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Law and Economics in Europe pp 69–91Cite as

Homo Economicus Versus Homo Iuridicus

Two Views on the Coase Theorem and the Integrity of Discourse Within the Law and Economics Scholarship

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Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 1))

Abstract

This essay concentrates on the critical analysis and evaluation of some characteristics of the one of the most influential discourses in modern jurisprudence , namely law and economics . In this essay I will claim that the interpretation of the Coase theorem adopted by the law and economics scholars in American jurisprudence , specifically the implementation of the price theory and welfare economics within the lines of the M. Friedman ’s predictive social theory (Homo Economicus model) leads to the conditions of the legal discourse that are essentially different from traditional ones, especially those based on philosophical assumptions. It seems that the interpretation adopted by some European scholars is more analytical and reflects an explanatory rather than predictive approach to modelling and the application of economics to law (Homo Iuridicus model). Thus this essay intends to explore the distinction between the two approaches and to link it with the analytical description of direct and indirect modelling , as it has been recently been proposed by A. Halpin. The aim of the essay is thus to explain the distinctive features on the law and economics discourse in the US and in Europe as potentially superseding the traditional, narrative legal discourse and to address the question about the relationship between those two types of discourses.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    About the definition of law, composed out of basic conceptual elements, cf. Bentham, pp. 18–28; Austin J., pp. 9–15; Hart , pp. 13–17.

  2. 2.

    Hart , p. 14, quoting Austin J.L., ‘A Plea’, p. 8.

  3. 3.

    Hart , pp. 79–123.

  4. 4.

    Austin J.L., Do Things with Words, pp. 14–40.

  5. 5.

    Wittgenstein, § 38–133.

  6. 6.

    Hart , pp. 100–110.

  7. 7.

    MacCormick, pp. 152–229

  8. 8.

    Finnis, pp. 260–343.

  9. 9.

    Raz, pp. 3–36.

  10. 10.

    Gary S. Becker , ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’; Posner , ‘The Economic Approach’, pp. 757 et seqq.

  11. 11.

    For American perspective see Kaplow and Shavell , pp. 15–81. European perspective has been expressed by Mathis, pp. 185–203.

  12. 12.

    Posner , Frontiers, pp. 2–10.

  13. 13.

    Hart , p. 7.

  14. 14.

    Coleman, pp. 33 et seqq.

  15. 15.

    Posner , Frontiers, pp. 31–34; Mathis, pp. 105–111.

  16. 16.

    On the pivotal function of Coase Theorem for law and economics see: Posner , Frontiers, p. 41; Coleman, p. 69; Mathis, pp. 53–69.

  17. 17.

    Coase, ‘Social Cost’, pp. 95 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    Coase, ‘Social Cost’, p. 104.

  19. 19.

    Cooter, pp. 20–28.

  20. 20.

    Posner , Frontiers, p. 6.

  21. 21.

    Mäki , pp. 5–31.

  22. 22.

    Mäki , pp. 5–31.

  23. 23.

    Hsiung and Gunning, pp. 227 et seqq.

  24. 24.

    Hsiung and Gunning, p. 228.

  25. 25.

    Bertrand, pp. 983 et seqq.

  26. 26.

    Halpin, pp. 91–109.

  27. 27.

    Halpin, p. 93.

  28. 28.

    Halpin, p. 95.

  29. 29.

    Halpin, p. 97.

  30. 30.

    Halpin, p. 98.

  31. 31.

    Halpin, p. 99.

  32. 32.

    Halpin, p. 100.

  33. 33.

    Cheung, p. 37. Coase admitted that he had been wrong about the foundational function of law: Coase, ‘The Firm’, p. 15.

  34. 34.

    Herbert L. A. Hart , The Concept of Law.

  35. 35.

    Hart , pp. 128–129.

  36. 36.

    Hart , p. 128.

  37. 37.

    Hart , p. 128.

  38. 38.

    Campbell and Klaes, pp. 567 et seqq.; Nicita and Pardolesi, pp. 3 et seqq.; Golecki, ‘The Coase Theorem’, pp. 215–218; Golecki, ‘Bargaining’, pp. 162–164; Mathis, pp. 53–69.

  39. 39.

    Samuelson, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 1411, Vol. 3, pp. 35–36; Regan, pp. 427 et seqq.; Cooter, pp. 115–123.

  40. 40.

    Coase, ‘Notes’, p. 163.

  41. 41.

    Hoffman and Spitzer, p. 73.

  42. 42.

    Golecki, ‘Bargaining’, pp. 164–167.

  43. 43.

    Rubinstein, pp. 97 et seqq.

  44. 44.

    Coase, ‘Notes’, p. 161.

  45. 45.

    Coase, ‘The Firm’, p. 15.

  46. 46.

    Coase, ‘The Firm’, pp. 8–9.

  47. 47.

    Nicita and Pardolesi, pp. 34–38.

  48. 48.

    Coase, ‘Social Cost’, p. 119.

  49. 49.

    This point has also been raised by Halpin, pp. 101–104.

  50. 50.

    It has been admitted by Coase, ‘Notes’, p. 178.

  51. 51.

    Coase, ‘The Firm’, pp. 9–10.

  52. 52.

    Becker , ‘Crime’, p. 169; Posner , ‘The Decline’, pp. 761 et seqq.; id., The Economics, pp. 205 et seqq.

  53. 53.

    Posner , Frontiers, p. 41

  54. 54.

    The detailed analysis of the notions of rationality and utility within the theory of Neumann-Morgenstern may be found in Załuski, pp. 42–71.

  55. 55.

    Becker , ‘The Economic’, p. 14.

  56. 56.

    Posner , Economic Analysis, pp. 15 et seqq.

  57. 57.

    Posner , The Problems, pp. 374–387.

  58. 58.

    This assumption was later confirmed by the broadly accepted within the contemporary economics theory of revealed preferences, presented by Samuelson, ‘A Note’, pp. 61 et seqq. and id., ‘Consumption’, pp. 243 et seqq. Nevertheless, the theory has met with the criticism of some scholars. See Sen, pp. 307 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    Posner , Economic Analysis, p. 19.

  60. 60.

    Posner , Economic Analysis, p. 19, where he states that: “[…] People are not omniscient, but incompletely informed decisions are rational when the cost of acquiring more information exceed the likely benefits in being able to make a better decision. A fully informed decision in such circumstances – the sort of thing a person makes who cannot prioritize his tasks – would be irrational.”

  61. 61.

    Friedman , p. 14.

  62. 62.

    In general terms, justification of sciences with the criterion of efficiency , has been stressed in the works of Lyotard.

  63. 63.

    Posner , The Problems, pp. 25–85.

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Acknowledgement

The article has been prepared within a framework of the FOCUS programme sponsored by the Foundation for Polish Science.

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  1. Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Lódź, ul. Kopcinskiego 8/12, 90-232, Lódź, Poland

    Mariusz J. Golecki

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Correspondence to Mariusz J. Golecki .

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

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Golecki, M.J. (2014). Homo Economicus Versus Homo Iuridicus. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_4

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