° 4: “the naturalization and the admission, extradition and expulsion of foreigners”; Article 38.
- 11.
See also Article 156 n° 22: “the regime and organization of the social security system”.
- 12.
See also Article 156 n° 23: “the legislation in matters of … public health [and] food safety…”
- 13.
See also Article 156 n° 31: “the national organization and administration of justice, the Ministerio Público and the Defensoría del Pueblo”.
- 14.
See TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 565 of 15 April 2008, file n° 07-1108, where the Supreme Tribunal interpreted the word “regimen” found in some of the provisions in Article 156 as indicating the power to legislate. See in 114 Revista de Derecho Público, 154–170 (2008).
- 15.
See also Articles 328–332.
- 16.
For the exclusive nature of the central authority’s legislative power over the natural energy resources see in more detail the text accompanying note 37, below.
- 17.
See also Article 304, which provides that all waters are property of the Republic and that the law establishes the necessary provisions in order to guarantee their protection, exploitation, and recovery.
- 18.
Contrast with n° 23 (environment and water in the context of public health, housing and food safety).
- 19.
See also the concurrent power in this area of the municipalities, Article 178 n° 4.
- 20.
For the concurrent nature of this power, see TSJ Sala Constitucional decision n° 826 of 16 May 2008, file n° 08-0479.
- 21.
See also Article 156 n° 23: “the national policies and the legislation in matters of navigation”.
- 22.
See Article 164 n° 8, which attributes “exclusive” power to the states for “the creation, regulation, and organization of public utilities of the states”.
- 23.
Cf. A.R. Brewer-Carías, “La descentralización política en la Constitución de 1999: federalismo y municipalismo (una reforma insuficiente y regresiva)”, 7 Provincia 7, 29–31 (2001).
- 24.
See, e.g., for the exclusivity of the federal jurisdiction for matters related to retirement and pensions on the basis of Article 156 n° 32, TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 518 of 1 June 2000, file n° 00-0841; decision n° 1452 of 3 August 2004, file n° 02-2585.
- 25.
See also Exposición de Motivos de la Constitución (the official justification of the 1999 Constitution): “As regards to the concurrent powers, the Constitution adopts the experience of comparative law on decentralization and it provides that national laws have the nature of basic laws, in which general, basic, and guiding concepts are laid down; and that state laws are laws developing these basic principles, which allows for better conditions for the delimitation of competences”; G.O. n° 5908 Extra of 19 February 2009.
- 26.
Cf. Brewer-Carías, supra note 22 at 29.
- 27.
Ley Orgánica para la Descentralización, Delimitación y Transferencia de Competencias del Poder Público, G.O. n° 4153 of 28 December 1989. See on this law see A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Bases legislativas para la descentralización política de la federación centralizada (1990: El inicio de una reforma)”, in idem (coord.) et al., Leyes para la Descentralización Política de la Federación 7–53 (Caracas 1990).
- 28.
Article 11, sole paragraph, of the Law of 1989 reads: “Until the states assume these powers through specific legislation, enacted by the respective legislative assemblies, the presently existing legislation continues in force”.
- 29.
See, e.g., Dictamen de la Procuraduría de la República, Oficio N° D.A.G.E. 000019 of 20 October 2000, available at http://www.pgr.gob.ve/PDF/Dictamenes/CONSTITUCIONAL1.pdf, which rejects the possibility that the states can establish the legislative basis for the conservation, administration and exploitation of the national highways on the basis of Article 164 n° 10, and suggesting that, until a national law is enacted, the states and the federal government should conclude cooperation agreements. On these matters, the TSJ, Sala Constitucional Decision n° 565 of 15 April 2008, has eliminated the “exclusive” character of the states’ jurisdiction, transforming it into a “concurrent” jurisdiction, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Abril/565-150408-07-1108.htm
- 30.
G.O. n° 37753 of 14 August 2003; G.O. n° 39140 of 17 March 2009.
- 31.
J. Sánchez Meléan, “Pasado, presente y futuro de la descentralización en Venezuela”, 9 Provincia 20, 26 (2002); A.R. Brewer-Carías, “La descentralización política. Un modelo de Estado,” in: F. Otamendi Osorio, T. Straka, & Grupo Jirahara (eds.), Venezuela: República democrática (Barquisimeto 2011), 645–673.
- 32.
