Abstract
I will focus on the phenomenon of heterotropic intentionality, on its role in the creation of social reality and on its relation to social ontology. I will argue five theses on heterotropic intentionality: (i) the heterotropism thesis identifies a great divide within the vast domain of intentional phenomena: solitary ones (which need just one individual in order to exist) vs. heterotropic ones (which need at least two individuals in order to exist); (ii) the three-types-of-heterotropic-intentionality thesis maintains that there are at least three types of heterotropic intentionality: collective, intersubjective and social intentionality; (iii) the three-modes-of-intersubjective-and-collective-intentionality thesis claims that, like solitary or individual intentionality, collective and social intentionality also involve different modes of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive; (iv) the sub-personal-and-personal-level thesis maintains that collective and intersubjective intentionality are both sub-personal and personal intentionality, while social intentionality is always a personal intentionality; (v) the ontological-efficacy thesis claims that all three types of heterotropic intentionality create social entities, and that social entities are ontologically dependent on heterotropic intentionality, and not on solitary or individual intentionality. Moreover, I will integrate my theses by putting forward a taxonomy which points out the family resemblances and the strong diversities of these types of heterotropic intentionality.
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- 1.
I would like to be precise that the adjective “heterotropic” and the noun “heterotropism” are neologisms born in the philosophy of law and social ontology group of the Universities of Pavia and Milan (members of the group are: Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Giampaolo Azzoni, Paolo Di Lucia, Giuseppe Lorini, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Stefano Colloca, Francesca De Vecchi and others). “Heterotropic” and “heterotropism” are “variations on the theme” of “nomotropic” and “nomotropism”, which are neologisms by A.G. Conte and P. Di Lucia, and which are, in their turn, “variations on the theme” of “heliotropic” and “heliotropism”. “Heliotropic” and “heli-otropism” are constituted by the ancient Greek words “hēlios” [sun] and “trépō” [turn towards] (think of heliotropic plants such as sunflowers). “Nomotropic” and “nomotropism” are composed by the ancient Greek words “nomos” [rule] and “trépō” [turn towards]. “Nomotropism” means an acting which is in some way turned towards rules and implies ontological dependence on rules (nomotropism is not conformity to rules; the cardsharper is an example of nomotropic acting), see Conte (2000) and Di Lucia (2002). Similarly, “heterotropism” means turning towards other subjects and implies ontological dependence on other subjects (see also De Vecchi and Passerini 2012).
- 2.
- 3.
See, among others, Searle (1995, 2010), Thomasson (2003), and Ferraris (2009). More precisely, Searle maintains that social and institutional facts depend on collective intentionality, but according to Searle collective intentionality can also be the intentionality of a very solitary brain in a vat. About Searle’s individualism, see infra, footnotes 6, 8 and 27.
- 4.
See: Husserl (1905–1935: XIII, 1912–1928), Reinach (1911a, 1913), Stein (1917, 1922, 1925), Scheler (1923), Hildebrand (1930), and Walther (1923); about the early phenomenological accounts, see Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), and De Vecchi (2010, 2012, 2013). My claims also refer to some of the recent accounts of collective intentionality and social cognition. See: Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Bratman (1992), Tuomela and Miller (1988), Gilbert (1989, 2002), Ferraris (2009), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), Gallese (2005), and Goldman (2005).
- 5.
This taxonomy is not to be considered exhaustive. It rather attempts to give a sample of the varieties of heterotropic intentionality within the framework of its three main types.
- 6.
As it is well known, Searle maintains an internalist collective intentionality account (Searle 1990, 1995, 2002, 2010), while other philosophers argue for an externalist collective intentionality account (Meijers 2003; Pacherie 2007; Schmid 2003, among others). For a very clear presentation of the salient issues of the internalism versus externalism collective intentionality debate and also a defence of Searle’s internalism see Gallotti (2010, ch. 3).
- 7.
Social acts were discovered and defined by Adolf Reinach, a phenomenologist and philosopher of law who was a pupil of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century (Reinach 1911a, 1913). Before Reinach, Thomas Reid had already spoken of “social operations” (Reid 1788). Reinach’s social acts anticipate by some 50 years the discovery of Austin’s speech acts (Austin 1962). About the history and theories of social and speech acts, see Smith (1990), Mulligan (1987), Schuhmann and Smith (1990), Searle (1969, 1995, 2010), and De Vecchi (2010).
- 8.
- 9.
Although heteroscopic acts, states and actions are also a heterotropic intentionality type, I will not pore on them in my chapter because of constraints on the chapter’s length. I will focus just on collective, intersubjective and social intentionality which are the main types of heterotropic intentionality. About heteroscopic states, acts and actions, see De Vecchi and Passerini (2012).
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- 12.
As Dan Zahavi claimed, there are, both in analytical philosophy of mind and in phenomenology, quite diverse accounts of intersubjectivity which transcend the face-to-face encounter between individuals and which posit the world as a common field of experiences among individuals (Zahavi 2001). I am by no means denying this. I am convinced that the encounter between individuals is the encounter between individuals that are subjects in a common world, i.e. in a common field of experiences and bodily interlacements of selfhood and otherness. But I think that this perspective is fully compatible with the attempt to outline a distinction among intersubjective, collective and social intentionality by the criteria of the directionality of intentionality: in the case of intersubjective intentionality, the direction of intentionality is always an I-you direction, even if between I and you there is, of course, the world.
