Abstract
This chapter explores the importance of changing the individualist assumptions that underlie most agent-based models (and all the models discussed in the book). Introducing the concept of we-intentionality, it argues that only once we take the idea of we-intentionality seriously can we hope to model the complexity of social phenomena, including social norms.
Everything is moral, only morality is no longer moral.
Robert Musil
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Elsenbroich, C., Gilbert, N. (2014). We-Intentionality. In: Modelling Norms. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_14
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