Cf. TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision 1182 of 11 October 2000, file n° 00-1410: “It is therefore clear that the states are constitutionally privileged by the principle of autonomy for the organization of their public power; however, it has to be understood that this autonomy is relative and therefore subject to numerous restrictions established by the Constitution and the Law”. See also note 23 above. For the central regulation of the state governors see also Articles 22–32 of the “Decentralization Law” of 1989 and 2003, according to which, inter alia, state governors can be removed for “repeated disobedience of orders or decisions by the President of the Republic” (Article 31); for harsh criticism see A. Hernández Becerra, “Nivel territorial intermedio en Colombia y Venezuela”, 15 Provincia 95, 105 (2006), but it has to be noted that prior to 1989, state governors were directly appointed by the President.
- 33.
Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Legislativos de los Estados, G.O. N° 37282 of 13 September 2001.
- 34.
Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública, G.O. N° 5890 Extra of 31 July 2008; Ley del Estatuto de la Función Pública, G.O. N° 37522 of 6 September 2002.
- 35.
Cf. Brewer-Carías, supra note 22 at 27.
- 36.
For the meaning of “régimen” in the constitutional catalogues of jurisdictions see note 13 above.
- 37.
This constitutional provision thus undermines Article 11 n° 2 of the 1989 Decentralization Law (note 26 above), which provided that “in order to promote the administrative decentralization and according to the provision of Article 137 of the Constitution [of 1961] the following matters are transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the States:… the legislation, administration and exploitation of stones for construction and decoration or of any type other than precious … of the earthy substances, the salt-mines and the pearl producing oyster banks”.
- 38.
The total control of the central authority over gas and petrol resources is complemented by Article 156 n°16(3), which provides that a federal law will establish a system of special economic attributions to the states in whose territory the exploited resources are found, yet without prejudice to the possibility to also establish special attributions in favor of other states, which means that the central authority has broad discretion in its decisions regarding at least gas and petrol.
- 39.
For the exclusivity of the jurisdiction over salt mines, albeit only in a conflict between a state and a municipality see TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 78 of 30 January 2001, file n° 00-1556 (“una competencia originaria de los [Estados] … una competencia natural y exclusive”). For such a state law see Ley de Régimen, Administración y Aprovechamiento de Salinas y sus Productos del Estado Sucre, Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria del Estado Sucre n° 10 of 29 November 1993.
- 40.
Brewer-Carías, supra note 22 at 29; K.S. Rosenn, “Federalism in the Americas in a Comparative Perspective”, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 26: 1, 16 (1994).
- 41.
See also Article 15 of the Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Legislativos de los Estados, G.O. 37282 of 13 September 2001, whose enumeration of the powers of the state parliaments, other than the power to enact and amend a state constitution and (restricted) budgetary laws, essentially mentions only the legislative power to enact “development laws” within the framework of federal “basic laws”.
- 42.
For a case in which a state claimed to be unable to legislate on matters of concurrent powers because the National Assembly had not yet enacted the necessary federal laws see TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 3203 of 25 October 2005, file n° 02-2984. See also A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Centralized Federalism in Venezuela”, 43 Duquesne Law Review 629, 639 (2005).
- 43.
Cf. TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision 843 of 11 May 2004, file n° 03-1236, where the Supreme Tribunal affirms obiter that “the concurrent powers … have to be previously delimitated by a basic national law; … only the national legislator has the power for enacting basic regulatory laws (according to the principles of interdependency, coordination, shared responsibility and subsidiarity) in the areas of concurrent powers”; this is reaffirmed in TSJ of 15 April 2008, supra note 13, on the relation between Articles 156 n° 26 and 164 n° 10 regarding highways.
- 44.
See, e.g., TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 2495 of 19 December 2006, file n° 02-0265, where the State of Carabobo claimed that Article 42 of the Ley General de Puertos (G.O. n° 73589 of 11 December 2002) violated its powers resulting from Article 164 n° 10 of the Constitution (which grants states the “exclusive” powers for the conservation, administration, and exploitation of commercial ports “in coordination with the national government”) because the federal law obliges the States either to establish an autonomous entity for the administration of each port or to grant concession to private entities for that task. The Supreme Tribunal rejected this argument, and interpreted Article 164 n° 10 as conferring merely concurrent powers, with the reasoning that such obligation is “justified” (it follows from the preceding discussion of federalism in general that this justification is made with regards to the principle of subsidiarity, although it is not specifically invoked) “by the general interest, which the Republic has to protect, in the effective and also efficient administration of decentralized public services… The reservation of the administration to a specialized entity safeguards that services are rendered optimally and it is in this line of reasoning that said provision is justified”.
