Abstract
Moism (aka, Mohism, Mojia墨家) refers to an influential philosophical, social, and religious school that flourished during the Warring States era (ca. 475–221 BCE). As a major philosophical work embodying the Moist thought and responding to the increasing dominance of the Ru School/Confucianism (Rujia, 儒家), the Mozi (《墨子》) presents a moral vision and political doctrine quite different from that of the latter. Moism, among all philosophical schools of pre-Han China under the name “One Hundred Schools” (Baijia, 百家), was engaged in rational debate, which covered a wide range of topics from politics, ethics, and law, to economics, government, and warfare. Although Moism once emerged and flourished in the intellectual history of China, and Moist communities under their Master were quite influential through the fourth and third centuries BCE, they lost their vitality after the Han. The Mozi and Moist philosophy have been neglected over two millennia in China in the sense that there is neither a surviving commentary tradition, nor a revival of Neo-Moism, as we see in other schools such as Confucianism and Daoism. Then why should I bother studying a philosophical/ethical tradition that died a long time ago?
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Notes
- 1.
Like most pre-Han Chinese texts, the Mozi is not a text of one author but is a compilation assembled in the centuries following the death of Mo Di or Mozi (Master Mo, ca. 480–438 B.C.E.), the philosopher named in its title. It claims to be a record of his teaching, the dialogues of Mozi and disciples and opponents. Based on the texts, two major trends developed in the Moist school, one stressing social ethics and religious beliefs, the other (later Moists) focusing on epistemology, logic, theory of analogical reasoning, and utilitarian ethics.
- 2.
Up until relatively recently, interest in Moist moral philosophy has been increasing. Scholars such as A. C. Graham, Benjamin Schwartz, Ian Johnston, Chad Hansen, and Chris Fraser have all been engaged in Moist studies. As a matter of fact, the Moist teaching had a special appeal to Chinese in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it has seen some signs of revival in the works of some Chinese intellectuals such as Kang Youwei who claims to be a Confucian. At the same time, Christian missionaries such as James Legge and those Chinese modernizers who were influenced by Christian and Western/Enlightenment thought were also attracted to the Moist ideas of inclusive care and social justice. For a detailed discussion on the thought of Kang Youwei, see Chen (2013). For the issue on the “moral vacuum” in China, see Fan (2013).
- 3.
The term jianai is traditionally translated as “universal love.” In this paper I adopt the translation of “inclusive care” that has been used in recent years by scholars like Chris Fraser and Dan Robins. I think that the concept of inclusiveness points to an all-embracing gesture that is connected to Mozi’s ideal-type of a social community, and that the word “care” is a more rationalized one than “love,” for the latter may bear emotionality and partiality that the Moist ethics tries to avoid.
- 4.
Graham continues to say, “No one else finds it tolerable to insist that you should be as concerned for the other man’s family as for your own. The doctrine in any case involved a complication, not clarified until the refinement of the ethical system by later Mohists (Moists)” (Graham 1989, p. 43).
- 5.
The translation is based on Van Norden (2008, p. 85). There are modifications and added Chinese phrases in brackets.
- 6.
When Mozi argues for the necessity of authority in society, he uses the family as an example tin order to explain why without authority the proper relationship of father and son would not be maintained. See Robins (2008, pp. 386–387).
- 7.
For a detailed discussion of the Confucian concept of filial piety, please see Wang (2013).
- 8.
We have a famous saying in the Mengzi (1A.7): “Treat with respect the elders in my family, and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families. Then you may move the world in the palm of your hand.”
- 9.
Scholars like Feng Youlan (Fung Yulan) link the Moist idea of inclusive care to its social context. He points out that Mozi’s philosophy represents “a logical extension” of the professional ethics of the class of knight-errant from which the School arises, suggesting that “exclusive care” is more practical for warriors. Since all humans were self-regarding, according to Feng, the Confucian teachings are more practicable, which is why Confucianism had a longer-lasting impact on Chinese history. See Fung Yulan (1948, p. 53). This kind of reading fails to see the larger ethical scheme that Moism attempts to establish.
