Abstract
Most countries in the world have some system of compulsory schooling. Such systems constitute a huge intervention in people’s (most obviously the children’s) lives, and therefore require justification. My main purpose in this chapter is to develop an idea of what such a justification would have to look like, to have a chance of being successful. I will argue that it must be concrete and contextual, rather than abstract, and that it must be both pragmatic and principled. I will also argue that, apart from such a theoretical justification, there is another kind of justification in play, a ‘historical justification’—justification seen as a process of ‘proving itself’ (or failing to do so) in the course of time. The theoretical justification must refer to the historical justification, and vice versa. I will end the main body of the chapter, in the section ‘On the Grounds of a Justification of Compulsory Schooling’, with some further suggestions as to the grounds on which a justification of compulsory schooling must be based, with special attention to the general aim of education. In the course of this chapter I develop (in outline) a view of the (general) aim of education and its relations to education’s extrinsic and overarching ends. In the context of the present text this serves the main purpose of showing what a justification of compulsory schooling entails, but it is also a secondary purpose of the chapter in its own right. I conclude by looking at a few possible objections and further questions.
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Notes
- 1.
In the Netherlands, for instance, children are legally required to attend school between the ages of 5 and 16, and until they are 18 if before that age they have not acquired a diploma.
- 2.
With regard to the interference with children’s lives, one may wonder why state intervention would require a strong justification, whereas parental influence over children’s lives tends to go undiscussed or even unnoticed. The latter seems to be the result of the common assumption of a parental prerogative to decide how their children are raised and educated. I share this assumption, in the sense that I believe the state’s claims in this regard to be secondary (in most cases) to those of the parents. An argument for this, which I cannot present here, would include the idea that the parents have the primary duty to take care of their children and act in their best interest, and that therefore they must also have a right to do these things. Furthermore, the parents normally have the greatest (personal) stake in their children’s well-being (both for the children’s sake and their own), due to their special relationship with them—a relationship in the quality of which they also have a great interest. Of course, none of this amounts to saying that children are owned by their parents or are an extension of them, or that parents can decide about them however they please. Nor does it mean that parents do in fact always act in their children’s best interest.
- 3.
One of the best known critiques of compulsory schooling, apart from the work of deschoolers like Ivan Illich (1975) and Paul Goodman (1972) and a critical pedagogue like Paulo Freire (2007), is Krimerman (1978). Other (radical) critiques are contained in Rickenbacker (ed.) (1974). Reagan (1973) emphasizes the need for a justification, and suggests some criteria it would have to meet; so does Callan (1983). Callan (1988) offers a paternalistic justification of compulsory schooling, based on the value of autonomy. A cautious justification of (some form of) compulsory schooling, in some respects similar to what I will suggest, is also given by Haydon (1977). Chamberlin (1989) offers a defence of compulsory schooling, which Williams (1990) attempts to buttress. Kleinig (1981) adopts an intermediate position, concluding that none of the main arguments for compulsory school attendance are really persuasive, but that ‘there are no obvious alternatives within the existing social formation’ (p. 201). Aviram (1986) calls the justification of compulsory education a ‘neglected moral duty’.
- 4.
He applies the same reasoning to Paulo Freire: his teaching took place outside the framework of the Brazilian school system, but nothing prevents Freire’s ideas ‘from giving shape to educational institutions [which] would be recognisable as schools’ (p. 47).
- 5.
- 6.
Haydon (1977, p. 10) remarks that “it would be inappropriate to say that anyone is compelling the child to be socialized” if “no part of the process of a child’s socialization can be separated out from its day-to-day living and growing up in the family and the wider community”. I agree; I would also not say the child is ‘compelled to be socialized’. But the child’s socialization will include elements and moments of compulsion.
- 7.
The Principle of Legitimate Paternalism is the third part of Mill’s Principle of Liberty, summarized as follows by Aviram (1986, p. 53): ‘According to this principle, the infringement of a person’s liberty is a prima facie evil [the first part, AS] unless it can be justified either as necessary for the defence of other persons’ vital interests [second part, Harm Principle]; or as necessary for the defence of his (or her) vital interests [third part, PLP].’ The conditions it sets are (in short) “that there should be good reasons to believe (1) that the human beings on whom paternalistic measures are imposed are heteronomous, and (2) that these measures are necessary for the protection or enhancement of their autonomy’ (1986, p. 53).
- 8.
Although some may wish to speak of aims (plural) of education, even on the most general level, in the section ‘On the Grounds of a Justification of Compulsory Schooling’ I will present a brief statement of a single general aim of education, which is why henceforth I will speak of the general aim, rather than aims, of education. On lower levels of generality there are, of course, multiple aims.
- 9.
Principles of justice can obviously be specified in various ways; I will come to that issue later.
- 10.
I have discussed the relations (and tensions) between the (general) aim of education and its overarching and extrinsic ends much more fully in Schinkel (2013).
- 11.
Cf. Peters (1970, p. 25): ‘[A] connection between “education” and what is valuable does not imply any particular commitment to content. It is a further question what the particular standards are in virtue of which activities are thought to be of value and what grounds there might be for claiming that these are the correct ones. All that is implied is a commitment to what is thought valuable.’
- 12.
See Winch (2002) for an interesting alternative view on the relation between education and such ends as being able to make a living; Winch is prepared to speak of such ends as aims of education, because he does not limit the use of the term ‘aim’ to intrinsic aims.
- 13.
As Hinchcliffe and Terzi (2009a, p. 387) note, the application of the capabilities approach to questions relating to education has only recently begun. This body of literature is growing fast, however; see, for instance, Saito (2003), Walker (2003, 2005), Walker and Unterhalter (eds.) (2010), Unterhalter (2003), Terzi (2010), Otto and Ziegler (eds.) (2010) and Hinchcliffe and Terzi (eds.) (2009b).
- 14.
They must not be confused with skills and capacities, as the term ‘capabilities’ may be used in everyday language. The ‘role of education in promoting capabilities’, as Klasen (2010, p. 105) writes, ‘must (…) be related to increasing the freedoms to choose among functionings one has reason to value’.
- 15.
- 16.
I thank Michael Merry for putting this question to me; at the 2012 PESGB conference in Oxford, he put the question as follows: ‘Doesn’t the context dilute the aim of education?’
- 17.
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) was a famous case in the USA. For a discussion of compulsory schooling for Gypsies see Liégeois (1988, p. 88 ff.).
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Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this text thanks are due to Anca Gheaus, to Doret de Ruyter and other colleagues at the department of Research and Theory in Education (Faculty of Psychology and Education, VU University Amsterdam), and to Michael Merry, Judith Suissa and other members of the audience at the 2012 Oxford PESGB conference.
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Schinkel, A. (2014). On the Justification of Compulsory Schooling. In: Papastephanou, M. (eds) Philosophical Perspectives on Compulsory Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7311-0_7
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