- 45.
See note 46 below and note 28 above, and also Point 20.4.1.1, below.
- 46.
Cf. C. Ayala Corao, “Naturaleza y Alcance de la Descentralización Estadal”, in: A.R. Brewer-Carías et al. (eds.), Leyes para la Descentralización Política de la Federación 94 (Caracas 1990), referring to the Exposición de Motivos of the 1961 Constitution.
- 47.
Cf. TSJ Sala Constitucional 15 April 2008 (note 13 above), affirming, with reference to Constitutional provisions on some public services of national interest, “that the central government [the “Administration”] has an implicit general power or general clause of public order to condition, limit, or interfere with the rights or liberties on the basis of the doctrine of inherent or implicit rights … that allows [the interpreter]… to review the spirit of the provision attributing powers in such manner as to accept the existence of a power when this is the logical consequence of the legal provision and of the nature of the main activity exercised by the organ or entity”.
- 48.
A.R. Brewer-Carías, La Constitución y sus Enmiendas 28 (Caracas 1991); idem, “El Sistema Constitucional Venezolano”, in D. García Belaunde et al. (eds.), Los Sistemas Constitucionales Iberoamericanos 771, 778 (Madrid 1992); Rosenn, supra note 39 at 16; see also J.M. Serna de la Garza, “Constitutional Federalism in Latin America”, California Western International Law Journal 30: 277, 286 (2000): “the peculiar manner in which implicit powers have been understood, has created an additional instrument that can be used by the federal government to expand its powers”.
- 49.
See text accompanying note 41 above.
- 50.
See, e.g., TSF Sala Constitucional, decision n° 1495 of 1 August 2006, file n° 05-2448 in which the Supreme Tribunal, upon request by the national Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman) suspended temporarily the Ley de Defensa y Seguridad Ciudadana of the State of Zulia, G.O. of the State of Zulia n° 659 Extra of 24 May 2004, due to the potential incompatibility with the Código Orgánico de Procedimiento Penal and the constitutional guarantees of freedom by allowing police forces to arrest suspect persons for 48 h; a final decision is not yet published. For the legal analysis of constitutionality by the Defensoría del Pueblo see http://www.defensoria.gob.ve/detalle.asp?sec=160104&id=110&plantilla=1
- 51.
See text accompanying notes 42–44.
- 52.
For the definition of Ordenanzas see Article 54 n° 1 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal, G.O. n° 6015 Extra of 18 December 2010.
- 53.
See, e.g., for tourism TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 826 of 16 May 2008, file n° 08-0479.
- 54.
Article 57 in fine of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal (note 51 above).
- 55.
The possibility to create such Asamblea de Ciudadanos y Ciudadanas is mentioned in Article 70 of the Constitution as one of the “means of participation and protagonism of the people in the exercise of its sovereignty”, “whose decisions have binding character”. The proposed reform of the Constitution, rejected in the Referendum of 2 December 2008, would have added “as long as they do not contradict the Constitution and the laws”, which is probably the interpretation that has to be given to the present Article 70 anyway.
- 56.
Article 6 n° 1 of the Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Comunales, G.O. n° 39335 of 10 April 2009. “Community” is defined in Article 4 n° 1 as “the social conglomerate of families and citizens which live in a specific geographic area, which share a common history and interests, know each other and have relations with each other, use the same public utilities and share similar economic, social, urbanistic, and other necessities and potentials”.
- 57.
It is worth noting that Article 6 n° 5 of the same law provide that Assembly of Citizens “exercises the social control”. See in this regard the Ley Orgánica de Contraloría Social, G.O. n° 6011 Extra of 21 December 2010. Articles 9 and 16 of the Decreto con Rango, Valor y Fuerza de Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y del Cuerpo de Policía Nacional, G.O. n° 5880 Extra del 9 April 2008 require the police only to inform and to consult the “communities”, the Consejos Comunales, or the other “communitarian” organs, without mentioning the municipalities. Furthermore, Articles 47–48 provides “communities” with the possibility to create their own police force “committed to the respect of values, identity and the own culture of each community”, with “the task to guarantee and ensure social peace, cohabitation, the exercise of rights and the fulfillment of the law”. The National Police Law has been declared constitutional by TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 385 of 15 March 2008, file n° 08-0233.
- 58.
See in particular, Ley Orgánica del Poder Popular, G.O. n° 6011 Extra of 21 December 2010; Ley Orgánica de las Comunas, G.O. n° 6011 Extra of 21 December 2010.
