Abstract
Major theoretical approaches to social norms from sociology and psychology are discussed. From sociology, the focus is on the micro-macro link between individuals and social structure and on game theory for the study of social interaction. From psychology, two topics are considered, developmental psychology and the internalization of norms, and social psychology and norms as the outcomes of social influence. Three formal models of social influence are introduced: the theory of reasoned action, social impact theory and social network analysis.
Using the word weird implies that there is a norm.
Robyn Hitchcock
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Notes
- 1.
A Nash equilibrium is a solution to a game, such that no player can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy.
- 2.
In the example in Fig. 2.1, the numbers represent years in jail so that lower numbers represent higher payoffs.
- 3.
The coordination and cooperation games above can also be expressed sequentially (extensive form), but as there is no knowledge of the other player’s move, a sequential representation makes no difference to the game.
- 4.
The trust game is a sequential game in which a proposer’s trusting first move can be exploited by the move of a second player.
- 5.
Both questions are taken from the Theory of Planned Behaviour questionnaire at http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.html
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Elsenbroich, C., Gilbert, N. (2014). Theorising Norms. In: Modelling Norms. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_2
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