Abstract
In this chapter we re-evaluate Segerberg’s “full DDL” (Dynamic Doxastic Logic) from the perspective of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), in its belief-revision-friendly incarnation. We argue that a correct version of full DDL must give up the Success Postulate for dynamic revision. Next, we present (an appropriately generalized and simplified version of) full DDL, showing that it is a generalization of the so-called Topo-logic of Moss and Parikh. We construct AGM-friendly versions of full DDL, corresponding to various revising/contracting operations considered in the Belief Revision literature. We show that DDL can internalize inside one model the “external” doxastic dynamics of DEL, as well as the evidential dynamics investigated by van Benthem and Pacuit. In our Conclusions section, we compare three styles of modeling doxastic dynamics: DDL, DEL and PDL/ETL (the Propositional Dynamic Logic approach, with its Epistemic Temporal Logic variant).
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Notes
- 1.
Even if one doesn’t accept Positive Introspection as a general axiom, one certainly shouldn’t exclude situations in which the agent is introspective, at least with respect to some particular fact \(p\).
- 2.
While soundness of the given axiomatic system is not explicitly claimed in [24], its completeness is claimed. But from a conceptual point of view, a completeness result (with respect to a class of frames) is of course of no use if the axioms are not sound (with respect to that same class of frames).
- 3.
Although the family \({\fancyscript{T}}\) of all opens is not in general required to be a topology in the mathematical sense, Moss and Parikh do consider and axiomatize various possible closure conditions on \({\fancyscript{T}}\), including the ones defining a topology.
- 4.
Unfortunately, this terminology diverges from the one in Belief Revision literature, where “update” refers to a completely different type of operation, namely to the Katsuno-Mendelson revision.
- 5.
But extensions of \(DEL\) which can define strongest postconditions have been proposed by G. Aucher and H. van Ditmarsch.
- 6.
Segerberg calls \(LR\) hypertheories (from Lindstrom and Rabinowicz) the hypertheories that satisfy these two conditions.
- 7.
Though the additional closure assumptions made by Segerberg in [21] do ensure the existence of contractions.
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Acknowledgments
Sonja Smets’ contribution to this paper was funded by the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) / ERC Grant agreement nr 283963.
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Appendix: Pictures of the Main Operations on Onions
Appendix: Pictures of the Main Operations on Onions
The pictures drawn here are following Hans Rott’s presentation [18]. The spheres of the initial onion are drawn as usual, as nested circles. The numbers represent the spheres of the new onion, after the revision/expansion/contraction: e.g. all regions labeled with one form the first sphere of the new onion, the regions labeled with two form the second sphere etc. Finally, the regions labeled with \(\omega \) contain the states that are outside the union of all the spheres of the onion (the “impossible states”).
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Baltag, A., Fiutek, V., Smets, S. (2014). DDL as an “Internalization” of Dynamic Belief Revision. In: Trypuz, R. (eds) Krister Segerberg on Logic of Actions. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7046-1_12
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