- 59.
But see note 54 above in fine.
- 60.
Articles 28 to 32 of the Ley de los Consejos Comunales (note 55 above).
- 61.
On this reform in general see A.R. Brewer-Carías, “El inicio de la desmunicipalización en Venezuela: La organización del Poder Popular para eliminar la descentralización, la democracia representativa y la participación a nivel local”, Revista de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Administrativo 49–67 (Mexico 2007); A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Introducción General al Régimen del Poder Popular y del Estado Comunal (O de cómo en el siglo XXI, en Venezuela se decreta, al margen de la Constitución, un Estado de Comunas y de Consejos Comunales, y se establece una sociedad socialista y un sistema económico comunista, por los cuales nadie ha votado),” in: idem (coord.) et al. (eds.), Leyes Orgánicas sobre el Poder Popular y el Estado Comunal (Los consejos comunales, las comunas, la sociedad socialista y el sistema económico comunal) 9–182 (Caracas 2011).
- 62.
For a list of, and internet links to, most of the law faculties in Venezuela see http://venezuela.justia.com/recursos/universidades/
- 63.
See, e.g., Decreto de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente sobre la Reorganización del Poder Judicial y el Sistema Penitenciario, G.O. n° 36805 of 11 October 1999 (intervening in the Supreme Tribunal and allowing the removal of justices by a Special Commission created by the Constituent Assembly); Human Rights Watch, “Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela”, 16/3b HRW Reports 17–20 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/venezuela0604/venezuela0604.pdf. See also A.R. Brewer-Carías, supra note 8 at 226–244.
- 64.
Other than the following examples, for the bias of the Supreme Tribunal in favor of the federal government see also A.R. Brewer-Carías, “El juez constitucional vs. la supremacía constitucional”, mimeo, available at http://www.allanbrewercarias.com, on the systematic rejection of all constitutional actions against the reform of the Constitution, which was eventually rejected in the referendum of 2 December 2007.
- 65.
G.O. n° 73589 of 11 December 2002.
- 66.
TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 2495 of 19 December 2006, file n° 02-0265, see also note 43 above.
- 67.
See below Point 20.4.2.2.
- 68.
TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 1682 of 18 September 2003, file n° 03-0207 (State of Monagas); and decision n° 1109 of 8 June 2004, file n° 03-0725 (State of Apure).
- 69.
See TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 1140 of 9 June 2005, file n° 03-0969.
- 70.
For the parallel case of the destitution of the head of the metropolitan police of Caracas by the Armed Forces see TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 3343 of 19 December 2002, file n° 02-2939.
- 71.
Transitional Provision 4 n° 9 of the Constitution, according to which this law should have been enacted within 1 year after the entry into force of the new Constitution. The Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y del Cuerpo de Policía Nacional was only enacted in 2008 through a presidential decree, G.O. 5880 Extra of 9 April 2008.
- 72.
Article 3 of the Ley de Armas y Explosivos, G.O. 19900 of 12 June 1939.
- 73.
On this point see also A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Instrumentos de justicia constitucional en Venezuela (acción de inconstitucionalidad, controversia constitucional, protección constitucional frente a particulares)”, in: J. Vega Gómez & E. Corzo Sosa (eds.), Instrumentos de Tutela y Justicia Constitucional 75–99 (Mexico City 2002); and A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Judicial Review in Venezuela”, Duquesne Law Review 45: 439–465 (2007).
- 74.
See, e.g., TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 843 of 11 May 2004, file n° 03-1236, whereby a law by which the State of Guárico intended to decentralize to the municipalities more areas than provided for in Article 165(2) was annulled.
- 75.
See Brewer-Carías, supra note 72 at 84: “Accordingly, any interpretation by the Constitutional Chamber of any law or any other legal provision of the rank of a law or regulation does not have binding effect”.
- 76.
Article 11, Parágrafo Único, of the 1989 and 2003 Decentralization Law (see notes 26 and 29 above).
- 77.
Article 148 of the 1961 Constitution.
- 78.
The 2003 law on the reform of the 1989 Decentralization Law was allegedly never submitted to the States’ Legislative Council, see TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 1801 of 24 August 2004, file n° 04-0331; and decision n° 966 of 9 May 2006, file n° 04-0331 (recourse of nullity eventually rejected due to inactivity of the claimants for more than 1 year). See also the allegations made by the State of Carabobo in its action against the Decreto con Fuerza de Ley General de Puertos (G.O. 37589 of 11 December 2002), which were rejected by the Supreme Tribunal with the argument that, in the meantime, the Decree had been substituted by a law for which the states allegedly have been consulted; TSJ Sala Constitucional, decision n° 2495 of 19 December 2006, file n° 02-0265.