- 10.
For a detailed exploration on the self-interest thesis, please see Fraser (2008), where the author explains different kinds of self-interests in Moism and argues that the Moist theory of motivation has been largely misunderstood by being reduced to the single dimension of self-interest.
- 11.
In the chapter Jianai III, Mozi poses the hypothetical question as to whether inclusiveness is too difficult to practice (it is like “holding up the Mount Tai and leaping with it across the Yellow River”). He has offered the following answers to respond to the challenge by his opponents: (1) it is not contrary to the natural feelings of human beings; (2) it was practiced by the four sage-kings in the past; (3) it does not harm filial piety; and (4) if the ruler is delighted in practicing inclusive care, common people would be encouraged and follow his example.
- 12.
Chris Fraser calls the utility bent (i.e., the consequentialist bent) of Moism a “practice consequentialism” that is not grounded in a single principle, but based on a loose notion of human welfare. See Fraser (2009, p. 148).
- 13.
Also see Mozi, the chapter on Tianzhi (The Will of Heaven). Watson (2003, pp. 82–83).
- 14.
Libertarian philosophers such as Friedrich Hayek, for instance, protest that to assign a “good” to a group is to assign it to something that does not exist, and suspect that the use of communal language is an excuse for the public pursuit of private gain. This suspicion regarding appeals to the good of the community is well grounded in light of the abuses of state power in the contemporary world. See, for instance, Feser (2006).
- 15.
Chris Fraser has observed that Mozi sees social disorder as the result of “normative disagreement, not individuals’ untrammeled pursuit of their own interests” as Hobbes does (Fraser 2009, p. 144).
- 16.
Chris Fraser translates shangtong as “conforming upward”, and Ian Johnston translates it as “exalting unity.”
- 17.
In Moism, the word yue means both “contract” and “constraint.”
- 18.
Also see Burton Watson’s translation of the Mozi, the chapter on Tianzhi (The Will of Heaven) (Watson 2003, pp. 82–83).
- 19.
See Ahern (1976). Ahern’s interpretation is challenged in Vorenkamp (1992), where Vorenkamp argues that Mozi is not inconsistent because he subscribes to a form of rule-utilitarianism. According to this kind of reading, what Mozi means is that, because heaven always wills the benefit of the world, following the will of heaven will lead to the benefit of the world.
- 20.
It should be stressed that the Moist philosophy, with its emphasis on the importance of standards and principles, provides a way within the Chinese tradition for correcting the problems of partiality and favoritism in Confucianism such as the guanxi network and the renqing ethics that are characterized by moral obligations and emotional attachments in interpersonal relations.
- 21.
For the discussion of the state-family metaphor, see Lo (2013).
- 22.
The attack on the Confucian model of family is one of dominant themes in the literary works of the new culture moment. Also see Lo (2013).
- 23.
Some scholars would see the idea that “a good family is paradigm for the state” in the Confucian tradition as a “vice” rather than a “virtue” because they regard family as the root of selfishness. For more detailed discussion on this argument, see Chen (2013).
- 24.
In his paper, Steven Erickson has rightly pointed out, “Families have the capacity to be quite selfish. As inwardly turned realities, they can be a detriment to their surrounding human environment. At the same time, they have the potential for generative activities that are communally supportive as well as receptive to the kind of support communities and likeminded families can provide. Under appropriate conditions, families can be increasingly motivated to aspire to more inclusive and pervasive levels of outreach, consideration, and concern” (Erickson 2013, p. 45–64).
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Zhang, E. (2014). The Common Good in Moism: A Reconstruction of Mozi’s Ethics of “Inclusive Care” and “Reciprocal Well-Being”. In: Solomon, D., Lo, P. (eds) The Common Good: Chinese and American Perspectives. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7272-4_6
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