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- 15.
The distinction between practical collective intentionality and cognitive collective intentionality is now more or less accepted (Gilbert 1989, 2002; Bratman 1999; Searle 2010; Zaibert 2003; Tollefsen 2005; Schmid 2009). The individuation of affective collective intentionality as a third kind of intentionality, internal to the type of collective intentionality, on the other hand, is much more recent (see Schmid 2009), and not widely adopted. Michael Tomasello seems still to give a priority to cognitive states: he talks about “cognitive representations” for both collective intentions and collective beliefs, without paying particular attention to affective states (Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello 2009).
- 16.
Among these different kinds of collective intentionality, the more problematic phenomenon to grasp and to define is affective collective intentionality: what exactly does it mean that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively? In which specific sense are we both amused and enthusiastic for The Apartment? Or, in which sense are we both deeply sad and moved by a tragic existential event? In this regard, I will mention Scheler’s famous case of feeling-together (Mit-einanderfühlen): a father and mother feel the same pain standing by the dead body of their beloved child (Scheler 1923). In this case, we properly have an example of “emotional sharing”, indeed. About this issue, see Schmid (2009: § 15 “Phenomenological Fusion”), Krebs (2010), Zahavi (2008), and De Vecchi (2011), where I outlined an account of collective affective (but also cognitive and practical) intentionality in terms of shared intentionality.
- 17.
The distinction between content and quality of intentional experiences is a classic phenomenological distinction: we find it already in the early Husserl (1901). It is also a classic analytical distinction: Searle, for example, distinguishes between “intentional content” and “intentional mode” (Searle 1983).
- 18.
I think that particularly in the case of intersubjective affective intentionality it makes sense to adopt the stronger criterion: it really could be difficult to see that you are feeling joy or pain without feeling it, i.e. without having the same intentional mode you have. This is also the position of phenomenologists like Scheler and Stein: according to them, empathy (called Nachfühlung by Scheler and, more traditionally, Einfühlung by Stein), the act by which I see the feeling of the other, is characterised by an affective nuance of knowing. Scheler speaks properly of “verstehend fühlen” (see Scheler 1923 and Stein 1917).
- 19.
There are different accounts which try to describe or explain the phenomenon of intersubjective intentionality or social cognition. The crucial problem is: how do I understand the experiences of others? Do I understand them by inferences (the inference which I can make from the expressions or bodily appearance of the other and from my own experience)? Do I understand them by simulating them? Do I understand them by feeling them, if they are feeling, by intending them, if they are intentions, etc.? Can I understand the experiences of the others without engaging myself in such experiences? Neurosciences maintain that mirror neurons are the heroes of social cognition. But the neurobiological data are interpreted in many ways according to the different accounts (Simulation theory, Theory of Mind, called also Theory-theory, etc.). About this debate, see: Gallese (2005), Goldman (2005), Rizzolati and Sinigaglia (2006), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008). See also Lipps (1913): Lipps represents the proto theorist of the present “Simulation Theory”.
- 20.
They are also intrinsically different because collective intentionality is essentially shared intentionality, while intersubjective intentionality is not. About this argument, see De Vecchi (2011).
- 21.
- 22.
Ferraris quotes this historical case and its representation in the movie Der Untergang (2004) as a counter-example against collective intentionality (Ferraris 2009). Instead, I think that this case is not a case of collective intentionality, but a case of emotional contagion. Thus it is not a valid example against the collective intentionality claim.
- 23.
Another way to formulate this thesis is that social entities presuppose always a society in order to exist, i.e. at least two individuals which constitute a society in miniature. This is the thesis of Czesław Znamierowski (1921).
- 24.
On the normative significance of “walking together”, see the famous account of Margaret Gilbert (2002).
- 25.
- 26.
On the contrary, some philosophers, e.g. Searle, hold that collective intentions could also be intentions of an extremely solitary brain in a vat. Most philosophers and cognitive scientists—with rare exceptions—pay very little attention to the inter-personal relation, and do not claim that it is a necessary condition of collective experience. See Searle (1990). For arguments against Searlian individualism in collective intentionality and in support of an account of collective intentionality based on relational intentionality, see Meijers (1994, p. 7), Bratman (1999), and Schmid (2009, p. 37).
- 27.
See Husserl (1905–1935, XIII, 98, 102–104), “Die für Sozialität konstitutiven Akte, die ‘kommunikativen’” and “Soziale Ontologie und deskriptive Soziologie”, and Husserl (1912–1928: § 51), “Die Personen in der Kollektivität der Personen”. See also Hildebrand (1930), Walther (1923), Scheler (1923), and Stein (1922).
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De Vecchi, F. (2014). Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality. A Taxonomy in Social Ontology. In: Konzelmann Ziv, A., Schmid, H. (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_8
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