- 79.
See Ley Orgánica del Consejo Federal de Gobierno, G.O. n° 5963 Extra of 22 February 2010. See the comments of Penfold-Becerra, supra note 5 at 220: “If this Federal Council is not properly regulated by the law, it could be used by the central government as a means to divide the governors through the political use of resources accumulated in [the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization]”. See also Sánchez Meléan, supra note 30 at 26.
- 80.
Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales para los Estados y el Distrito Metropolitano de Caracas Derivadas de Minas y Hidrocarburos, G.O. 37086 of 27 November 2000; substituted by Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales Derivadas de Minas y Hidrocarburos, G.O. 5991 Extra of 29 July 2010. See A. Vigilanza García, La Federación descentralizada. Mitos y realidades en el reparto de tributos y otros ingresos entre los entes políticos territoriales de Venezuela (Caracas 2010).
- 81.
See note 78 above.
- 82.
Sánchez Meléan, supra note 30 at 28-2; see also text accompanying note 67 above.
- 83.
Ley del Estatuto de la Función Pública, supra note 33.
- 84.
Ley del Estatuto Sobre el Régimen de Emolumentos, Pensiones y Jubilaciones de los Altos Funcionarios y Altas Funcionarias del Poder Público, G.O. N° 39592 of 12 January 2011; see also note 23 above.
- 85.
See also note 76 above.
- 86.
Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales Derivadas de Minas y Hidrocarburo (note 79 above).
- 87.
See Brewer-Carías, supra note 41.
- 88.
Exposición de Motivos de la Constitución de la República de Venezuela (1961), cited by M. Arcaya, Constitución de la República de Venezuela 35–36 (Caracas 1971). This passage is partially also cited by M. Kornblith, “The Politics of Constitution-Making: Constitutions and Democracy in Venezuela”, Journal of Latin American Studies 23: 61, 86 (1991).
- 89.
Sánchez Meléan, supra note 30 at 27 (citing the President himself as having declared in his weekly television show “Aló Presidente” that Venezuela is a “unitary republic”); J. Biardeau R., “El proyecto de reforma y la destrucción del Estado Federal Descentralizado”, mimeo (20 October 2007), available at http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a42897.html (criticizing the planned reform of the Constitution [failed due to the negative referendum on 2 December 2007] as “not containing any elaboration of the principles of the decentralized federal State in the new geometry of power. Much is being said about popular power [poder popular], but the cruel reality is that it is born as an appendix of the national executive power and without any autonomy”. More optimistic in 2002 was Penfold-Becerra, supra note 5 at 221: “Venezuela’s federal system might help counterbalance presidential power, continue to modify legislators’ behavior, and even undermine the coalition that keeps Chávez in power. It is still too early to tell the impact of federalism on the eventual shape of Venezuelan democracy, but evidence indicates that federalism remains a critical source of political change in the country”.
- 90.
Serna de la Garza, supra note 47 at 283.
- 91.
Asamblea Nacional, Informe de Gestión 2007 – Balance Legislativo (18 December 2007), available at http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ve/uploads/biblio/Balance_Legislativo\%202007\%20.pdf
- 92.
Ley que Autoriza al Presidente de la República para Dictar Decretos con Rango, Valor y Fuerza de Ley en las Materias que se Delegan, G.O. n° 38617 of 1 February 2007. See on the Decree Laws enacted according to this 2008 enabling law, 115 Revista de Derecho Público (2008). Previously, the President had been given fast track powers for one year by the Ley Habilitante of 2000, G.O. n° 37077 of 14 November 2000; on this law see A.R. Brewer-Carías, “Apreciación general sobre los vicios de inconstitucionalidad que afectan los Decretos Leyes Habilitados” in: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (ed.), Ley Habilitante del 13-11-2000 y sus Decretos Leyes 63–103 (Caracas 2002).
- 93.
Ley que Autoriza al Presidente de la República para Dictar Decretos con Rango, Valor y Fuerza de Ley en las Materias que se Delegan, G.O. n° 6009 Extra of 17 December 2010.
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Brewer-Carías, A.R., Kleinheisterkamp, J. (2014). Venezuela: The End of Federalism?. In: Halberstam, D., Reimann, M. (eds) Federalism and Legal Unification. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7398-1_20
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